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A b strac t
The most important problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics 
are the problem of measurement and the problem of the ‘acausal’ EPR 
correlations. It is commonly thought that these problems call for a new 
interpretation of the quantum theory. I argue that it is possible to construe 
both problems rather differently, as resulting from a mistaken understanding 
of scientific theory-application. It then becomes possible to tackle both 
problems independently of questions of interpretation, by attending carefully 
to what constitutes a successful application of a scientific theory, and of the 
quantum theory in particular.
In the first part of the Thesis, I argue against a standard conception 
of scientific theory-application. This standard conception, which is often 
presupposed in the philosophical discussions of quantum mechanics, takes 
the applications of a scientific theory to constitute its domain of empirical 
adequacy. I argue that, on the contrary, a scientific theory can be applied to 
phenomena that it does not subsume. I present a case study in the history 
of superconductivity to illustrate and to motivate this claim.
In the second part, I argue that the problem of measurement can be 
construed as the impossibility of applying the quantum theory to measure­
ment interactions. I then argue that Arthur Fine’s proposed solution to 
the measurement problem implicitly abandons the standard conception of 
application. Finally I look at quantum correlation phenomena. Bas Van 
Fraassen has claimed that the EPR correlations fit no causal model. The 
correctness of this claim depends on what probabilistic constraints a causal 
model is taken to have to satisfy. I argue, following Nancy Cartwright, that 
Van Fraassen’s constraints on common-cause models are too strong; and I 
describe a direct-cause model that, I urge, constitutes a successful applica­
tion of the quantum theory to the EPR correlations.
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0.1 Introduction
It is often assumed that the domain of empirical adequacy of a scientific 
theory is constituted by all of the theory’s applications. This assumption 
has its simplicity in its favour, but it also occassionally yields some seem­
ingly counterintuitive results. Quantum theory, for instance, would be in a 
dramatically much better shape than the general theory of relativity: the ap­
plications of quantum theory are many, diverse and widely accessible; those 
of general relativity are few, and highly remote. Thus, quantum theory 
should be much better confirmed than general relativity -and yet, scientists 
seem generally to think that both theories are just about as equally likely 
-or as equally unlikely- to be true.
In part I of the Thesis, I argue for a separation between application 
and confirmation: a scientific theory does not gain confirmation from all 
of its applications. In many instances of successful theory-application, a 
mediating model is confirmed instead. In these cases a scientific theory will 
play a largely instrumental role in its own application. The theory, although 
playing an essential part in the process of generating an accurate model of 
the phenomena, will not itself be under test in that process. This seems 
to point towards a distinction between epistemic and pragmatic reasons 
to uphold a theory. I outline a contrast between degree of ‘confirmation’ 
and degree of ‘confidence’ that, I suggest, may be capable of tracking this 
distinction. Confirmation, on this view, accrues only via those applications 
where the theory plays a genuinely propositional role.
But the common assumption is not totally off the mark. For indeed, 
success in applying a theory must count for something; it must somehow 
raise our confidence in the theory. I argue that while a theory’s degree of 
confirmation is an indication of its truth, or of its empirical adequacy, a 
theory’s degree of confidence measures its reliability as an instrument in 
application.
From this point of view, quantum theory looks very much like any other 
physical theory. It can be applied with the intention of testing it, as is 
currently being done by Leggett and his collaborators, who are investigat­
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ing its validity in the macroscopic domain; or it can be simply applied, but 
not tested -as is the case in so many of its technological applications. In 
the second part of the Thesis, I argue that some of the foundational prob­
lems surrounding quantum mechanics appear in a very different light when 
construed as problems of application rather than, as often understood, as 
problems of empirical adequacy, and confirmation.
A word is due on my usage of the terms ‘realism’ and ‘instrumentalism’. 
In the first part of the Thesis, I argue against a particular form of scientific 
realist epistemology, embodied in what I call the ‘idealization account’ of ap­
plication. The idealization account involves a very strong form of scientific 
realism about physical theory: just by investigating the theory it ought to be 
possible to derive all of its possible descriptions of the physical objects and 
problem-situations in its domain. In some of his writings Eraan McMullin 
defends this form of realism; but it is clear to me that scientific realists are 
not generally required to adopt such a strong view. There are many other 
forms of scientific realism that I do not discuss in this Thesis, and against 
which the arguments in part I have no force. Ian Hacking’s entity real­
ism, Nancy Cartwright’s causal realism and Jim Brown’s phenomenological 
realism are but a few examples.
In the second part of the Thesis, I also employ the terms ‘realism’ and 
‘instrumentalism’ -but in a different fashion, as methodological, rather than 
epistemic, attitudes. My view is that, in bringing out the instrumental relia­
bility of a scientific theory, either an instrumentalist or a realist methodology 
may prove fruitful. In chapter 3 I exhibit a case where, I think, an instru­
mentalist approach helps; while in chapter 4 I show how a more realistic 
attitude can also prove useful. Thus, about methodological issues I take an 
undogmatic attitude: any number of strategies may help advance the aim of 
instrumental reliability. Both instrumentalism and realism can play a part 
in raising confidence in our best scientific theories.
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Scientific Application and 
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Chapter 1
M ediating M odels, 
Superconductivity and 
Realism
1.1 M odels as M ediators
There are many kinds of models in science. In the second chapter I shall 
review and discuss some of them. In this chapter I focus on a specific 
kind: mediating models. First, in this section, I introduce the notion of a 
mediating model, and I briefly outline some of its main features. In the 
remaining sections I make the notion more precise by considering the key 
role that mediating models play in the application of scientific theories, and 
the implications of mediating models for the epistemology of science.
Mediating models have been recently discussed by a number of authors. 
Adam Morton1 has referred to them as the providers of physical insight; 
Margaret Morrison2 has studied and discussed their properties carefully;
lcMathematical Models: Questions of Trustworthiness’ [105]; also in conversation, Bris­
tol May 1997.
2‘Mediating Models: Between Physics and the Physical World’ [104].
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among historians of science, Norton Wise3 has unearthed some of the me­
diating models and instruments that operated in Enlightment France; and 
a forthcoming book4 collects recent work by philosophers of physics and 
economics that deals with methodological and epistemological issues arising 
from this type of models.
1.1.1 Features o f M ed iatin g  M od els
Mediating models always stand between theory and the physical world. 
Their main function is to enable us to apply scientific theory to natural phe­
nomena. A mediating model often involves a novel conception of a particu­
lar physical phenomenon that facilitates the application of some established 
physical theory to such phenomena. Morrison has identified three main fea­
tures. First, mediating models are not derivable from theory. In a very 
specific sense the construction of these models is not theory-driven; I will 
emphasise this feature later on in this chapter. Second, these models are not 
necessitated by the empirical data either (although they can be suggested 
by the phenomena). In contrast to a data-model which is determined by the 
data together with established statistical techniques, a mediating model Hs 
more than simply a phenomenological classification constructed as a conve­
nient way of representing [dataf (Morrison [104, page 11]). In other words, 
mediating models typically involve substantial theoretical and conceptual 
assumptions. Finally mediating models have a very significant property: 
they can replace physical systems as the central objects of scientific inquiry. 
Morrison [104, page 9] writes:
Not only do models function in their own right by providing 
solutions to and explanations of particular problems and pro­
cesses, but in some cases they even supplant the physical system 
they were designed to represent and become the primary object
3‘Mediations: Enlightenment Balancing Acts, or the Technologies of Rationalism’ [141].
4 Models in Physics and Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [102].
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of inquiry. In other words, investigation proceeds on the ba­
sis of the model and its structural constraints rather than the 
model being developed piecemeal in response to empirical data 
or phenomena.
This is an essential feature of mediating models; it distinguishes this type 
of models from other closely related types, such as for instance Heinz Post’s 
floating models. As reported by Michael Redhead5, floating models will also 
satisfy the first two features ascribed to mediating models. Redhead [114, 
page 158] describes a floating model as:
... a model which is disconnected from a fundamental theory 
T  by a computation gap in the sense that we cannot justify 
mathematically the validity of the approximations being made 
but which also fails to match experiment with its own (model) 
predictions. So it is disconnected from the fundamental theory 
and the empirical facts. In Post’s graphic terminology the model 
‘floats’ at both ends. It has, in this sense, no theoretical or 
empirical support.
Post’s parody of a floating model was an example he called the Farm 
Gate Contraction. Redhead [114, page 158] reports this example as follows:
A farmer investigates the relation between the length of the 
diagonal strut and the length of the rails and stiles of a farm gate. 
Although he is familiar with Euclid the derivation of Pythago­
ras’s theorem is utterly beyond his deductive powers. So he 
invents a model theory, a linear one, in which the lengths are 
related by I = x +  y instead of I = y/x2 + y2. Now [the model] 
has many properties analogous to [the theory] -for x = 0 or 
y = 0 it gives correct values for I and / increases monotonically 
with x or y in the model as in the correct theory. But detailed
5Redhead, ‘Models in Physics’ [114].
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measurement shows that [the model] is false. So the farmer now 
introduces a new effect, the Farm Gate Contraction, to explain 
the mismatch between the predictions of the model and the ex­
perimental results.
The Farm Gate Contraction is a correction on a floating model. The 
model, even when corrected in this way, is certainly not required by the 
data, as is shown by the fact that there are alternative models that fit 
the data just as well (the ‘correct’ theory is one of them); and it is not 
supported by any fundamental theory as it is only an inspired (although 
ultimately mistaken) initial guess. Floating models are not derivable from 
either theory or empirical data. In that sense a mediating model is a kind 
of floating model.
However a mediating model has a further essential feature, one that is 
not necessary for a floating model. While a floating model may convey no 
new knowledge at all, a mediating model mediates between high level theory 
and the world by conveying some particular or local knowledge specific to 
the effect or phenomenon that is being modelled. This is why the model 
itself becomes the active focus of scientific research. While a floating model 
is typically only a computational tool, a mediating model is a carrier of 
specific, or ‘local’ knowledge. Morrison [104, page 12] writes:
It is exactly in these kinds of cases, where the model takes 
on a life of its own, that its true role as a mediator becomes 
apparent. Because investigation centres on the model rather 
than nature itself its representative role is enhanced to the point 
where the model serves as a source of mediated knowledge rather 
than as simply a mediator between high level theory and the 
world.
Hence this third feature, the capacity a model may have to replace the 
phenomenon itself as the focus of scientific research, is an essential feature of 
mediating models. It distinguishes mediating models from the fax larger class 
of floating models. In this chapter I develop a further feature of mediating
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models, which is essential for a full understanding of the role that these 
models play in the application of scientific theories. Mediating models will 
often fix the criteria that we use to refine our theoretical descriptions of a 
phenomenon. These criteria are required to apply theory successfully to the 
world. Before discussing this fourth feature of mediating models it may be 
worth emphasising the differences with some of the the types of model I 
shall be discussing in the second chapter.
1.1 .2  M ediating  M odels in th e  P h ilosop hy o f  Science
The philosophical lessons to be learnt from this new role of models as me­
diators are perhaps still unclear. Some preliminary remarks may serve to 
illustrate why it would seem that there must be profound implications. The 
syntactic view of scientific theories equates models with interpretations of 
theory. This tradition assimilates the distinction between scientific theories 
and scientific models to the syntax/semantics distinction in linguistics. The 
theory is a purely syntactical entity, while the models provide us with the 
semantics of the scientific discourse. The relation between the models and 
the theory is one of satisfaction: the model must make the theory’s axioms 
true.
It is difficult to see how models are to literally ‘mediate between theory 
and the world’ if the view of models as providing the semantics of theories is 
correct. If models are interpretations, or partial interpretations, of theories 
they are in a sense supererogatory on theory. A theory will define an ele­
mentary class of models; hence it will greatly restrict the class of permitted 
models. An inconsistent theory, for instance, restricts the class of permitted 
models to the empty set. However, it is a presupposition of the notion of 
models as mediators that there are three distinct objects (theories, models, 
and the world) and that they are ordered with the theory at the most ab­
stract end, the world at the opposite end, and the model as the interface 
between the two. Moreover the model conveys specific physical knowledge. 
The view of models as interpretations of theories allows for a trichotomy 
between theory, model and world but it seems to order these objects the
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wrong way around, with models at the most abstract end, and theories at 
the interface (as model/theory/world rather than as theory/model/world). 
Moreover it implies that models do not convey any significant novel physical 
information that is not already encoded in theories. Surely this is partly the 
reason why proponents of this view have so often attempted to construe the 
relation of confirmation as a purely syntactical connection between a theory, 
on the one hand, and evidence, on the other.
It is possible on the syntactic view to see the world itself as a possible 
model of a theory. The theory is a set of axioms in some formal system, 
and it implicitly defines an elementary class of models. We may then say 
that a theory is true if it has the world as one of its models, and false if the 
world is not among its models. In so far as the world itself is to be a model, 
the distinction between model and the world collapses, and we are left with 
a dichotomy theory/world. So on this view, models mediate between the 
theory and the world only in the sense that the set of permitted models of a 
theory can be said to include the world itself. The activity of model-building 
reduces, on this account, to investigating ways the world would have to be 
if some specific scientific theory was true. This assumes, once more, that 
the totality of scientific knowledge about the world is encoded in theories.
There is also, of course, the semantic conception of theories that I shall 
describe in the second chapter, advocated by Suppes, Van Fraassen and oth­
ers. Here the distinction between theory and model collapses as, according 
to the semantic view, theories are models -they are really nothing but col­
lections of models. On this view there is a hierarchical structure of models, 
from low-level data-models to high-level theoretical models. So the contrast 
between theories and models disappears. I shall address the semantic view of 
theories in the second chapter, where I describe the conception of empirical 
adequacy within the semantic view.
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1.2 The Idealization Account o f Application
In this section I describe a specific proposal for theory-application that in­
volves models as idealizations. This proposal, essentially due to Ernan Mc- 
Mullin, is intended to go further than the traditional accounts of scientific 
theorising, by placing the activity of model-building at the very core of sci­
entific practice. I argue, in section 3, that despite its intention, McMullin’s 
proposal effectively dispenses with the need for models as mediators because 
it invariably construes models as approximations to theories. In section 4 
I try to illuminate and explicate this practical role of models as mediators 
by using an example from the history of superconductivity. In section 5 I 
discuss the epistemological implications.
1.2.1 Form s o f Id ea liza tion
How does scientific theory get applied to the world? Ernan McMullin6 has 
proposed a realist account of theory-application. Theoretical descriptions, 
argues McMullin, are always idealized; they apply only under very special 
circumstances, often not realizable in practice. But the idealization inherent 
in theory is not epistemologically problematic. Although theoretical descrip­
tions are often not absolutely true or false, they are approximately true or 
false.
McMullin finds support for this view in Galileo’s idealization techniques. 
In The New Sciences Salviati, Galileo’s alter ego, argues against the Aris­
totelian views of some of Galileo’s contemporaries, personified mainly in 
the character of Simplicio. The discussion centres around the techniques 
of approximation required to apply theory to concrete problem situations 
and to validate the theoretical claims of Galilean mechanics. Two exam­
ples are repeatedly used: parabolic trajectories of projectiles, and motion 
of rolling objects on inclined planes. Consider the latter. Galileo’s claim is 
of course that the motion of a perfectly symmetric sphere under the earth’s
6McMullin, ‘Galilean Idealization’ [100].
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gravitational pull on a frictionless plane in a vacuum follows a very strict 
mechanical law. But any real plane will exhibit friction, any real object is 
bound to be only imperfectly spherical, and in any actual experiment there 
is bound to be dampening due to the presence of air. To establish his me­
chanical conclusions on the basis of actual experiments, Galileo has to claim 
that the imperfections can be accounted for, and that there is a well estab­
lished and unique method of introducing corrections into theory to account 
for ‘impediments’, the imperfections of nature.
In order to show that there is indeed such a method, Galileo (and Mc­
Mullin) need to appeal to the notion of approximation. There are, broadly 
speaking, two methods for approximating theory to the world. One is the 
approximation of the theory to the problem situation brought about by in­
troducing corrections into the theoretical description (the theory is refined 
to bring it closer to the problem-situation). The other is the approxima­
tion of the problem-situation to the theory by means of simplifications of 
the problem-situation itself. In the latter case the theory is left untouched, 
while the problem-situation is altered; in the former case the converse is true: 
the problem-situation is left untouched, while the theoretical description is 
corrected.
Let us first consider the former kind of approximation whereby the theo­
retical description is refined to bring it closer to the problem-situation. This 
is a form of approximation towards the real case: the corrections introduced 
into the theoretical description are intended to account for the imperfections 
that occur in the problem-situation. The same method can be reversed (n.b. 
this is not yet the second method of approximation) by subtracting, rather 
than adding, the required corrections. We may call this an idealization; for 
the result of such subtraction is of course a more, rather than less, idealized 
description of the problem-situation. The important feature of this ideal­
ization is that the subtraction of corrections is performed on the theoretical 
construction, while the description of the problem-situation is left entirely 
unaffected. For this reason McMullin7 calls the first form of approximation
7See McMullin [100, page 256].
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construct idealization.
The second method of approximation brings the problem-situation closer 
to theory. We idealize the description of the problem-situation, while leaving 
the theoretical construction unaffected. McMullin calls this causal idealiza­
tion because the description of the causes present in the problem-situation 
is altered to bring the description into the domain of the theory. In the 
practice of physics this process can come in either of two forms. It can come 
first in the form of conceptual redescriptions of the problem-situation, per­
formed only in thought, and not in reality. In such ‘thought-experiments’ 
interfering causes axe idealized away and the result is a simplified description 
of the problem-situation. Secondly, there is also the possibility of physical 
‘shielding’ of the experimental apparatus, which will involve changes in the 
actual experimental set-up. Such changes are designed to minimise the in­
fluence of interfering causes, or to block such influences out altogether. It is 
perhaps instructive to quote Galileo in full:
We are trying to investigate what would happen to moveables 
very diverse in weight, in a medium quite devoid of resistance, so 
that the whole difference of speed existing between these move­
ables would have to be referred to inequality of weight alone.
Hence just one space entirely void of air -and of every other 
body, however thin and yielding- would be suitable for showing 
us sensibly that which we seek. Since we lack such a space, let 
us (instead) observe what happens in the thinnest and least re­
sistant media, comparing this with what happens in others less 
thin and more resistant. If we find in fact that moveables of dif­
ferent weight differ less and less in speed as they are situated in 
more and more yielding media, and that finally, despite extreme 
difference of weight, their diversity of speed in the most tenuous 
medium of all (though not void) is found to be very small and 
almost unobservable, then it seems to me that we may believe, 
by a highly probable guess, that in the void all speeds would be 
entirely equal, (quoted in McMullin [100, page 267])
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It is uncertain whether Galileo performed any of these experiments in actual 
fact. If he did, he would certainly have needed to use a technique of ‘shield­
ing’ to minimise the influence of interfering causes. If, on the other hand, 
he didn’t actually perform the experiments then in this passage he is de­
scribing a series of thought-experiments that gradually minimise the effects 
of interfering causes -in the mind, of course, not in reality. The dynamics of 
moveables in the void that he concludes will exhibit equal speeds is in either 
case a causal idealization. Starting with a concrete problem-situation (i.e. 
the motion of an object in the earth’s atmosphere) Galileo constructs a set 
of simpler problem-situations. If relations between quantities measurable in 
these gradually simpler thought experiments converge to a law we can then 
enunciate the law for the ideal (simplest) case. The resulting law is a causal 
idealization, because the simplifications correspond to missing causes in the 
problem-situation.
McMullin summarises the main features of each form of idealization con­
cisely as follows:
We have seen that idealization in this context takes on two 
main forms. In construct idealization, the models on which the­
oretical understanding is built are deliberately fashioned so as to 
leave aside part of the complexity of the concrete order. In causal 
idealization the physical world itself is consciously simplified; 
an artificial (‘experimental’) context is constructed within which 
questions about law-like correlations between physical variables 
can be unambiguously answered. Causal idealization, instead 
of being carried out experimentally, can also be performed in 
thought, when we focus on the single causal line in abstraction 
from others and ask ‘what would happen if’, (op. cit. [100, page 
273])
In this Thesis I focus only on construct idealization, the kind of idealiza­
tion whereby simplifications are worked out on the theoretical description, 
rather than on the problem situation. This is partly because I believe that
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every case of theory-application will involve, in practice, at least some de­
gree of construct idealization; and partly because this is the only form of 
idealization that shall concern us when the main issues in the philosophy of 
quantum mechanics are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 of the Thesis. Let me 
just stress that construct idealization requires no thought-experiments, nor 
does it require tampering with the real experimental situation. Only one 
problem-situation, namely the real case, is entertained. It is the theoretical 
description that gets modified by introducing correction factors that repre­
sent ‘impediments’, the special circumstances that make up the particular 
problem-situation. In other words, in construct idealization, the theoreti­
cal description is refined gradually to make it applicable to the problem- 
situation.
In actual practice we look for approximations to the theory that can be 
applied to a particular problem-situation. Michael Redhead8 refers to these 
approximations as impoverishment models. The theoretical description may 
be very complicated: there may be no analytic solutions to the theoretical 
equations. How then can we derive the correct impoverishment model? 
How can we choose among all possible approximations the very one that 
accurately represents the behaviour of the system? The important point, 
that I shall now stress, is that the theory itself must contain the information 
required to select the correct approximation if the approximation in question 
is to count as a de-idealization of theory.
1.2 .2  Idealization  and Scientific R ealism
A theory can be applied by finding a simplifying approximation to it that 
is adequate for the description of a phenomenon. Not all approximations, 
however, guarantee that the theory is confirmed by its applications. It is 
essential to McMullin’s realism that the corrections introduced into the the­
oretical description should not be ad hoc. The corrections have to be well 
motivated from the point of view of theory. If the theory is to receive confir-
8 Redhead [114].
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mation boosts from its applications the corrections need to be not only con­
sistent with the theory, but also if not dictated by, at least suggested by, the 
theory. If in a particular application the necessary corrections turned out to 
be inconsistent with the theory, the theory could be said to be disconfirmed; 
if the corrections were consistent with the theory, but not suggested by it, 
the theory would neither receive a confirmatory boost nor a disconfirmatory 
one. McMullin explicitly acknowledges this important point: according to 
the (construct) idealization picture of theory application the manipulations 
exerted on the theoretical description must be ‘theory-driven’ because the 
theory itself is to be truth-apt (a ‘candidate for tru th’ in Ian Hacking’s 
terminology 9) and is to gain confirmation through its applications. If the 
corrections were not suggested by the theory then the resulting description 
would be ad hoc and, from the point of view of a realist epistemology, it 
would be unable to provide any evidence for the truth of the theory. Thus 
McMullin writes:
The implications of construct idealization, both formal and 
material, are thus truth-bearing in a very strong sense. The­
oretical laws [...] give an approximate fit with empirical laws 
reporting on observation. It is precisely this lack of perfect fit 
that sets in motion the processes of self-correction and imagina­
tive extension described above [i.e. deidealization[. If the model 
is a good one, these processes are not ad hoc; they are suggested 
by the model itself. Where the processes are of an ad hoc sort, 
the implication is that the model is not a good one; the uncor­
rected laws derived from it could then be described as ‘false’ or 
defective, even if they do give an approximate fit with empirical 
laws. The reason is that the model from which they derive lacks 
the means for self-correction which is the best testimony of its 
truth, (op. cit [100, page 264]).
9See Hacking [79].
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In this passage McMullin is not using the term ‘model’ to describe a 
mediating model, as I do in this chapter. I have taken ‘mediating models’ 
to be distinct from established theory while McMullin is here taking ‘model’ 
to stand for a theoretical description, as in the semantic view of theories. 
McMullin makes it clear that the corrections introduced into a theory to 
generate predictions in a particular physical problem-situation have to be 
suggested by the theory itself; otherwise, the corrections would be ad hoc 
and the resulting description, no matter how well it fitted the particular case, 
would not yield any confirmatory boost for the theory. If the corrections 
were not suggested by the theory there would be no way to account for the 
effects that those corrections have upon the final predictions. As McMullin 
notes [100, page 256] it is essential that there be “a way of dealing with the 
fact that construct idealizations “depart from the truth”. I f  this departure is 
appreciably large, perhaps its effect [...] can be estimated and allowed for”. 
By requiring that the corrections into a theoretical model be well motivated 
from the point of view of theory we make sure that we are always able to 
estimate their contribution to the final description.
In other words, application must be theory-driven in order to provide 
confirmation for the theory. I shall refer to this sort of theory-driven approx­
imation of the theory to the problem-situation that results in a refinement 
of the theoretical description as construct de-idealization, or deidealization 
for short. The name is due to the fact that an approximation of this kind is 
nothing but the converse process to construct idealization. In forming con­
struct idealizations we idealize away, by subtracting from the description, 
those features of the problem-situation that are either (a) irrelevant to the 
theoretical description, or (b) relevant to the theoretical description, but are 
also known in the theoretical description to have effects that are precisely 
accountable for. (In the latter case construct idealization is often used for 
the purpose of improving the mathematical tractability of the problem.) In 
either (a) or (b) a strict criterion of theoretical relevance is presupposed. It 
is the theory that tells us what are the relevant features to be idealized away, 
and suggests how to account for their effects. The same criterion of theo­
22
retical relevance must be in place if the converse process of “adding back” 
features is to count as a meaningful deidealization. Tbe requirement that 
the introduction of corrections into a theoretical model be well motivated 
from the point of view of theory ensures that the criterion is firmly in place.
The above discussion is perhaps sufficient to make cleax why the ideal­
ization account of theory application satisfies the realist’s constraints. For 
applications which follow the idealization account, the theory receives confir­
mation boosts from the applications. The corrections that serve to generate 
successful applications are necessarily consistent with theory, because they 
are suggested by theory. They are corrections suggested by some strict rel­
evance criterion - a  criterion that is wholly and unambiguously theoretically 
determined. So, an application of a theory that conforms to nature provides 
a good reason to believe that the theory itself is true.
Let me now briefly address the sense of ‘approximate tru th’ that is in­
volved in the idealization account. McMullin is not arguing that scientific 
theories are approximately true or false. The theory, on McMullin’s view, 
contains its own criteria of application; so, indeed, the theory contains all 
of its possible theoretical descriptions of the problem-situation. Hence the 
theory is either true (if it contains one true description of the problem- 
situation), or false (if it contains none). It is because of this that a successful 
deidealization of a scientific theory to a particular problem-situation should 
always be taken as an indication of the theory’s truth: it shows that the 
theory contains one true description of the problem-situation.
McMullin’s claim is rather that theoretical descriptions of a particu­
lar problem-situation may be approximately true or false. His intuition 
is roughly as follows: successive approximations of a theory to a problem- 
situation have a degree of confirmation inversely proportional to their ‘dis­
tance’ from the problem-situation as measured on the ‘idealization scale’; 
but, -for a realist-, degree of confirmation is degree of truth; so ‘distance in 
the idealization scale’ measures degree of truth. Given two representations 
A and B of some concrete problem-situation if A is less idealized than B 
then, in a very precise sense, A is truer than B. To pursue a Galilean exam-
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pie: the representation of a sphere rolling down a frictionless plane is less 
idealized if described in the actual atmosphere (description A) than if de­
scribed in a vacuum (description B ). The description in the atmosphere has 
to involve a measure of the dampening due to air. The realist would want 
to claim that this description is truer than the description of the sphere in a 
vacuum, in a totally unobjectionable sense of the notion of objective truth. 
For a scientific realist, such as McMullin, Galilean idealization provides the 
model for the notion of approximate truth.
1.3 The Role o f M odels in Theory-Application
It is always open to the opponent of realism to attack the inference from 
the past success of a theory to its future success, and from its pervasiveness 
in practice to its truth. An instrumentalist may after all have no qualms 
with Galilean idealization: it is a technique of application, it is often used, 
and sometimes with some conviction that it carries epistemic weight, but 
in fact it is only a tool, and it can give no genuine warrant for belief other 
than the psychological comfort offered by the familiarity of its use. But here 
I do not attempt a general philosophical rebuttal of the realist view. This 
would take us one step back, in the direction of the traditional disputes 
concerning arguments for scientific realism -disputes that have not been 
settled, possibly because they could never be settled10.
On independent grounds the realist view won’t work. The realist wants 
to claim that the idealization account captures the essential features of the 
procedure of theory-application. I argue in this chapter that the idealization 
account is seriously flawed because it can not explain the role of models in 
scientific practice. The inadequacy of the idealization account stems from 
the fact that, in practice, theory-application does not typically follow the 
pattern of deidealization. But the realist does not rest content with this base-
10In the philosophy of science this quietism, or perhaps simply ‘pessimism’, towards the 
realism/antirealism debate has been most ably defended by Arthur Fine -see chapters 7 
and 8 of The Shaky Game [62].
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level claim; in addition lie claims that the idealization account also agrees 
with scientific practice at an epistemological level. Scientists’ confidence 
in a scientific theory typically increases on account of its many successful 
applications. The realist seeks support for the idealization account also on 
these epistemological practices of scientists. And, indeed, on the idealization 
account a theory gains confirmation through its applications.
To sum up, there are two distinct claims that the realist makes on behalf 
of the idealization account. First, this account agrees with the practice of 
theory-application and second, it agrees with scientific epistemology. In this 
Thesis I contest the truth of the former claim, and I argue that the latter 
claim, although true, does not provide ammunition for the realist account 
of theory-application.
1.3.1 P rob lem s w ith  Idealization
I like to illustrate the idealization account of application with a simple ex­
ample in mechanics due to Ronald Giere11. The example brings out very 
clearly what, in my view, is the major defect of the idealization account.
Consider the derivation of the equation of the damped linear oscillator 
from that of the simple harmonic oscillator. The equation of the simple 
harmonic oscillator is:
”$ - ( ? ) * •  <■•“ >
while the equation that describes a damped harmonic oscillator is:
~ (T)1+bv■ (1-3-2)
The process that takes one from the theoretical description of the friction- 
less harmonic oscillator to the damped harmonic oscillator is a successful 
deidealization in the attempt to apply classical mechanics to a real-life pen­
dulum. The extra term bv represents the dampening due to air friction that
11 Giere [73, chapter 3].
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any real oscillator must be subject to. The introduction of this correction 
term into the idealized description afforded by the equation of the simple 
harmonic oscillator is motivated by theoretical considerations: in classical 
mechanics friction is modelled by a linear function of velocity12. By in­
troducing well-motivated corrections into the theoretical description of the 
simple harmonic oscillator we obtain a less idealized description of a real-life 
pendulum in ordinary circumstances, namely the description of a damped 
harmonic oscillator.
Equation (1.3.2) tends to equation (1.3.1) in the limit b — ► 0, as required 
for an approximation. Hence the two descriptions agree in the asymptotic 
limit. There are of course plenty of equations that, just like (1.3.2), tend to 
the original equation (1.3.1) in some mathematical limit. (1.3.2) is special 
because it is derived from the equation of the simple harmonic oscillator by 
a process of deidealization. The damped harmonic oscillator and the sim­
ple harmonic oscillator are objects defined implicitly in the theory by their 
satisfaction of the corresponding equations; hence it is the theory that de­
termines the relations between them. The correction terms introduced into 
the equation of the simple harmonic oscillator are justified by the putative 
relations between the objects themselves. Equation (1.3.1) is satisfied by a 
linear oscillator with no friction; equation (1.3.2) is satisfied by a linear os­
cillator subject to friction. The theory contains all the necessary techniques 
to represent this difference formally.
Hence the idealization account makes superfluous the use of models in 
theory application. Theories must be seen as entirely self-sufficient in the 
task of generating genuinely realistic representations of problem-situations13. 
Where the idealization account is true, or generally true, it follows that 
models cannot mediate between theories and the world: in the application
12For a discussion of modelling friction see eg. Herbert Goldstein [76, page 24]
13Specifically, and to anticipate the main issue in what is to follow, theories do not 
(must not) rely on independently-standing models in order to fix the corrections required 
for successful deidealizations.
26
of scientific theories that satisfy the idealization account, there is essentially 
no work for mediating models to do.
This is perhaps a bit too hasty, as it does seem intuitively possible to 
supplement the idealization account so as to accommodate the role of models 
as mediators. A defender of the idealization account could argue that we are 
misusing the terms “theory” and “model” . She could argue that these terms 
refer to relative, rather than absolute, concepts. Consider two theoretical 
descriptions A  and B, and suppose that A  is less idealized than B  with 
respect to some physical system S. A  could then be defined as “a model 
with respect to” B , and B  as “a theory with respect to” A. The proponent of 
the idealization account can now claim that the role of models as mediators is 
a necessary consequence of these relative definitions. Given the idealization 
account “models” always mediate between theory and the world because a 
“model” is defined to be a relatively deidealized theoretical representation 
of a problem-situation in the domain of the “theory” .
Although this approach in terms of relative definitions is certainly pos­
sible, it does not seem plausible for at least two reasons. First, the relative 
definition of models and theories seems counterintuitive precisely when it is 
conjoined with the idealization account. We already saw that the latter ac­
count entails that the less idealized a description of a situation, the truer it 
is of that situation. The relative definition entails that less idealized descrip­
tions are “models” with respect to the more idealized ones: it follows that 
“models” are generally truer than “theories”. Such conclusion runs against 
the common view that theories are candidates for truth or falsehood while 
models, as fictional representations, are not truth-apt. This is obviously not 
a conclusive objection because the intuition that underlies the common view 
can always be resisted, but it makes the relative approach less plausible.
Another reason against the relative definitions is that intuitively the 
definitions of “model” and “theory” should be transitive. Given three rep­
resentations, A, B  and C, if C is a theory with respect to B  and B  is a 
theory with respect to A  then C should also be a theory with respect to 
A. There is no reason, however, why the relation of idealization should be
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transitive, and hence no reason why the proposed relative definitions should 
turn out to exhibit transitivity either. In other words, it may well be the 
case that A  is less idealized than B, and B  is less idealized than C, and yet 
A  is not less idealized than C. On the relative definition approach, C would 
be a theory with respect to B  and a model with respect to A , even if B  is a 
theory with respect to A. The possibility of failure of transitivity is a result 
of the fact that the relation “to be less idealized a representation than” is 
really a three-place relation, not a two-place one, depending as it does cru­
cially upon the problem-situation for which the representations are intended. 
When assessing which of two representations is more idealized it is assumed 
that they are intended representations of the same problem-situation. But 
of course a representation may be intended of several problem-situations. 
The failure of transitivity described above could arise for instance if B  was 
such a representation, intended for two different problem-situations.
In practice we will often be concerned with classes of theoretical de­
scriptions that won’t allow for any kind of ranking. For instance, when 
two applications of the same theory to two different problem-situations are 
considered, there is no way to rank the two applications. It does not make 
sense to say of any one of them that it is the more idealized: they are incom­
mensurable as regards their degree of idealization. Similarly there is no way 
to establish which of two applications of two different theories to the same 
problem-situation is more idealized. In both cases the relative definition in 
terms of degree of idealization entails that it is impossible to assess which 
one is a model and which a theory.
Perhaps these two problems can be surmounted. The proponent of the 
idealization account may convince us that our intuitions about the absolute 
character of the definition of “models” and “theories” need to be corrected, 
and that the relative definitions are sound after all. There would still be a 
third problem for the idealization account which in my view cannot be sur­
mounted. The idealization account assumes there is a final representation 
of every system in the theory’s domain of application. In practice we may 
never be able to write this representation, as it may be hideously compli­
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cated; but the representation must exist because it can be approximated to 
an arbitrary degree by successive deidealizations of the theory.
However, even in the simple case of the harmonic oscillator the presump­
tion that such a final theoretical representation exists seems profoundly per­
plexing. The equation of the damped harmonic oscillator is certainly not 
a final representation of this kind. It is not a theoretical representation 
of any concrete real system in the world. Admittedly the equation of the 
damped harmonic oscillator is a less idealized representation than the equa­
tion of the simple harmonic oscillator for real-life penduli. But this does 
guarantee that the theory contains a (true) representation of a real-life pen­
dulum. The theory may be incomplete; there may well be some aspects 
of the problem-situation left unaccounted for, even after all the relevant 
corrections suggested by the theory have been added in.
But now the promised sense in which models were to mediate between 
theory and the world is definitely lost: models mediate only between theory 
and further models. On the idealization account the theory does all the work 
required for its own application by determining, in stages, sets of increasingly 
less idealized representations. These representations, however, may never 
truly represent anything real at all.
1.3.2 T h e P rob lem  o f M aterial A b straction
Nancy Cartwright has argued14 that the Galilean method of idealization is 
valid, t/(and only if) a metaphysics of capacities is presupposed. Cartwright 
is at pains to distinguish idealization from abstraction, as she wants to argue 
that where capacities are involved abstract laws -rather than idealized laws- 
hold. She draws the distinction as follows:
... in idealization we start with a concrete object and we 
mentally rearrange some of its inconvenient features -some of its
14In chapter 5, -entitled ‘Abstract and Concrete’- ,  of her book Nature’s Capacities and 
Their Measurement [27]. Also in ‘Capacities and Abstractions’ [30], and in ‘How we Relate 
Theory to Observation’ [31].
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specific properties- before we try to write down a law for it. The 
paradigm is the frictionless plane. We start with a particular 
plane, or a whole class of planes. Since we are using these planes 
to study the inertial properties of matter, we ignore the small 
perturbations produced by friction. But in fact we cannot just 
delete factors. Instead we replace them by others which are 
easier to think about, or with which it is easier to calculate.
The model may leave out some features altogether which do not 
matter to the motion, like the colour of the ball. But it must 
say something, albeit something idealizing, about all the factors 
which are relevant.
[...] By contrast, when we try to formulate [an abstract law], 
we consider the causal factors out of context all together. It is not 
a matter of changing any particular features or properties, but 
rather of subtracting, not only the concrete circumstances but 
even the material in which the cause is embedded and all that 
follows from that. (Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement 
[27, page 187]
In idealization we make assumptions that we know to be false about a 
particular system. For instance we may imagine a plane with a perfectly 
polished surface, even if we know well that no real surface can be perfectly 
polished: all surfaces are rough and grainy to some degree. By contrast, 
in an abstraction we simply delete a feature, and we do not substitute it 
with anything else. Following the same example, an abstraction would be 
a ‘surfaceless’ plane. Of course our ordinary concept of a ‘plane’ essentially 
involves the feature of its having a surface; it is part of what we mean by 
‘plane’ that it has a surface. So a ‘surfaceless plane’ is really no plane at 
all, not even an idealized one. Unlike an idealization, which continues to be 
about real objects, an abstraction is no more about real planes, or real rolling 
balls, but is strictly about those features that remain after the subtraction 
takes place.
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It is perhaps easiest to bring out the contrast by considering the distinc­
tion between idealized and abstract laws. An idealized law is essentially a 
ceteris paribus law. It is true or false of the phenomena but it holds only 
when a large number of antecedent idealizing conditions are satisfied. (‘I f  
the surface of the plane was perfectly polished, and a perfectly polished 
ball was to roll down the plane, and the experiment was performed in a 
vacuum, and... then the motion of the ball would be precisely described by 
Galileo’s dynamic laws’.) By contrast, in an abstract law we drop the ceteris 
paribus conditions altogether. An abstract law is not intended to be true or 
false of the phenomenal world (although it may be true or false of the pow­
ers, tendencies or capacities that underlie the phenomena), and hence the 
satisfaction of the long idealizing antecedent is not required for the law to 
apply. It follows that the language of approximate truth, which is intuitive 
when dealing with idealized laws, is useless when it comes to abstract laws. 
These laws are not intended to be true or false of the phenomenal world, so 
they can hardly be ‘approximately’ true descriptions of the phenomena. As 
Cartwright puts it:
[...] where relevant features have been genuinely subtracted, 
it makes no sense to talk about the departure of the remaining 
law from truth, about whether this departure is small or not, 
or about how to calculate it. These questions, which are so 
important when treating of idealizations, are nonsense when it 
comes to abstractions, (op.cit. [27, page 188])
Although the conceptual difference between an idealized law and an ab­
stract law is very important, from the purely formal point of view there may 
be no apparent differences, as the antecedent conditions may be elliptical. 
Consider the equation of the simple harmonic oscillator, equation (1.3.1): 
does it correspond to an idealization or an abstraction? Earlier on I argued, 
following McMullin, that the simple harmonic oscillator is an idealization, 
relative to the problem-situation of real-life penduli. I assumed that there 
would be a long list of conditions, stating states of affairs in the world, that 
would need to be satisfied if (1.3.1) is to precisely describe the motion of
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any real object at all. When we move to the law that contains the equa­
tion of the damped harmonic oscillator (equation (1.3.2)) we are effectively 
deleting one of the conditions in the long antecedent (namely the condition 
that reads: ‘if there was no damping due to air friction...’). The resulting 
law is less idealized because it has fewer antecedent conditions; it is, as it 
were, one step closer to the truth.
However, the simple harmonic oscillator can also function as an abstrac­
tion. In such case equation (1.3.1) should not be said to ‘approximately 
describe’ the motion of a real object (such as a real pulsating pendulum) 
but rather to exactly describe the motion of an abstract one (an object im­
plicitly defined by equation (1.3.1)). Hence in abstraction we ignore the 
long list of antecedent conditions and we assert that the abstract law is true 
or false, not of the phenomenal world, but of an abstract object. Ronald 
Giere15 defends this view in his book Explaining Science:
I propose that we regard the simple harmonic oscillator and 
the like as abstract entities having all and only the properties as­
cribed to them in the standard texts. The distinguishing feature 
of the simple harmonic oscillator, for example, is that it satisfies 
the force law F  = —kx. The simple harmonic oscillator, then, is 
a constructed entity.
I shall not discuss Giere’s views in any detail here. Rather I concentrate on 
the question: can this proposal in terms of abstraction help to patch up the 
realist account of application?
Nancy Cartwright has argued that the realist account of application, 
in terms of the introduction of corrections into a representation, is a fine 
method for what she calls concretization, the converse of abstraction. For­
mally the process of concretization looks like deidealization. Both require the 
gradual introduction of corrections into a representation, as in the case of 
the derivation of the equation of the damped harmonic oscillator from that
15Giere, [73, page 78].
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of the simple harmonic oscillator. However, in deidealization the refinements 
aim to an increasingly more realistic representation of a phenomenon or an 
entity in the world (such as, for instance, a real life pendulum). In con­
cretization, by contrast, the corrections are intended to represent the effects 
of additional features that figure in a more concrete representation of the 
phenomenon, or its underlying causal structure, or a more concrete object 
(perhaps defined implicitly by its corresponding equation, in this case by 
equation (1.3.2)). But there is no guarantee that the movement is towards 
the real case: the distinction abstract/concrete does not need to parallel the 
distinction ideal/real.
Moreover the refinement that corresponds to a concretization need not 
provide evidence for a scientific theory. A scientific theory will typically not 
have the resources to provide enough corrections to generate a description 
of all the relevant features of most concrete objects to give a totally ac­
curate prediction of the behaviour of the object in question. This is what 
Cartwright calls the problem of material abstraction. She puts it in the 
language of laws:
The abstract law is one which subtracts all but the features 
of interest. To get back to the concrete laws that constitute its 
phenomenal content, the omitted factors must be added in again.
But where do these omitted factors come from? [...] given a 
theory, the factors come from a list. But the list provided by 
any given theory, or even by all of our theories put together, 
will never go far enough. There will always be further factors 
to consider which are peculiar to the individual case. I call this 
the ‘problem of material abstraction [...] After a while, it seems, 
in any process of concretization, theoretical corrections run out 
and the process must be carried on case by case, (op.cit. [27, 
pages 207 and 209]).
She gives several examples of this problem. Here is one:
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Donald Glaser built the first bubble chambers, using diethyl 
ether. He operated on the principle that a passing charged parti­
cle has the capacity to cause bubbling in a liquid in a superheated 
state. (The liquid is ready to boil and just needs a stimulant.) He 
was also successful with hydrogen and most of the heavy liquid 
hydrocarbons, like propane or freon. But surprisingly the bub­
ble chamber did not work with xenon. Here the passing charged 
particles excite optical transitions, and the energy is sent off as 
fight rather than producing the heat necessary to trigger the 
boiling. Again mundane facts about actual materials and their 
construction made a difference, facts outside the domain of the 
initial theory about the behaviour of superheated fluids, (op.cit.
[27, page 209])
Cartwright’s problem of material abstraction is that in any genuine con­
cretization of a theory to a particular object, the criteria that we follow to 
choose the appropriate corrections will vary from case to case. The problem 
that I am setting for idealization is indeed a very similar one, but with one 
significant difference: it does not need to appeal to the peculiarities of any 
one particular concrete object. For, in fact, the fist of corrections provided 
by the theory sometimes runs out even earlier than Cartwright’s problem of 
material abstraction suggests. Even in the development of a totally general 
electromagnetic theory of superconductivity -one that, for instance, pays no 
attention to the peculiarities of any one specific superconducting material-, 
the theory on its own is unable to determine the corrections required for 
its application. The theory needs help from an independently motivated 
mediating model.
1.4 How M odels Mediate: The Case o f Supercon­
ductivity
The inference from successful application to the truth of the theory becomes 
problematic when it is noticed that in practice the criteria of theoretical rel­
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evance presupposed by the idealization account are rarely operative in cases 
of successful theory-application. On the contrary it is often the case that 
scientific representations of effects or phenomena are not arrived at as deide­
alizations of theory. My case study in superconductivity illustrates one way 
in which models typically mediate between theory and the world16. The first 
theoretical representation of the Meissner effect was not found by applying 
a criterion of theoretical relevance for the introduction of corrections into 
the electromagnetic equations of a superconductor. These correction terms 
were not given by, and could not have been given by, classical electromag­
netic theory but were rather derived from a new model of superconductivity. 
The model was motivated directly by the phenomena, not by theory. The 
criterion required for the application of electromagnetic theory could only 
be laid out when the model was in place, and an adequate classical elec­
tromagnetic description of superconductivity (the London equations) could 
then finally be derived.
This is, I want to claim, an important sense in which models mediate: 
they establish the corrections that need be introduced into a theory in order 
to generate many of its applications. My case study shows how the derivation 
of a theoretical representation of a physical effect can result from corrections 
that are suggested by a mediating model, which is independent from theory. 
The approximation used to generate an appropriate representation is not a 
deidealization of theory, because the criterion of relevance that guides the 
introduction of corrections is not theoretically motivated.
I have chosen the Londons’ account of superconductivity for a number of 
reasons: first, because it is such a well-known episode of successful theory- 
application; second, because of the high esteem and reputation of the two 
scientists involved; finally, because it is a case of application that is to a large 
extent explicitly not a deidealization. My case study is not exceptional or 
isolated; on the contrary, I believe that it is paradigmatic of the activity of
16 Aspects of this case study have been published in a joint paper with Nancy Cartwright 
and Towfic Shomar [34]. In this Thesis I make use only of those parts that were strictly 
written by me, based entirely upon my own research.
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theory-application in many branches of physics.
1.4 .1  T he H allm arks o f S u p ercon d u ctiv ity
The electromagnetic treatment that Fritz and Heinz London17 proposed 
for superconductors in 1934 is one of the most celebrated cases of theory 
application in the history of twentieth century physics. It was the first 
comprehensive electromagnetic theory of superconductivity and it remained 
the fundamental account of superconductivity for nearly 20 years until the 
advent of the BCS theory (which was heavily informed by the Londons’ 
account, as were all subsequent theories of superconductivity). Supercon­
ductors are materials that exhibit extraordinary conducting behaviour un­
der specific circumstances. The hallmarks of superconducting behaviour are 
the following two well established phenomenological findings: resistanceless 
conductivity and the Meissner effect.
In 1911 Kamerlingh Onnes18 found that when mercury is cooled below 
4.2K° its electrical resistance falls to near zero. In 1914 he discovered that 
the effect does not take place in the presence of an intense magnetic field. 
This is the first phenomenological trait of superconductivity: under a cer­
tain critical transition temperature, and in the absence of strong magnetic 
fields, a superconductor exhibits almost perfect resistanceless conductivity. 
Almost perfect resistanceless conductivity is confirmed by the presence of a 
stationary current through, say, the surface of a superconducting ring. The 
current flows at virtually the same constant rate and does not die off.
The relation between the transition temperature (Tc) and the critical 
magnetic field (Be) was explored experimentally by Onnes himself. He 
found that the following relation held with an accuracy of a few percent:
B e = B0 { 1 -  ^ }. (1.4.3)
17London and London, ‘The Electromagnetic equations of the Supraconductor’ [98].
18Onnes [110].
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Superconducting
Region
B = 0
T  = 0
Figure 1.1: The Domain of Superconductivity
This equation defines the domain of superconductivity. Figure 1.1 is the 
graph of equation (1.4.3); it displays the region where superconductivity 
occurs. Bo is a numerical constant which depends on the substance. The 
graph clearly shows that there are two different ways to approach the su­
perconducting regime. One way is to bring down the ambient temperature 
to Tc  while maintaining constant the weak external magnetic field (weaker 
than B e )• The other way is to decrease the magnetic field below B e  and 
to maintain constant the temperature at some T  < Tc* Both strategies will 
work. Superconducting behaviour is suddenly exhibited when the critical 
phase transition takes place.
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The second, equally important, trait of superconductivity was found 
in 1933 by Meissner and Ochsenfeld19. The Meissner effect is the sudden 
expulsion of magnetic flux from a superconductor when cooled below its 
transition temperature. The flux in a superconductor is always vanishingly 
small, regardless of what the flux inside the material was immediately before 
the phase transition into the domain of superconductivity took place20.
1.4 .2  A pp ly ing  E lectrom agn etism
Superconductivity was initially considered an electromagnetic phenomenon 
and providing an electromagnetic treatment became the main theoretical 
task. This was a formidable task in view of the Meissner effect. Maxwell’s 
equations on their own are totally ineffective: for a medium of perfect con­
ductivity (a ‘superconductor’) Maxwell’s equations are inconsistent with the 
Meissner effect. Perfect conductivity occurs when the scattering of electrons 
in a medium of low resistance is so small that the electric current persists 
even in the absence of a supporting external electric field. For a conductor 
in a vanishingly small electric field, for which E = 0, Maxwell’s second equa­
tion V x E = — predicts that ^  = 0 and hence that B, the magnetic 
field, must remain constant in time in the transition to the superconducting 
state. In other words, Maxwell’s equations predict that the flux through a 
coil surrounding the metal must remain unaltered during the phase tran­
sition. The experiments of Meissner and Ochsenfeld showed that in fact 
there is a sudden change in the value of the external magnetic field, consis­
tent with the total expulsion of the magnetic flux density from within the
19Meissner and Ochsenfeld [101].
20 A distinction is usually made between Type I and Type II superconductors. In Type 
I superconductors all magnetic flux is expelled in the phase transition. In Type II super­
conductors the expulsion is only partial. Type II superconductors only appeared much 
later, and the distinction played no role in the historical instance that I wish to discuss. 
In this Thesis by “superconductors” I refer to type I superconductors only. These are thin 
films made out from metals like zinc, aluminium, mercury, lead.
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superconductor21.
Of course by 1933 there was much more to electromagnetic theory than 
just Maxwell’s equations. In the construction of their theory of perfect con­
ductivity Becker, Sauter and Heller22 had to appeal to further assumptions 
about the media, the shape of the conductor, the forces that propelled the 
electrons in the absence of electric fields and, crucially, the form of the law 
that linked the electric current to external fields. Their ‘acceleration’ theory 
accounted for a persistent current in a superconductor, but it was shown by 
the Londons to be in contradiction with the Meissner effect.
In a normal conductor the current either induces an external electric field 
or is supported by one, and Ohm’s law predicts that the current is directly 
proportional to the field, j  = aE . With the discovery of resistanceless con­
ductivity Ohm’s law had to be abandoned for superconductivity because the 
current persists in the absence of an external field. Nevertheless all proposed 
treatments of superconductivity continued to assume that there existed some 
relation between the superconducting current and external electric fields -  
not a proportionality relation obviously, but some relation nevertheless. The 
Londons’ fundamental contribution was to make unambiguously clear that 
superconducting currents are in no way supported by electric fields, but by 
magnetic fields.
What prompted the Londons’ suggestion? Why did previous attempts 
to understand superconductivity continue to assume that the current was 
physically linked to electric fields? The answer cannot be found by inspect­
ing the state of electromagnetic theory in 1933. No significant contribution 
or substantive addition to the theory was made during these years that could 
help to explain the Londons’ breakthrough. The significant event was the 
proposal, by the Londons, of a new model
21 The inconsistency of the Meissner effect, perfect conductivity with E  =  0, and 
Maxwell’s equations is often emphasised in textbook discussions (see, for instances, 
Bleaney and Bleaney [13, chapter 13] and H.E.Hall [81, chapter 11]).
22 Becker, Sauter and Heller [11].
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Historically, the discovery of the Meissner effect signalled the turning 
point. This unexpected discovery brought about a change in the conception 
of superconductivity. A superconductor was initially conceived in analogy 
with ferromagnetism: just as a ferromagnet exhibits a magnetic dipole mo­
ment in the absence of any supporting magnetic fields, a superconductor 
exhibits a permanent current even if unsupported by electric fields. The 
superconducting current is constant in the absence of an electric field, and 
what this indicates is that the field is not proportional to the current, as 
in Ohm’s law. As a replacement Becker, Sauter and Heller proposed the 
following ‘acceleration equation’, where the field is proportional to the time 
derivative of the current:
= E  (1.4.4)
where A = ^  (a constant that depends upon the mass to, charge e and 
number density of electrons n). In the absence of an external field (E =  0) 
the ‘acceleration equation’ predicts a permanent current: ^  = 0.
1.4 .3  E nter th e  M odel
The Londons understood that the Meissner effect pointed to an entirely 
different model. They modelled a superconductor as one huge diamagnet, 
and replaced Ohm’s law with a new electromagnetic relation between the 
superconducting current and the magnetic field. The Londons went on to 
attempt a microscopic explanation of the coherence of the ‘magnetic dipoles’ 
in terms of a coherent macroscopic quantum superposition23.
By modelling a superconductor as a diamagnet the Londons were able to 
introduce an important correction into the ‘acceleration equation’ theory of 
Becker, Sauter and Heller. Diamagnetism is associated with the tendency of
23Superconductivity is of course ultimately a quantum phenomenon. The definitive 
quantum treatment was given in 1951 by Baxdeen, Cooper and Schrieffer [10] who ex­
plained the emergence of coherence by appealing to the formation of Cooper pairs at low 
temperatures. The history of the BCS theory is fascinating in its own right, but it is of 
no relevance to my present argument.
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electrical charges to shield the interior of a body from an applied magnetic 
field24. Following a proposal by Gorter and Casimir25, the Londons began 
by assuming that a real superconductor is constituted by two different sub­
stances: the normal and the superconducting current. They then proposed 
that Ohm’s law be restricted to the normal current in the material, and the 
description of the superconducting current be supplemented with an equa­
tion that determined the relation of the current to the background magnetic 
flux. The ‘London equation’ for the superconducting current takes the form:
V x Aj =  — H  (1.4.5)c
where j  is the current, and H  represents the magnetic flux inside the super­
conductor.
It is important to understand that this equation was not derived from 
electromagnetic theory, but was suggested by the new model of diamag­
netism. Although analogy was certainly involved, this is not just simply 
a case of reasoning by analogy. The Meissner effect does not just mean 
that the equations that describe magnetic flux in a superconducting mate­
rial must be formally analogous to the equations for flux in a diamagnetic 
material. It rather means that a superconductor is a kind of diamagnet. 
Equation (1.4.5) was derived from a correction to the solutions of the old 
‘acceleration equation’ theory -a correction prompted by the conception of 
the superconductor as a diamagnet. According to this conception the funda­
mental property of a superconductor is not nearly perfect conductivity but, 
of course, the expulsion of the magnetic flux within the material during the 
transition phase. Superconductivity is no longer characterised as the limit 
of perfect conductivity, but as the limit of perfect diamagnetism. Hence 
the phenomenon of the expulsion of the magnetic flux cannot, and should 
not, be explained by the emergence of a superconducting current. Super­
24See, for instance, Charles Kittel, Introduction to Solid State Physics [94, Chapter 14].
25Gorter and Casimir, [78].
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conductivity is truly characterised by two independent and non-reducible 
phenomenological hallmarks: perfect conductivity and the Meissner effect.
In the theory of Becker, Sauter and Heller the absence of an electric field 
entails that the Meissner effect is impossible, as expected from our initial 
consideration of Maxwell’s second equation in the case of perfect conductiv­
ity. Indeed the ‘acceleration equation’ entails the following equation for the 
magnetic flux inside the superconductor:
. 2 r 7 2 « ®  dB.A rV  —  = — . (1.4.6)dt dt v '
Integrating with respect to time one finds the following nonhomogeneous
equation:
Ac2V2(H -  H o )  = H  -  H o  (1.4.7)
Ho denotes the magnetic field at the time t=0 (ie. before the transition 
phase has occurred). Its value depends entirely on the value of the ambi­
ent field because a superconductor behaves exactly like a normal conductor 
before the phase transition, and the external field penetrates completely. 
The solutions to this equation are given by H  =  +  Ho, where the
exponentials e^■cx decrease very quickly with distance x from the surface 
of the material. So the ‘acceleration equation’ predicts that the field inside 
a superconductor will remain invariant throughout the phase transition. No 
change in the external flux will be observed and a surrounding coil will ex­
perience null induction. As London and London26 write of the theory of 
Becker, Sauter and Heller:
The general solution means, therefore, that practically the 
original field persists for ever in the supraconductor. The field 
Ho is to be regarded as ‘frozen in’ and represents a permanent 
memory of the field which existed when the metal was last cooled 
below the transition temperature [...] Until recently the existence
26London and London [98, page 72].
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of ‘frozen in’ magnetic fields in supraconductors was believed 
to be proved theoretically and experimentally. By Meissner’s 
experiment, however, it has been shown that this point of view 
cannot be maintained.
On the other hand the Londons’ diamagnetic model suggests that the 
field inside the material once the transition has occurred decreases very 
quickly with distance x from the surface of the material. So the correct solu­
tions must exclude the value (Ho) of the initial field, and must contain only 
the exponentials e^ cx. These are solutions to the following homogenous 
equation: Ac2V2H  = H. From this equation, the fundamental equation of 
superconductivity (1.4.5) can be derived, since V x H  = £j.
A useful way to visualize this result is by plotting the paths that would 
be followed in the graph for the phase transition (see the graph in figure 1.2 
-which is taken from a standard textbook27). Suppose that we begin in the 
position designated by P  in the graph. There is no initial field in the super­
conductor and hence no flux. In that case the prediction of the ‘acceleration 
equation’ model is as in the Meissner experiment: after the transition to the 
superconducting domain we expect to end up in the position given by S. In 
the final state there is no flux inside the bulk of the superconductor. But 
consider the case when there is initially some flux in the superconductor. 
For instance suppose that before the transition takes place the material is 
placed in some magnetic field. As the material is perfectly conducting the 
field will penetrate totally, and there will be a magnetic flux in the material 
identical to the flux outside the material. We can represent such a situation 
by position Q in the graph. In this case the prediction of the ‘acceleration 
equation’ theory contradicts the Meissner effect. According to the ‘acceler­
ation equation’ after the transition we end up in R  as the flux is ‘frozen in’ 
the material; the Meissner effect entails that we end up in S  nonetheless.
To sum up, the Londons suggested that the superconducting current is 
maintained by a magnetic field. The relation is of inverse proportionality, so
27Bleaney and Bleaney [13, page 399].
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Superconducting
Region
T  = 0
Figure 1.2: The Meissner effect
that if the field is greater than a certain threshold value the superconducting 
current will virtually come to a halt, as predicted by Onnes. This equation 
was determined, in the manner described above, by a new model of super­
conductivity; the model was in its own turn suggested by the phenomena. 
This reconstruction explains why no satisfactory theory of superconductivity 
was derived before the discovery of the Meissner effect. A novel conception, 
embodied in the model of the superconductor as one huge diamagnet, was re­
quired for a successful electromagnetic treatment of superconductivity, and 
such conception was not available before the discovery of the Meissner effect.
1.4.4 T he R ole  o f th e  T h eoretica l C on text
Steven French and James Ladyman28 have recently made an important con­
tribution to my case study, as part of their response to ‘The Tool-Box of 
Science’ [34]. Their work emphasises two aspects of the historical episode. 
First, French and Ladyman argue that there is a substructure common to 
the ‘acceleration equation’ theory and to the London equation. As this sub­
structure is derivable from either theory, it is hence confirmed in both cases. 
From the acceleration equation (1.4.4), by taking the curl and using the 
identity V x E  = -  J ® ,  one can derive the following equation:
VA £  =  . ! £  (1.4.8)dt c dt
As French and Ladyman point out this equation is the common substructure 
to both the ‘acceleration equation’ theory and the Londons’ theory. On the 
one hand (1.4.8) can be derived from the ‘acceleration equation’ theory 
as above; on the other hand (1.4.8) also follows from the Londons’ theory 
by simply taking the time derivative of the Londons’ equation (equation 
(1.4.5)). French and Ladyman [68, page 33] conclude that:
The acceleration equation goes beyond this [(1.4.8)] and in 
doing so ‘expresses a prejudice’ in so far as it is not supported
28French and Ladyman, ‘Superconductivity and Structures: Revisiting the London Ac­
count5 [68].
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by experience. Thus what we have here is an example of what 
Post29 calls ‘stripping’, where the old theory is ‘...stripped of 
dispensable, not independently confirmed superstructure’.
As can be seen by inspecting figure 1.2, it follows from equation (1-4.7) 
that the dispensable superstructure is in this case constituted by all those 
solutions to the ‘acceleration equation’ that correspond to a non-zero mag­
netic flux inside the material before the phase transition (i.e. all those 
cases where Ho ^  0). Hence, in this case, the ‘stripping’ of dispensable 
superstructure would amount to restricting the initial conditions on the old 
theory (in particular, it would amount to restricting Ho to Ho = 0). Was 
the Londons only contribution to restrict the set of initial conditions in the 
old ‘acceleration equation’ in order to get rid of the falsified substructures, 
while retaining the well-confirmed ones? Bardeen30, for instance, may seem 
to be saying just this when he writes in his impressive review article:
The Londons added (1.4.5) to the earlier ‘acceleration’ theory 
of Becker, Sauter and Heller to account for the Meissner effect.
But, it is not possible to read Bardeen as claiming that the Londons 
merely ‘stripped away’ the dispensable superstructure. The replacement of 
the set of solutions that involve the initial field in the superconductor by the 
family of exponential solutions is not a restriction of the old theory to the 
case where there is no initial magnetic flux inside the material, i.e. to the 
case where the initial external field Bo is zero. It is true that the ‘acceleration 
equation’ theory and the Londons’ theory fully agree that in this particular 
case the magnetic flux inside the superconductor after the transition will 
vanish. Nevertheless the whole point of the Londons’ theory is to show that 
the flux inside the superconductor is vanishingly small even if  the initial flux 
at the time when the transition took place is not zero, i.e. even if the material
29Post [ i l l ,  page 229].
30 Bardeen [9].
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is initially placed in a magnetic field Bo ^  0. Whenever the magnetic field 
is not vanishingly small outside the material before the transition the two 
theories give inconsistent predictions as regards the expulsion of flux: the 
‘acceleration equation’ theory predicts no expulsion, while the new theory 
predicts a brutal change, consistent with the Meissner effect. The Londons 
of course accept that in the case Bo = 0 the ‘acceleration equation’ theory 
gets it right. But they do not remain silent about those other cases that 
this theory does not get right. They provide a whole new theory that has 
the same predictions for the Bo = 0 case, but gives the correct predictions 
for the other cases. In general, writing down a new equation for the value 
of a physical quantity in a theory is not equivalent to restricting the initial 
conditions on the old equations.
The Londons did not just ‘strip away’ the old ‘acceleration equation’ 
theory. They proposed a radically different account that, as I have shown, 
could not be derived in any way from classical electromagnetism■, or for 
that matter from the ‘acceleration equation’ itself. French and Ladyman 
correctly note that the Londons new proposal keeps intact the substructure 
that generates the predictions that the ‘acceleration equation’ had got right, 
while providing new predictions for those cases the ‘acceleration equation’ 
could not cope with. This is not much of an argument for or against the 
idealization account (nor is it intended to be one); rather it brings to the 
fore the Londons’ common sense and their sound scientific methodology.
Secondly, French and Ladyman emphasise the very rich theoretical back­
ground to the Londons’ theory of superconductivity. In the ‘Tool-Box of 
Science’ a distinction was made between theoretical and phenomenological 
models; and it was argued that the Londons’ account of superconductiv­
ity (equation (1.4.5)) constituted a ‘phenomenological model’. Indeed the 
conclusion of the ‘Tool-Box’ was that:
... we have stumbled upon an example of phenomenological 
model building about which the theory-driven view has little to 
say. What is needed is the recognition of the independence from 
theory, in methods and aims, of the scientific activity we have
47
come to call phenomenological model building. [34, page 11]
French and Ladyman object to this conclusion. They argue that the London 
account of superconductivity was theoretical, not phenomenological, as its 
construction was not independent of theory; and they stress that the Lon­
dons’ work cannot be understood outside its proper theoretical context. As 
they write:
The construction of the London-London model did not pro­
ceed ‘phenomenologically’, in the sense of being independent of 
theory, but rather on the basis of a consideration of the earlier 
theoretical context and, in particular, of what could be retained 
from that context in the light of Meissner’s work. (op. cit. [68, 
page 34], my italics)
According to French and Ladyman, there are two salient aspects of this 
background theoretical context. First, of course, there is the ‘acceleration 
equation theory’ of Becker, Sauter and Heller, which was "'the first attempt 
to supplement Maxwell’s equations” (Gavroglu, [71, page 118]). Second, 
French and Ladyman claim, on the basis of Dahl’s31 recent exposition, that 
the model of a superconductor as a diamagnet was already ‘in the air’, and 
it was not introduced for the first time by the Londons in their 1934 paper. 
Fritz London himself, in a passage in a later paper32 in 1935, acknowleged 
this when he wrote:
It is rather seductive to consider the supra-current as a kind 
of diamagnetic current, an idea which has sometimes been ut­
tered in the past, now more seductive than ever, since Meiss­
ner’s experiment seems to reveal to us the more elementary phe­
31 Dahl [40].
32I want to thank Steven French for calling this passage to my attention, and for sending 
me with a copy of Fritz London’s paper which is absurdly unavailable in Oxford’s Bodlean 
library.
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nomenon to which one may hope to reduce the so enigmatical 
phenomenon of conductivity, (op. cit. [97, page 26], my italics)
Indeed a couple of years earlier, in a letter to Nature, Gorter33 had suggested 
that if diamagnetism was regarded as the general defining characteristic of 
superconductors then the phase transition would be reversible; thus opening 
the way for a consistent thermodynamics of superconductivity. The Lon­
dons took up the suggestion and provided an electromagnetic treatment of 
superconductivity by correcting the ‘acceleration equation’ theory in light 
of the diamagnetic model. As French and Ladyman note:
It was Gorter who realised, on reading of Meissner’s results, 
that the contradiction between the thermodynamic and magnetic 
representations of the superconducting transition could be dis­
solved if the condition of B = 0 (...) were regarded as the general 
defining characteristic of superconductors. The task was then 
to reconfigure the electromagnetic treatment in line with this 
criterion for distinguishing the superconducting phase, which is 
precisely what London and London did. (op. cit. [68, page 27], 
my italics)
If a ‘phenomenological model’ is a representation, or a collection, of 
empirical data that involves no theoretical assumptions or concepts, the 
Londons account of superconductivity was not a phenomenological model. 
It was a heavily theory-laden account. It was in fact an application of clas­
sical electromagnetism. The distinction between ‘phenomenological’ and 
‘theoretical’ models in no way ought to presuppose a notion of non theory- 
laden observation. Nor is ‘phenomenological model’ intended as a model 
of raw uninterpreted empirical data. Instead the distinction between phe­
nomenological and theoretical models outlined in the ‘Tool-Box of Science’ 
was intended to turn solely upon the ‘theory-driven’ view of model-building. 
A theoretical model is accordingly defined as a model that can be derived
33 Gorter [77].
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from another theoretical model by the introduction of corrections suggested 
by the theory. As we saw in the discussion of the idealization account, it is 
essential that the criterion whereby we choose corrections figures already in 
the theory; otherwise the resulting model would be called ‘phenomenologi­
cal’.
The terminology of ‘theoretical’ and ‘phenomenological’ models was cer­
tainly not used by the Londons themselves, nor was it known to them; and it 
led French and Ladyman to infer, incorrectly, that the claim of ‘Tool-Box of 
Science’ was that the Londons’ theory was inductively found, a claim which 
would of course be false. As French and Ladyman write:
Obviously model construction, and theory change in general, 
does not proceed by logical derivation -how would there be any 
genuine change if it did?- nor does it proceed purely phenomeno- 
logically, which is to say inductively (op. cit. [68, page 34]).
It should be clear that I am not arguing that the Londons found their the­
ory by inductive means. On the contrary, they found it by introducing 
corrections into the ‘acceleration equation’ theory. The point is that these 
corrections were prompted by an independently standing model of the su­
perconductor as a diamagnet, -a  model that was not itself suggested by 
theory. Hence, the London equation was not a ‘theoretical’ description, in 
the sense that I have been using the term here: the derivation of the London 
equation was not ‘theory-driven’34.
My thesis is then that the Meissner effect acted as the catalyst for the dia­
magnetic model of superconductivity. Of course the diamagnetic model also 
served to solve other long standing problems, mainly the inconsistency of the
34 See the discussion of McMullin’s views on application in section 1.2.2. Incidentally 
note that French and Ladyman’s remark that “obviously model construction [...]  does 
not proceed by logical derivation”, if indeed addressed to the theoretical/phenomenological 
models distinction, misses the target as a critique of McMullin’s views on application. 
For ‘theory-driven’ is not as strong as ‘entailed by theory’. If the corrections are logically 
dictated by the theory then, of course, they are also suggested by it. But a theory can 
suggest corrections that it does not logically entail.
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electromagnetic and the (reversible) thermodynamic treatments of supercon­
ductivity. But this inconsistency could not have, on its own, suggested the 
diamagnetic corrections to the ‘acceleration equation’. Historically the dis­
covery of the Meissner effect signalled the turning point. Before Meissner’s 
discovery the diamagnetic model was hardly credible; the analogy with ferro­
magnetism held tremendous sway, as it was so much more naturally fitted to 
perfect conductivity; but after Meissner’s discovery the diamagnetic model 
gained an irresistible appeal. Whether it was the Londons or Gorter who 
initially suggested the model is of secondary importance here. It would not 
even matter if the model had been mentioned before Meissner’s discovery. 
What matters is that for the community working in the field the transition 
from the ferromagnetic to the diamagnetic conception of superconductivity 
was prompted by the discovery of the Meissner effect. In fact the quoted pas­
sages (from French and Ladyman, Fritz London, and French and Ladyman 
again) make my point most forcefully. Every one of the emphasised phrases 
in those passages unambiguously states the fact that the diamagnetic model 
of superconductivity was prompted by Meissner’s discovery.
Kostas Gavroglu’s recent biography of Fritz London provides further 
evidence, once again in the form of testimony from Fritz London himself. 
In a 1937 letter to Casimir, London -while acknowledging the importance 
of the theoretical context- makes it clear that the Meissner effect was the 
determining factor in the acceptance of the diamagnetic conception:
The paper by Gorter, and that of Gorter and yourself, made 
a strong impression on me at the time, and incited me to en­
gage myself with superconductivity. It is true that the Meissner 
effect could have been predicted from Gorter’s ideas. The fact 
that the development of things did not take place this way and 
needed an experimental push, always appeared to me a sign that 
the acceptance of the reversibility was not at all self-evident, be­
cause of the fact that all the experiments displayed hysteresis 
and other non-reversibilities. It was at that time only a hypothe­
sis that was constructed in the dark ... and it was not proper to
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interpret in exactly that manner the objective non-reversibility 
and to pinpoint in that particular manner the assumption of re­
versibility. This is why the verification of this magnetothermic 
phenomenon seems to be so important for me. Because it means 
something more than a mere verification of thermodynamics. It 
also means, as far as I know, the verification that what we as­
sumed to be reversible is indeed reversible. ([71, page 121], italics 
in the original).
To sum up, French and Ladyman’s emphasis on the important role played 
by the theoretical context in this episode is in general agreement with my 
reconstruction, and their work in fact supports my main claim. I claim that 
the Londons’ account, even if not a deidealization, constituted an application 
of electromagnetic theory to superconductivity. For we arrive at the London 
equation (equation 1.4.5) by introducing corrections on a previous electro­
magnetic description of the phenomenon: the ‘acceleration equation’. So I 
welcome a study of this episode that emphasises the Londons’ background 
in electromagnetic theory, and in particular, their debt to the ‘acceleration 
equation’ theory of Becker, Sauter and Heller. I go further than French and 
Ladyman in claiming that, due to the fact that the diamagnetic concep­
tion was ultimately impressed upon the community by experimental facts 
independent of theoretical considerations, the Londons’ account is no ‘deide­
alization’ of electromagnetic theory. The theory did not suggest, and could 
not have determined, how to correct the ‘acceleration equation’ to account 
for the Meissner effect. I have no reason to believe that French and Lady­
man would disagree with this claim. On the contrary, as the emphasised 
passages show, their work not only falls to undermine my claim, it rather 
explicitly supports it.
1.5 Application in Practice: Problem s for Realism
In providing a macroscopic description of the Meissner effect in electromag­
netic terms, the Londons effectively succeeded in providing a satisfactory
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application of electromagnetic theory to superconductivity. However, they 
did not deidealize electromagnetic theory. Instead they came up with a 
model that permitted them to impose a novel constraint upon the original 
theoretical construction. This case study is not exceptional; on the contrary, 
many scientific applications are derived in this way. In astrophysics, for ex­
ample, there are several models of stellar structure. A certain conception 
of the internal constitution of a star, which determines the form of the con­
vection forces in the stellar plasma, has to be assumed before the quantum 
theory of radiation can be applied. For each different conception there is a 
corresponding application of the theory, a family of models, that could not 
have been derived from the theory alone. The idealization account is then 
not a universal account of scientific theory-application. It is far too restric­
tive. It imposes constraints so severe that they are not always -indeed are 
rarely- met in practice.
1.5.1 T he E p istem ology  o f T h eory-A p p lication
What are the epistemological implications of the rejection of the idealiza­
tion account? I shall focus the discussion closely upon the case study. The 
Londons built an application of electromagnetic theory to superconductiv­
ity; and yet, on McMullin’s account, the theory was in no way confirmed by 
the phenomenon of superconductivity. Confirmation requires that the the­
ory itself must suggest the introduction of corrections into the theoretical 
description. For, as McMullin points out35, a theoretical description is ad 
hoc with respect to a theory that does not suggest or motivate its deriva­
tion; and an ad hoc description, or hypothesis, cannot increase the degree 
of confirmation of a theory with respect to which it is ad hoc36.
35See the discussion in section 1.2.2 in this Thesis, and in particular the passage quoted 
from McMullin.
36Hempel too makes this claim in his [84, pp.28-30l, although he there ascribes a slightly 
different meaning to the term ad hoc. For Hempel, a hypothesis is ad hoc, with respect to 
some theory, if it has no surplus empirical content over the theory other than the particular 
phenomenon that it is specifically called to account for.
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In constructing their account of superconductivity, the Londons intro­
duced a correction into the previously available theoretical description. The 
correction was certainly not arbitrary, since it was justified by a new model 
of superconductivity. However, this model was not suggested by the the­
ory -it was suggested by a newly discovered physical effect. On McMullin’s 
confirmation theory, classical electromagnetism was not in this instance gen­
uinely confirmed at all. Was it neither confirmed nor disconfirmed, or was it 
simply disconfirmed? The answer depends on what we take electromagnetic 
theory to be circa 1933.
There are two possible pictures. It is possible to take ‘electromagnetic 
theory’ in an extended, historical sense, as constituted by all applications 
to electromagnetic phenomena known to the Londons. The ‘acceleration 
equation’ is part of electromagnetic theory, when construed in this extended 
sense. And, as we saw, the Londons gave an account that contradicted the 
acceleration equation predictions in a range of cases. Hence, if taken in this 
‘historical’ sense, classical electromagnetism was indeed disconfirmed by the 
Meissner effect.
Alternatively, one may provide an abstract reconstruction of electro­
magnetic theory. The standard reconstructions normally assume that clas­
sical electromagnetism is constituted by the deductive closure of Maxwell’s 
equations. Now, the ‘acceleration equation’, although not inconsistent with 
Maxwell’s equations, is not a logical consequence of these equations. It can 
be postulated alongside them, in just the way Ohm’s law is often postu­
lated alongside Maxwell’s equations, but it cannot be derived from them. 
Nor is the Londons’ account a logical consequence of Maxwell’s equations; 
although it is also consistent with them, and can be postulated alongside 
them37. Thus, neither the ‘acceleration equation’ nor the London’s equa­
tion is part of electromagnetic theory, understood in this abstract manner. 
And it follows that, in this abstract reconstruction, the Londons account
37N.B. It is perfectly possible for a theory T  to be consistent with each of two mutually 
inconsistent assumptions a and b, -as long as T  entails neither a nor 6, of course.
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provided neither a confirmatory nor a disconfirmatory boost for classical 
electromagnetism.
And yet, the Londons’ treatment did increase scientists’ confidence in 
electromagnetic theory. Superconductivity had proved difficult to model in 
classical electromagnetism for a long time, and many were beginning to de­
spair that a consistent electromagnetic treatment would ever be found. The 
diamagnetic conception played a key role in the Londons’ explanation of 
the phenomenon of superconductivity, which reveals the extent to which a 
mediating model carries genuine physical knowledge. The Londons’ theory 
was generally accepted to account rather accurately for the rate of magnetic 
flux expulsion from a superconductor during the phase transition reported 
by Meissner and Ochsenfeld in their experimental investigations38. From 
this application of electromagnetism we learn that superconductivity is an 
essentially diamagnetic effect; that a superconductor is not a ferromagnet; 
and, moreover, as the Londons’ account correctly predicts the rates of ex­
pulsion of magnetic flux observed by Meissner and Ochsenfeld, we gain a 
theoretical understanding of the Meissner effect. The Meissner effect does 
not appear as a mysterious side-effect of superconductors; instead it takes 
centre stage, it becomes a fundamental hallmark of superconductivity.
The Londons’ account of superconductivity provided an extra ‘boost’ 
of confidence in classical electromagnetism which the old ‘acceleration’ the­
ory could not provide. But, as we have seen, on McMullin’s idealization 
account of application, the Meissner effect does not make electromagnetic 
theory more likely to be true. It seems that this extra boost of confidence in 
electromagnetism cannot be captured by the standard realist theory of con­
firmation, so I shall refer to the kind of support that the Londons treatment 
provided for electromagnetism as degree of confidence rather than degree of 
confirmation.
The fact that the Londons’ equation accounts for the Meissner effect
38Although there was some initial resistance to the London’s theory on empirical 
grounds. In particular Von Laue disagreed; for the dispute between Fritz London and 
Von Laue, see Gavroglu [71, pages 123-127].
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gives grounds to believe that classical electromagnetism is instrumentally 
reliable. But it does not constitute evidence for the truth of classical elec­
tromagnetic theory. Here degree of confidence and degree of confirmation 
seem to depart. Degree of confidence, unlike degree of confirmation, does 
not point to the likelihood of the theory to be true; it only to points to 
the reliability of the theory as an instrument in application. The theory 
is a reliable instrument if it is capable, perhaps when conjoined with good 
enlightening mediating models, of generating successful applications. And 
from the fact that the theory is instrumentally successful, the truth of the 
theory does not follow.
Or does it? Would it not be a miracle if the theory was false, yet instru­
mentally successful? Does the instrumental success of scientific theories not 
argue for scientific realism? Arguments of this kind in favour of realism are, 
of course, well known in the literature39. Typical antirealist responses to 
this argument are equally well known. For instance Arthur Fine40 responds 
that the ‘no-miracles’ argument is riddled with circularity: it assumes that 
precisely the very sort of inference from explanatory power to truth that re­
alism sanctions and instrumentalism contests for scientific practice, is valid 
at the ‘meta-level’ and can be used as part of an argument for realism in gen­
eral. As a response, scientific realists have turned to the pragmatic virtues 
of realism, and they have tried to show that no version of antirealism is 
in any better shape. In particular the debate has focused upon Bas Van 
Fraassen’s version of antirealism, known as constructive empiricism41.
It is not necessary to rehearse these arguments here. The issues about 
realism that I am raising are tangential to the recent debate between sci-
39The original £no-miracle’ arguments are due to Putnam [113], and Boyd [16], and [17].
40Fine, ‘Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science’ [63].
41 For Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism see ‘To Save the Phenomena’ [132], 
reprinted with corrections in his book The Scientific Image [133]. A collection of pa­
pers by critics of constructive empiricism, together with responses by Van Fraassen is 
contained in Images of Science [37].
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entific realists and constructive empiricists. The contrast between degree of 
confidence and degree of confirmation is not captured by the debate. Degree 
of confirmation measures the degree of a theory’s empirical adequacy, or its 
truth. Degree of confidence, as I would like to define it, is not grounded 
on an evidential relationship of the truth-conferring type between a theory 
and phenomena. Increased confidence in classical electromagnetism need 
not to be accompanied by an increase in one’s estimated probability that it 
correctly describes the world, i.e. that it is true. The success of the London 
model does not provide warrant for that. Neither does it warrant an increase 
in one’s estimated probability that the theory correctly describes the phe­
nomenal world, ie. that the theory is empirically adequate. Unlike degree of 
confirmation, degree of confidence is not a function of a theory’s predictive 
power and empirical adequacy. It is not evidential but pragmatic, a function 
of the success of a theory in generating applications to diverse phenomena 
whenever conjoined with the appropriate mediating models. I call this fea­
ture of theories ‘instrumental reliability’ in order to distinguish it sharply 
from empirical adequacy. The instrumental reliability of a theory does not 
require, nor does it necessarily follow from, its empirical adequacy. This is 
of course in agreement with my argument so far: the fact that classical elec­
tromagnetic theory can be applied to superconductivity should not be taken 
as an indication that the theory is true to superconductivity phenomena.
1.5 .2  C onclusions
Let us grant that scientists do see a theory’s applications as providing some 
degree of confidence in the theory. Does this not argue for the idealization 
account, and hence for the realist epistemology that underpins it? Some 
scientific realists, such as McMullin, think so. The idealization account, they 
think, is required by scientific epistemology. On the idealization account the 
explanatory power of a theory is exhibited through its applications, and the 
theory is more likely to be true in view of the success of its applications. So, 
realism is required to make sense of the epistemology of theory-application.
However, the instrumentalist can give a similarly good account of the
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epistemology of application. Scientists’ increased confidence in a theory 
that has generated many applications is a result of the theory’s instrumental 
success in modelling the phenomena. This gives, at most, confidence that 
the theory will continue to generate successful applications in the future, i.e. 
that it is an instrumentally reliable theory. And this argues against realism: 
a successful application of a theory need not constitute evidence that the 
theory is true. The applications of a scientific theory do not necessarily 
yield the kind of evidential support for the truth of the theory that scientific 
realism requires them to.
1.6 Summary
In this chapter I have introduced the notion of a mediating model (section 
1). By means of a case study in superconductivity I have argued that medi­
ating models play a key role in the application of scientific theories (section 
4). I have described McMulllin’s realist account of scientific theory applica­
tion (section 2), and I have argued that the role of models as mediators is 
incompatible with such an account (section 3). I have finally argued (sec­
tion 5) that the pervasive role of models as mediators strongly suggests a 
very different account of application, one that carries no com m itm en t to a 
realist epistemology. Yet this alternative account can also explain why, in 
scientific practice, confidence in a scientific theory is typically boosted by 
its applications.
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Chapter 2
The Semantic View: 
Empirical Adequacy, Truth 
and Application
2.1 To Save the Phenom ena
In The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [49], Pierre Duhem argued 
that the aim of physics is ‘to save the phenomena’. The physicist’s task is to 
construct physical theories that account for the phenomena, in the following 
two ways. Firstly, theories provide scientists with a Machian economy of 
thought that permits them to hold in mind a number of empirical regularities 
all at once:
Instead of a great number of laws offering themselves as in­
dependent of one another, each having to be learnt and remem­
bered on its own account, physical theory substitutes a very 
small number of propositions, viz., fundamental hypotheses. [...]
Such condensing of a multitude of laws into a smaller number 
of principles afford enormous relief to the human mind, which 
might not be able without such an artifice to store up the new 
wealth it acquires daily. (Duhem, Aim and Structure [49, page
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21])
Secondly, theories contain only the most abstract principles which can clas­
sify and impose structure upon the diversity of natural phenomena:
Experimental physics supplies us with laws all lumped to­
gether and, so to speak, on the same plane, without partitioning 
them into groups of laws united by a kind of family tie. [...] On 
the other hand theory, by developing the numerous ramifications 
of the deductive reasoning which connects principles to experi­
mental laws, establishes an order and a classification among these 
laws. [...] Theory gives, so to speak, the table of contents and 
the chapter headings under which the science to be studied will 
be methodologically divided, and it indicates the laws which are 
to be arranged under each of these chapters. (Duhem, op.cit.
[50, pp. 23-24]).
The physical laws that theoretical hypotheses classify are not themselves 
empirical regularities, but rather inductive generalisations of empirical reg­
ularities . Observed regularities necessarily have only a finite number of in­
stances, -as they are constituted by a collection of concrete facts, normally 
relating to past spatio-temporal coincidences between particular kinds of 
events-, while laws have a potentially infinite number of instances. Hence 
the observed regularities do not fix the physical laws. In modem philosophi­
cal jargon: physical laws are underdetermined by the phenomena. Similarly, 
for Duhem, physical theory is underdetermined by the set of physical laws. 
As a matter of principle there will be several hypotheses that can equally 
well classify the set of physical laws, and equally well account for the phe­
nomena.
According to Duhem, the truth of a theory can only manifest itself in 
the theory’s capacity to account for the phenomena:“agreement with exper­
iment is the sole criterion of truth for a physical theory” (Duhem, op.cit. 
[49, page 21]). However, two empirically equivalent theories may postulate 
radically different properties of the entities and processes that underlie the
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phenomena. (The Ptolemaic system of the world, for instance, postulates 
that the earth is static at the centre of the Universe, while in the Copernican 
system the earth follows a perfect circular motion around the sun.) This 
yields the well-known sceptical argument from underdetermination: How 
are we to choose, among all these empirically equivalent possibilities, the 
one and only true theory? If the truth of the theory manifests itself only 
in its capacity to save the phenomena, it is not possible to select the true 
theory from among the set of empirically indistinguishible hypotheses. The 
assertion that one of them is true becomes an empty metaphysical claim, 
devoid of empirical content1.
The only necessary requirement for accepting a theory is that it must 
save the phenomena. But how exactly is a theory supposed to ‘save the phe­
nomena’ ? How can physicists know when the theory has achieved its aim to 
‘save the phenomena’? And how much of the phenomena is a theory sup­
posed to ‘save’ ? In a collection of papers originally published in 1908, and 
now available under the title To Save the Phenomena [50] Duhem suggests 
that astronomy, in the tradition of Eudoxus and Ptolemy, will provide the 
model: theories save the phenomena in just the same fashion astronomical 
hypotheses describe the observed motions of the objects in the heavens2.
1This doctrine is essentially of scholastic origin; Duhem (op.cit. [50, page 41]) approv­
ingly quotes Saint Thomas Aquinas:
Astronomers have tried in diverse ways to explain this motion [of the 
planets]. But it is not necessary that the hypotheses they have imagined be 
true, for it may be that the appearances the stars present might be due to 
some other mode of motion yet unknown by men.
2In To Save the Phenomena [50] Duhem describes two competing astronomical tra­
ditions. In the tradition of Eudoxus and Ptolemy celestial phenomena are ‘saved’ if the 
motions of objects in the heavens can be calculated, and predicted. In the tradition of 
Aristotle and Posidonius some further conditions must be satisfied: hypotheses about the 
motions of the objects in the heavens must be based upon the solid principles of physics. 
The Aristotelian tradition is lost for centuries to the Christian world, preserved only in the 
Arab writings of Averroes and Al-Bitrogi, translated into latin only late in the middle ages 
in the Court of Alfonso X of Castille; it is adopted during the Renaissance by the Italian 
Averroists of the School of Padua and, according to Duhem, it is inherited by Coperni-
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The observable predictions of the theory are found by deduction from first 
premises expressing nomological relations between physical quantities, to­
gether with boundary conditions and a number of auxiliary assumptions 
about the workings of instruments, etc. These predictions must be borne 
out if the theory is to ‘save the phenomena’. This hypothetico-deductive 
methodology is of course not in contradiction with Duhem’s belief in under- 
determination. An experimental contradiction of a theoretical prediction 
does not necessarily result in a refutation of the theory, as the underdeter­
mination argument still applies in its holistic form:
The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to ex­
perimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when 
the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he 
learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this 
group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experi­
ment does not designate which one should be changed. (Duhem, 
op.cit. [49, page 187]).
What is interesting about Duhem’s later historical work is that in the 
astronomical model both the application and the testing of astronomical 
hypotheses follow the hypothetico-deductive method. In order to test a 
hypothesis about the constitution of the heavens, we look for a derivation 
from the hypothesis of a sequence of positions of a planet, given the appro­
priate boundary conditions, and we test that sequence by direct observation. 
Equally a model for the motion of a planet is a sequence of positions deduced 
from a hypothesis, in just the same manner. But, in general, the distinc­
tion between confirmation and application is coherent, and it is important.
cans and Inquisitors alike (although with obviously competing interpretations) during the 
Galilean trials. The former tradition, which Duhem favours, begins with Eudoxus and 
Ptolemy; it is pursued in Christianity by the scholastics of the University of Paris during 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and their followers in German-speaking countries 
thereafter; and it eventually gives rise to the conciliatory and ecumenical views of Osiander 
and Bellarmino.
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In fact, Duhem himself had carefully distinguished between what he called 
experiments of testing and experiments of application:
You are confronted with a problem in physics to be solved 
practically; in order to produce a certain effect you wish to make 
use of knowledge acquired by physicists; you wish to light an in­
candescent bulb; accepted theories indicate to you the means 
you have to secure certain information; you ought, I suppose, to 
determine the electromotive force of the battery of generators 
at your disposal; you measure this electromotive force: that is 
what I call an experiment of application. This experiment does 
not aim at discovering whether accepted theories are accurate 
or not; it merely intends to draw on these theories. In order to 
carry it out, you make use of instruments that these same theo­
ries legitimise; there is nothing to shock logic in this procedure. 
(Duhem, op.cit. [49, page 184]).
In To Save the Phenomena Duhem assimilated the notion of application 
to the notion of empirical adequacy: in the model provided by astronomy, 
the domain of application of a theory (such as, for instance, Ptolemy’s) 
coincides with its domain of empirical adequacy. (If Ptolemy’s theory can 
be applied to all kinds of observed motions in the sky, then it is an empirically 
adequate theory of celestial motion.) In other words, the cases that confirm 
the theory are precisely those to which the theory gets applied. This view, 
which construes a theory’s applications as strict deductions from theory, 
is not, however, a consequence of Duhem’s empiricist epistemology. It is 
instead a consequence of taking astronomy to provide the model for the 
application of theories. Astronomy provides a handy picture, one in which 
application and confirmation go hand in hand. But there is no reason why 
physics as a whole ought to accord to this picture, and there is no reason 
why empiricism ought to be committed to it.
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2.2 The Nature o f Scientific Theories
The syntactic picture of a theory identifies it with a body 
of theorems, stated in one particular language chosen for the 
expression of that theory. This should be contrasted with the 
alternative of presenting a theory in the first instance by identi­
fying a class of structures as its models. In this second semantic, 
approach the language used to express the theory is neither basic 
not unique; the same class of structures could well be described 
in different ways, each with its own limitations. The models 
occupy centre stage.
(Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image [133, page 44])
2.2 .1  T he Syn tactic  C onception
With a few remarkable exceptions the logical positivist tradition focused on 
the empirical adequacy of scientific theories, and construed empirical ade­
quacy as a logical relation between a theory and the phenomena that the 
theory describes. In Carl G. Hempel’s early work the empirical adequacy 
of a theory is closely connected with the meaning of its theoretical terms. 
Theoretical terms are supposed to gain their meaning from the observational 
vocabulary to which they are linked by correspondence rules -sentences that 
contain a mixture of theoretical and observational terms. In ‘The Theoreti­
cian’s Dilemma’ Hempel writes:
A deductive system can function as a theory in empirical 
science only if it has been given an interpretation by reference 
to empirical phenomena. We may think of such interpretation 
as being effected by the specification of a set of interpretative 
sentences, which connect certain terms of the theoretical vocab­
ulary with observational terms. (Hempel, Aspects of Scientific 
Explanation [83, 184])
According to the Received View of scientific theories, a theory is a set 
of sentences in a first-order language L. The logical vocabulary consists
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of the usual first-order logical constants, while the non-logical vocabulary is 
divided into Vo which contains the ‘observational’ terms, and Vp which con­
tains the ‘theoretical’ or non-observational terms. This splits the language 
L into three sublanguages: Lp, the theoretical language, which contains 
sentences formed exclusively out of terms in Vp] L o , the observational lan­
guage, whose sentences are formed out of terms in Vo only; and Lm , the 
mixed language, which has ‘mixed’ sentences containing at least one term of 
Vo and at least one of Vp. The observational language is then given a full 
semantic interpretation by describing a domain of purely observable entities 
and relations, and by setting up a mapping from the terms in Vo into a set of 
concrete observable events or entities, and from the predicates that appear 
in the sentences of Lo into directly observable relations between those events 
or entities. It then becomes possible to give a partial interpretation of the 
theoretical language Lp  by providing two kinds of postulates: theoretical 
postulates and mixed postulates.
Theoretical postulates axe sentences in Lp which implicitly define some 
of the terms in the theoretical vocabulary by means of antecedently under­
stood terms in Vp. The set of theoretical postulates T  is said to constitute 
the ‘axioms’ of the theory. But if these were the only sentences in the the­
ory, all the terms in Vp would be implicitly defined by the postulates in 
T, which would make T, the theory, analytically true and, therefore, true 
a priori3. This consequence may, pace Quine, be welcomed in the context 
of pure mathematics, but it is unacceptable for scientific theories. Scien­
tific theories therefore necessarily contain further sentences that connect 
the observational and theoretical vocabularies -for no scientific theory can 
the ‘mixed’ language Lm  be empty.
The sentences in the mixed language Lm  are called mixed postulates, 
or correspondence rules. Let us refer to the set of all correspondence rules 
as C; a scientific theory is then defined, in the syntactic conception, as 
the union of the set of theoretical postulates and the set of correspondence
3 Essentially this point is made by Hempel in [86, page 248].
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rules, and can be denoted by TC. Correspondence rules have a semantic, 
cognitive and empirical role. They provide a partial semantics for theoretical 
terms; they guarantee that the propositions asserted by the theory are truth- 
apt and receive a truth value (which one depends upon the truth value of 
the observational sentences under their ascribed interpretation); and they 
provide the empirical import of the theory. As Frederick Suppe writes:
Correspondence rules serve three functions in the Received 
View: first, they define theoretical terms; second, they guarantee 
the cognitive significance of theoretical terms; third, they specify 
the admissible experimental procedures for applying theory to 
phenomena. (Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories [124, 
page 17])
A theory is empirically adequate if what it entails about the phenomena 
is indeed the case. What does the theory entail? Well, according to the 
syntactic conception of scientific theories, this has an easy answer. We 
began precisely by assuming that the observable content of the theory can 
be isolated in a sublanguage of the language of the theory, L o , which receives 
a full semantic interpretation in terms of observable processes and entities. 
Hence the empirical content of the theory is the set of all synthetic sentences 
in L o • If these are all true, the theory is empirically adequate. This is, in 
the syntactic conception, the basic criterion for the empirical adequacy of a 
scientific theory.
2.2 .2  C ritique o f th e Syn tactic  C onception
It is not necessary to review here the history of misery and pitfalls that 
followed the introduction of the distinction between the theoretical and the 
observational vocabulary of a theory. The many and varied criticisms of 
the distinction -due mostly to Norwood Russell Hanson, Paul Feyerabend, 
Hilary Putnam, Grover Maxwell4 -turned on aspects of the theory-ladenness
4 An overview and summary is in Suppe, op.cit. [124].
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of observation. Suffice it to say that Hempel himself famously abandoned the 
requirement that the division between subvocabularies be drawn on any such 
distinction. Instead he adopted a division between ‘new’ and ‘antecedently 
understood’ terms, and replaced correspondence rules with bridge principles:
The bridge principles will evidently contain both the terms of 
[the new vocabulary] and those of the vocabulary used in formu­
lating the original descriptions of, and generalisations about, the 
phenomena for which the theory is to account. This vocabulary 
will thus be available and understood prior to the introduction 
of the theory, and its use will be governed by principles which, 
at least initially, are independent of the theory. Let us refer to 
it as the pretheoretical or antecedent vocabulary, relative to the 
theory in question. (Hempel [85, page 143])
This vocabulary is pretheoretical relative to a theory, in the sense that its 
terms already appear in previous theories. Terms in the antecedent vocab­
ulary need not be linked to observational terms, nor are they to receive a 
full semantic interpretation by means of observable entities and processes:
The terms of the antecedent vocabulary are by no means 
assumed to be “observational” in the sense of the familiar theo­
retical - observational distinction; that is, they are not required 
to stand for entities or characteristics whose presence can be 
ascertained by direct observation, unaided by instruments and 
theoretical inference. (Hempel [86, page 245].)
Hempel’s revision was designed to patch up the syntactic conception as 
a theory of meaning for theoretical terms. In abandoning correspondence 
rules and adopting bridge principles instead, Hempel effectively abandoned 
the symmetry between theoretical meaning and empirical adequacy. Bridge 
principles connect the new terms with antecedently understood terms, pro­
viding a partial interpretation of the new terms. But as the antecedent 
vocabulary is not restricted to observable entities and processes, bridge
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principles cannot give empirical content to the theory; the restriction of 
the theoretical postulates to the antecedent vocabulary does not yield the 
empirical import of the theory. Therefore, Hempel’s revision leaves us in 
the dark as to how to characterise the empirical adequacy of a theory. In 
fact, this revision reflects Hempel’s conviction that such a characterisation 
is not needed, after all, for a satisfactory understanding of the meaning of 
theoretical terms.
Bas Van Fraassen has provided independent arguments against the syn­
tactic characterisation of empirical adequacy. In his book The Scientific 
Image he argues that it is impossible to isolate the empirical import of a 
theory in a purely syntactic fashion, by drawing a distinction between theo­
rems in terms of vocabulary. The empirical content of a theory is what the 
theory says about what is observable, and nothing more. However, many 
theoretical commitments of a theory can be expressed in its restricted ‘ob­
servational’ vocabulary:
Any unobservable entity will differ from the observable ones 
in the way it systematically lacks observable characteristics. As 
long as we do not abjure negation, therefore, we shall be able to 
state in the observational vocabulary (however conceived) that 
there axe unobservable entities, and, to some extent, what they 
are like. The quantum theory, Copenhagen version, implies that 
there are things which sometimes have a position in space, and 
sometimes have not. This consequence I have just stated without 
using a single theoretical term. (Van Fraassen [133, page 54])
The syntactic characterisation of empirical import misfires. In the syntactic 
conception the empirical import of a theory is constituted by the theorems of 
the theory expressed in the observational vocabulary: T C /V o • Two theories 
TC\ and TC2 are considered to be empirically equivalent if their restrictions 
to the observable vocabulary are identical, i.e. if TC 1/V0  = TC 2/V0 (as­
suming that the extension of Vo is the same for both theories). However, the 
requirement that all sentences in the observational language be true for the
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theory to be empirically adequate is too strong. And the criterion of empir­
ical equivalence is correspondingly too strong: theories that axe in practice 
empirically indistinguishible will, according to the syntactic criterion, be 
judged empirically non-equivalent. Van Fraassen gives several examples of 
empirically indistinguishible theories that turn out, on the syntactic crite­
rion, to be ‘empirically non-equivalent’. For instance, Newton’s theory of 
mechanics and gravitation, with the postulate of absolute space, is indistin­
guishible from a version of the Leibnizian theory that simply asserts that 
Newton’s theory is empirically adequate. On the syntactic account, how­
ever, these theories are not empirically equivalent, because it is possible to 
make assertions about the properties that absolute space lacks within the 
observational vocabulary of Newton’s theory.
The problem is that the restriction of the theorems of the theory to the 
‘observable’ vocabulary does not need to correspond to a demarcation of 
those claims that the theory makes about the observable part of the world. 
As Van Fraassen notes:
The reduced theory \TC /Vo] is not a description of part of 
the world described by TC\ rather \TCjVo] is, in a hobbled and 
hamstrung fashion, the description by TC of everything. (Van 
Fraassen, op.cit. [133, page 55])
Some of the claims that a theory makes about the non-observable part of the 
world can be expressed wholly in the observable vocabulary. The theory- 
ladenness of observation points to the fact that the the converse must also 
be the case: in order to assert the observational consequences of the theory 
we will often need to appeal to the theoretical vocabulary. So, the division 
between ‘observable’ and ‘theoretical’ vocabularies of a theory cannot track 
the distinction between those claims that the theory makes about the ob­
servable part of the world, and those it makes about the unobservable part. 
The syntactic conception has some other severe problems (for instance: it 
makes theories essentially language-relative objects), but I do not need to 
discuss them here. Like Van Fraassen, I look for an account of theories that 
can explicate the notion of empirical adequacy. It seems it is impossible to
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isolate the empirical content of a theory in a syntactic fashion, by means of 
a division of the vocabularies in which the theory’s claims are cast. So, an 
alternative, non syntactic, account of scientific theories must be sought. I 
turn now to Van Fraassen’s favourite account: the semantic conception.
2 .2 .3  T he Sem antic C onception
The semantic view of scientific theories has antecedents in work by Beth 
and Von Neumann in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. It was developed into 
a comprehensive account of scientific theories by Patrick Suppes in a series 
of papers in the late 1950s5. Van Fraassen expresses the basic tenet of the 
semantic view as follows:
To present a theory, we define the class of its models directly, 
without paying any attention to questions of axiomatisability, 
in any special language, however relevant or simple or logically 
interesting that might be. And if the theory as such, is to be 
identified with anything at all -  if theories are to be reified- 
then a theory should be identified with its class of models. (Van 
Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry [137, page 222])
There axe, however, many kinds of models. What sort of models is the 
semantic conception appealing to? Defenders of the semantic conception 
seemingly differ on their answers to this question. I will begin by distin­
guishing two kinds of models. I call the first semantic models, for lack of a 
better term. These models are also sometimes referred to as interpretations, 
although this terminology is somewhat misleading: a semantic model is not 
only an interpretation, but an interpretation and a structure. The structure 
is composed of a domain D of objects and some relations R{ defined over 
the elements in that domain, and can be denoted as S  = <  D ,R i >. A 
language L is specified which contains logical constants, names and n-place
5Suppes [125], [126], and also a manuscript circulated under the title ‘Set-theoretical 
Structures in Science’ [128].
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predicates. An interpretation of the language L  in terms of the structure 
S  is a mapping from the constants in a language into the elements of the 
domain D , and from the predicates in the language into the relations R{ in 
the structure. In order to identify a particular interpretational mapping we 
need to specify both the structure S  that constitutes its range, and also the 
language X, including the syntax, that constitutes its domain. Thus, the 
definition of a semantic model is always tied to a particular language.
The second kind of models I call simply structures. To specify these we 
need not specify a particular syntax; structures are not necessarily tied up to 
any language. These are typically mathematical structures, defined over a 
domain of mathematical objects. In Van Fraassen’s version of the semantic 
conception a scientific theory is a collection of models of this kind:
The impact of Suppes’s innovation is lost if models are de­
fined, as in many standard logic texts, to be partially linguis­
tic entities, each yoked to a particular syntax [...] Models are 
mathematical structures, called models of a given theory only 
by virtue of belonging to the class defined to be models of that 
theory. (Van Fraassen, op.cit. [137, page 366])
This suggests that the name of the ‘semantic’ conception of scientific theories 
is perhaps misleading. For this name brings to mind the syntax/semantics 
distinction in linguistics, and the notion of an interpretation of a particu­
lar language; while, as a matter of fact, the ‘semantic’ conception defends 
the view that scientific theories are families of mathematical structures -  
and these are not to be thought of as providing an interpretation of any 
language. Indeed, for very much these reasons, Ronald Giere has recently 
proposed changing the name of the semantic view to the model-theoretic 
view6. The ‘model-theoretic’ or, as I will call it, the ‘structuralist’ construal 
of the semantic conception has an important advantage over the ‘semantic- 
model’ construal. It provides an answer to the charge, by Michael Friedman
6Giere [74, page 277].
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[69] and John WorraU [144], that there is no essential superiority of the se­
mantic over the syntactic conception. If the models the semantic view refers 
to were models of the first kind, i.e. semantic models, the semantic and syn­
tactic characterisations of a theory would be provingly equivalent. Given an 
elementary class of models (call it N ) we know, by the completeness theorem 
of first-order logic, that there must be a set of axioms A x , in the language of 
first order logic, that is satisfied by this and only this set of models. So talk 
about the models (semantic models) is equivalent to talk about the axioms 
(in the language of first order logic). As Michael Friedman puts it:
Let us follow van Fraassen in identifying a theory with a 
class of models or structures. Suppose, however, that the class 
of models in question is a so-called “elementary class”: i.e. that 
it contains precisely the models of some first-order theory T  [...]
Then the completeness theorem immediately yields the equiv­
alence of Van Fraassen’s account and the traditional syntactic 
account. (Friedman, [69, page 276-77])
And John Worrall concurs:
The primacy of the semantic approach cannot rest on logical 
considerations. So far as logic is concerned, syntax and semantics 
go hand-in-hand -to  every consistent set of first-order sentences 
there corresponds a non-empty set of models, and to every nor­
mal (‘elementary’) set of models there corresponds a consistent 
set of first-order sentences. (Worrall, ‘An Unreal Image’ [144, 
page 71])
Van Fraassen has answered this criticism in two stages. First he has ar­
gued, following Patrick Suppes, that first-order logic will normally be insuf­
ficient for the formalisation of any interesting theory. The Friedman-Worrall 
equivalence claim goes through only if a set of axioms in the language o f first 
order logic exists of which the family of models is an equivalent class. The 
completeness theorem then guarantees the equivalence claim. But, any phys­
ical theory that appeals to the real number continuum cannot be formally
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axiomatised in the language of first order logic. And virtually no interest­
ing physical theory can make do without employing the real numbers and 
differential calculus.
The completeness theorem is, as Patrick Suppes7 has emphasised, irrel­
evant in the formalisation of any interesting physical theories. Imagine that 
a scientific theory is presented in just the way that the semantic view ad­
vocates, i.e. by specifying a class of structures directly, without appealing 
to any particular language. Call this set of structures T. Suppose further, 
that in specifying these structures we need to mention the real number con­
tinuum. We can try to formalize T  in some particular natural or artificial 
language L. We will write a set of axioms Ax  which we can correlate with 
the class of semantic models in L that make the axioms Ax, and only those 
axioms, true. This is an equivalence class of models in L: call this set of 
semantic models N . However, the real number continuum is infinite, and 
the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem guarantees that there will be many models 
in N  not isomorphic to any of the structures in T . So N  is not a very 
good representation of T; and Ax is a rather poor axiomatisation of T  in 
the language L (note, however, that no better axiomatisation of T  in L is 
available, as the same problem recurs with any other set of axioms).
This suggests, though, a more general thought: the class of models M  
that constitute a scientific theory is simply not an elementary class -th a t is, 
there is no set of axioms (in any language) that is satisfied by all the models 
in the class and by only those models. Indeed Van Fraassen’s second defence 
has consisted in stressing the distinction between structures and semantic 
models. He has written:
If a theory is to be identified with the set of its models, is 
that set an elementary class or not? The question makes sense 
only if we construe “models” as referring to the models of some 
particular language. (Van Fraassen, [134, page 302])
And more recently:
7Suppes, [128, chapters 1,2].
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In a trivial sense, everything is axiomatizable, because a thing 
must be described in order to be discussed at all. But for logi­
cians, ‘axiomatizable’ is not a vacuous term, and a scientific the­
ory need not be axiomatizable in their sense -o r as they say, the 
family of models may not be an elementary class. (Van Fraassen,
Laws and Symmetry [137, page 211]).
Consider again the case of T, defined directly by delimiting its set of 
structures. T  is not a set of semantic models; i.e. it is not a set of models in 
a particular language. The set N  is, and it is ‘a sort of image o fT  produced 
through the lens (which may be more or less distorting) of the specific chosen 
language'1 (Van Fraassen, op.cit [134, page 302]). But moreover, as we saw, 
N  is typically too large -it contains plenty of structures not isomorphic to
any structures in T. Some unspecified subset of TV, call it T*, will contain
just those structures that figure in T, accompanied by interpretations of the 
syntax of L. So T* is a more perfect image of T  in terms of models of L 
than is N . But if T* is some unspecified subset of IV, there is no guarantee 
that it will turn out to be an elementary class. In fact, it is now clear that 
the same set of structures can form an elementary class of semantic models 
in a language L ', given some interpretation of the syntax of X', while not 
forming an elementary class of semantic models in a different language X, 
however interpreted. Unlike T *, the theory T  is not a set of semantic models 
that by accident fail to form an elementary class. For the elements of T, 
which constitute the theory, are not semantic models; they are instead a set 
of what I have called structures.
When a theory is presented, on the semantic view, it is not a set of 
semantic models that is given; rather, it is a set of structures. It is then 
possible to show that the Friedman-Worrall equivalence claim doesn’t apply: 
structures cannot form ‘elementary classes’. To define an elementary class 
of models we need to refer to a particular language. Semantic models would 
allow us to do so, as they themselves specify a language; but a structure 
does not specify any language. It simply makes no sense to ask of a set of 
structures whether they constitute an elementary class.
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2.3 Empirical Adequacy in the Semantic Concep­
tion
Empiricists maintain that a scientific theory can be justified only by care­
ful consideration of the relevant evidence. But in practice the assessment 
of a theory’s empirical adequacy is a complicated affair that involves many 
factors other than the logical relation between different propositions. The 
logical positivists once championed a reduction of the theoretical to the ob­
servational vocabulary that is nowadays seen to be impossible. The semantic 
view of scientific theories allegedly provides an alternative. According to Van 
Fraassen a theory saves the phenomena by ‘embedding’ phenomenological 
structures within theoretical structures. More specifically, the phenomena 
must be shown to be isomorphic to some particular substructure of the the­
ory.
2.3 .1  Van Fraassen’s E m bedding
Van Fraassen has characterised empirical adequacy as an embedding relation 
between two different structures:
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its 
models; and secondly, to specify certain parts of those models 
(the empirical substructures) as candidates for the direct repre­
sentation of observable phenomena. The structures which can 
be described in experimental and measurement reports we can 
call appearances: the theory is empirically adequate if it has some 
model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical sub­
structures of that model. (Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image 
[133, page 64])
In Van Fraassen’s view theories and phenomena alike are represented by 
set-theoretical structures, or alternatively by sets of points in phase space. 
A set-theoretical structure < D ,R f > consists of a domain D of some car­
dinality, and a class of relations { Rf }  between n-tuples of objects in the do-
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main. Theories save phenomena by embedding phenomenological structures 
within theoretical structures. A phenomenological structure P  = <  A,P j  > 
can be embedded in a theoretical structure T  = <  B,Ti  > (with i > j ) ,  if 
the former is isomorphic to an ‘empirical substructure’ E  —< C,Tj > of 
the latter. The domain of the substructure is strictly a subset of the do­
main of the theoretical structure (C C B).  The relations Tj that appear* 
in the empirical substructure are the restrictions of some of the relations Tt- 
to the smaller domain of objects that appear in the empirical substructure 
({Z?} C {2J|e })«.
It is important to stress that there are not just two structures, but three: 
the theoretical structure, the phenomenological structure, and the appropri­
ate ‘empirical’ substructure of the theoretical structure (see figure 2.1). The 
empirical substructure contains only relations that are already in the theo­
retical structure ({Tj} C {Tt}), restricted to the new domain (Tj = Tj\c)- 
The theory would fail to embed the phenomenological structure if there were 
new relations defined on the domain of the phenomenological structure that 
do not have a counterpart in the theory. This is a sensible requirement: 
the theory could never account for all the richness and complexity of the 
phenomena if the phenomena were structured in ways the theory could not 
capture.
Hence this characterisation of empirical adequacy amounts to the follow­
ing: a theory is empirically adequate i f  and only if  it contains a complete 
representation (a ‘picture’) of all phenomena in its intended range9. If it is
8Relations over a domain can be defined extensionally by describing sets of n-tuples 
of objects in the domain. Thus, a one-place relation can be defined simply as a subset 
of the domain, a two-place relation as a set of pairs of objects chosen from the domain, 
and more generally an n-place relation can be defined by presenting a set of n-tuples of 
objects chosen from the domain. Hence, a restriction of a relation T ” , defined by a set S  
of n-tuples, to a smaller domain consists in taking out of S  all those n-tuples that contain 
at least one object which is absent in the smaller domain. The restricted relation T m is 
then defined as the set of remaining n-tuples.
91 have here assumed that embedding is meant as a necessary and sufficient condition 
for empirical adequacy. In the passage quoted above Van Fraassen appears to present
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Theory:
T  = <  B,Ti >
substructure
Phenomena:
E =< C,Tj > --------------------------- P =< A ,P j >
isomorphism
Figure 2.1: Embedding
to be empirically adequate, the theory must put forward an object to stand 
for each object in the domain of the phenomena, and a candidate relation for 
every relation that appears in the phenomenological structure. (In addition, 
a theory may postulate ‘surplus’ structure of course; a good scientific theory 
will typically do so.)
But the requirement of isomorphism between phenomenological struc­
tures and ‘empirical’ substructures has further, important, consequences. 
An isomorphism is a one-to-one mapping, a function that maps every el­
ement in C uniquely onto some element in A, and every relation in {TJ1} 
uniquely onto some relation in {Pj1}- Formally, an isomorphism between 
two structures P  = <  A ,P ” > and E  = <  C ,Tjn > is a function f  : A
embedding as a sufficient condition only. However, the only if  part is, I think, elliptic. 
Embedding is commonly understood to be necessary as well as sufficient. Van Fraassen 
himself understands it as a necessary condition in his arguments against causal explana­
tions of the EPR-Bell correlations -which I review in chapter 4.
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C, such that if x \ , . . ,x n form an n-tuple of objects in A  and if y i,..,y n 
form an n-tuple of objects in C, then: there is some P-1 which holds 
of x i,. . . ,x n if and only if there is a Tjn which holds of f ( x \ ) ,  ...,/(a;n); 
and there is some T'-n which holds of t / i , yn if and only if there is a 
P.f which holds of / -1 (yi), . . . , /_1(yn). More concisely, an isomorphism 
between P  = <  A, Pj > and E  = <  C,Tj > is a function /  : A  —► C 
such that F?[xi, iff Tjn[f(xi), . . . , / (z n)], for any € A; and
T<n[yi,...,yn] iff J ? [ / _1( y i ) , - , / _1(2/n)], for any yu ...,yn e C.
It follows that the domain C (B D C) that the theory must put forward 
as candidate for representing the phenomena must be of the same cardinality 
as the domain of objects A  in the phenomenological structure. The number 
of relations Tj defined over this domain must be identical to the number of 
relations Pj that appear in the phenomenological structure. And, although 
the objects and their properties (represented by the n-place relations P/1 on 
A) need not be preserved with the mapping, the properties of the relations 
that denote those properties must be so preserved10. The existence of an 
isomorphism between two structures is, so to speak, a statement that the 
structures have identical properties. In the context of the semantic view, 
isomorphism is structural identity.
There is one fundamental difference between this characterisation of em­
pirical adequacy in the semantic view, and the old syntactic criterion of
10The relation Tj put forward by the theory to match the relation Pj  in the phenomeno­
logical structure will not hold of the same objects because the phenomenological structure 
is not part of the theoretical structure. As a relation can always be defined extensionally 
by appeal to sets of n-tuples of objects in its domain, and as the domains of the phe­
nomenological and the theoretical structure will typically be different, it follows that the 
relations themselves will be different. In other words, isomorphism between structures 
does not require that the objects in the structure be the same, nor that the properties of 
those objects be identical. However, if there is to be an isomorphism between the struc­
tures the domains A  and C  must be of equal cardinality, and the corresponding relations 
Tj and Pj  must possess identical properties. For instance, an equivalence relation over 
a domain of cardinality x is mapped onto another equivalence relation over a domain of 
equal cardinality, etc.
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empirical adequacy. It becomes possible, in tbe semantic view, to isolate 
the empirical import of a theory: it is the set of substructures the theory 
puts forward as candidates for the representation of phenomena. There is 
no problem in isolating the observable content of the theory in this man­
ner either. The theoretical domain can be restricted, if so wished, so as to 
yield an empirical substructure with a domain of observable objects only. 
We would then be interested in the properties that the theory ascribes to 
these objects, so we would look for a restriction of the properties postu­
lated by the theory to those objects. There is of course no reason to think 
that these properties themselves will be observable, nor is it required in the 
‘embedding’ conception that they should be so (for more on this, though, 
see footnote 11). And there certainly is no reason why we should have to 
refer to these objects and relations, when we speak about them, in a purely 
‘observational’ language. Such requirement would only follow if the models 
that, on the semantic view of theories, constitute a scientific theory were 
semantic models. For in that case, as Michael Friedman makes clear:
the empirical substructures in question are definable in the 
language of [the theory...] Consider one of Van Fraassen’s em­
pirical substructures: a set of objects (the observable objects) 
together with appropriate properties and relations. Now look at 
the terms the theory uses to denote these properties and rela­
tions: these comprise our observational vocabulary. Look at the 
sentences built up from these terms by truth functions and quan­
tifiers restricted to the set of observable objects: these will be 
just the observational sentences. T  will be empirically adequate 
in Van Fraassen’s sense just in case its (syntactic) consequences 
within this class of observational consequences are true. (Fried­
man [69, page 277])
If the class of models that constituted the theory was an ‘elementary class’, 
there would be a syntactic representation of the theory T, and an equally 
syntactic representation of the empirical content of this theory. In rejecting
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the construal of models as semantic models, we have preempted this possi­
bility. A theory is a collection of models; fortunately these are not semantic 
models; hence they cannot be said to form an elementary class; so there 
need be no corresponding syntactic characterisation of any of the features 
of a scientific theory, and that includes its empirical adequacy.
2 .3 .2  F r ie d m a n ’s M o d e l-S u b m o d e l R e d u c tio n
Embedding nicely captures an empiricist intuition about confirmation: the 
degree of confirmation of a theory does not measure the likelihood that the 
theory is true but, rather, the likelihood that the theory is empirically ade­
quate. According to the embedding conception a theory provides represen­
tations of the phenomena. The theory provides structures, and it delineates 
those substructures that are intended to directly model the phenomena. The 
theoretical structures are constituted by certain mathematical or physical 
entities (such as numbers and n-tuples of numbers, lines, planes, manifolds, 
vectors and n-tuples of vectors; electrons, atoms, molecules, etc.,) and some 
relations defined over them (operations such as norm, angle, scalar prod­
uct, trace; the relations of spacelike, lightlike and timelike separation in 
relativity theory; and physical properties such as charge, mass, etc). The 
entities and relations in the theory are emphatically not to be thought of 
as existing in reality. The mathematical structures are not real; rather they 
are mere candidates for representations of the phenomena. Theories may 
be more or less successful in this task of representing, of course, and a the­
ory’s accumulated degree of confirmation measures just the overall success 
of a theory in successfully representing phenomena. For convenience, I will 
refer to this picture of the relation between theories and phenomena as the 
‘representational’ picture.
Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism goes even further, by restrict­
ing the phenomenological structures to sets of observable entities and their 
properties. The constructive empiricist advises us to suspend belief in the 
existence of the unobservable entities and processes postulated by scientific 
theories. We may choose to accept a scientific theory, as a research pro­
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gramme, and we may have confidence in its future predictions, but the only 
belief that is involved in such acceptance is the belief that the theory is 
empirically adequate, not the belief that it is true:
Science aims to give us theories which are empirically ade­
quate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that 
it is empirically adequate. (Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image 
[133, page 12])
Van Fraassen’s ‘selective’ epistemology implies that it is always possible 
to identify the empirical import of a theory, and to separate it from the 
‘surplus’ theoretical commitment. The semantic view, in its representational 
version, provides a schema: the empirical content of a theory in constituted 
by those empirical substructures that the theory makes available to model 
the phenomena. We are then advised to believe only in the existence of 
those entities and processes that appear in the phenomenological structure 
(i.e., according to the constructive empiricist, those entities that are directly 
observable); and we are told that we are not required to believe in the 
existence of the unobservable entities that the theory postulates.
Michael Friedman, on behalf of the scientific realist, has put forward an 
argument against the representational picture. In his view, a more proper 
account of the relation between theory and phenomena (particularly in the 
context of space-time theories) is rendered by the notion of model-submodel 
reduction. In contrast to an embedding, a reduction requires only two struc­
tures: the theoretical structure and the phenomenological structure. A the­
ory is empirically adequate if it can literally subsume the phenomena (see 
figure 2.2). In a reduction the domain of the phenomenological structure is 
a subset of the domain of the theoretical structure (A  = C C B), and the 
properties found in the phenomena are precisely the same relations that the 
theory postulates, restricted to the domain of phenomenological entities and 
processes ({Pj} = {Tj} = {2j|c})- As Friedman writes:
Under this construa! T functions as a genuine explanation or 
reduction of the properties of P , for elements of P  are literally
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Theory: T  =< B , T{ >
submodel
Phenomena: P —< A ,P j >—< C,Tj >
Figure 2.2: Model-Submodel Reduction
identified with elements of T. (Friedman, Foundations of Space- 
Time Theories [70, page 236].)
As a consequence, on this alternative ‘reduction’ picture, if a theory is shown 
to account for some new phenomenon, this constitutes a reason to believe 
that the whole theory is true -including the ‘surplus’ theoretical relations 
{ Tj+W} (with w < i —j) ,  and the ‘surplus’ domain B — C. For it would make 
no sense to claim, on this view, that the phenomenological structure is true 
but the theoretical structure is not, when the phenomenological structure 
is actually a part (a ‘chunk?) of the theoretical structure. Therefore, in the 
reduction picture, degree of confirmation is a measure of the likelihood that 
the theory is true.
The main argument in favour of constructive empiricism (and its close 
ally in the philosophy of space and time, relationalism) is that a scientific 
theory, considered in isolation, has exactly the same empirical consequences 
on the representational picture as on the reduction picture. That is, if we
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consider the theory in isolation from other theories, and focus exclusively 
upon its relation with the phenomena for which it is intended, the theory 
receives exactly the same degree of confirmation on the representational 
picture as on the reduction picture. As the representational picture is com­
mitted to the existence of fewer entities, refraining as it does from reifying 
any theoretical entities, it is always preferable on grounds of ontological 
parsimony.
An initial objection to the representational picture is that it is not pos­
sible to make do without theoretical ‘surplus’ in the description of the phe­
nomena. This ‘surplus’ will often induce theoretical properties and relations 
on objects in the phenomenological domain which are normally required to 
state accurate laws about the behaviour of these objects. But, the objection 
continues, the representational picture implies that no ‘surplus’ can ever be 
employed in the description of the phenomena. Asserting that the phenom­
ena P  =<  A, Pj1 > is merely embeddable in a theory T  =<  B, T? > will not 
induce the necessary theoretical properties and relations. If T 1 (i > v > j )  
is one such theoretical relation, and unless T 1 is definable from the set of 
phenomenological properties {Tjn}, there will be automorphisms of the do­
main of the empirical substructure C, that will leave the isomorphism with 
the phenomenological structure entirely intact while crucially altering the 
extension of T£ in the empirical substructure. In other words, there will 
be two embeddings /  and g of P  into T  that take every Pj1 into its cor­
responding Tjn and yet such that, for some object a £ A, T„(f(a)) and 
->Ty(g(a)). The objection, however, is not a very good one. For there is 
no reason why the representationalist cannot simply expand the empirical 
substructure by restricting this new relation T1 to the domain C. In fact, 
given some justification, the representationalist could introduce all ‘surplus’ 
theoretical relations {T^+w] (with w < i — j ), appropriately restricted to C, 
into the empirical substructure11.
11 Admittedly, however, this argument may cut some way against the constructive em­
piricist. For the introduction of Tj into the empirical substructure entails the existence of 
a corresponding property in the phenomenological structure, under the assumption that 
both structures continue to be isomorphic. Is the constructive empiricist happy to intro­
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Friedman, who is well aware that a different strategy is needed to defend 
the reduction picture, has proposed to block the main premise of the above 
argument in favour of the representational picture. He denies that in all oc­
casions a scientific theory will gain the same amount of confirmation on the 
representational picture as on the reduction picture. If we considered the 
relations between scientific theories, we could see how the representationalist 
and the reductionist accounts may ascribe different degrees of confirmation 
to the very same theory. In particular, Friedman claims, in cases of theory- 
unification there is a substantial boost in confirmation for the individual 
theories that make up the unified theory whenever the unified theory comes 
up with a successful new prediction in a different domain. The reduction pic­
ture can accommodate this fact naturally, while the representational picture 
is unable to do so.
An interesting reply to Friedman has been given by Morrison [103]. How­
ever, this debate, which is fascinating in its own right, is not directly relevant 
to my concerns in this Thesis. The reductionist and the representationalist 
can equally account for the theoretical induction of properties and relations 
into the phenomena; they agree on what the degree of confirmation of an 
individual theory is, whenever taken in isolation, in the presence of a phe­
nomenon; and, more importantly, they agree that a theory always picks 
up confirmation from phenomena that the theory accounts for (although, 
naturally, they disagree as to whether increased confirmation indicates that
duce theoretical relations among the appearances, if it is in the restricted form in which 
they are taken to apply to observable entities only? (I am indebted to Hasok Chang 
for raising this question). I am not sure. Perhaps Van Fraassen’s intem alism  can help 
here. For intemalism  -th e thesis that it is up to science itself to decide what to count as 
observable and what n ot- enables us to bring into phenomenological structures relations 
that were previously thought to be unobservable. (N.B. Intem alism  is built into Vein 
Fraassen’s definition of a scientific theory: “to present a theory is to specify a family of 
structures, its models; and secondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical 
substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena”).
In any case, the representationalist is in no trouble at all here -for he is not committed 
to the view that the entities and relations in the phenomena should be ‘observable’.
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the theory is more likely to be true, or just more likely to be empirically 
adequate).
Moreover they agree on what the logical relation is between their own 
positions. The representationalist thinks that there may be many different 
ways of mapping a phenomenological structure onto empirical substructures 
of a theory (in other words there may be different mappings: /  and g above 
are an example), while the reductionist thinks that there is only one pos­
sible mapping, namely identity. Hence, they both agree that reduction is 
logically stronger than embedding. And this is important because it shows 
that if a theory is unable to embed a particular phenomenon then it cannot 
be empirically adequate on either characterisation of what it means for a 
theory to be empirically adequate. Such a theory, therefore, cannot pick any 
confirmation at all from that particular phenomenon.
2.4 The Empirical Basis o f Science
I have been discussing different conceptions of scientific theories, with special 
emphasis on the relation between theory and phenomena. Van Fraassen and 
Friedman have established the requirements that this relation must obey 
if the theory is to receive confirmation, on an empiricist and on a realist 
construal. Their work is heavily informed by a conception of theories as 
structures. But, so far, I have had little to say about the other relata of the 
confirmatory relation, namely phenomena. A more detailed discussion of 
what constitutes phenomena is imperative, though, for Van Fraassen’s and 
Friedman’s epistemological purposes. Theories are to receive confirmation 
from the phenomena they account for; but unless we have good grounds 
for believing that the phenomena are true, Van Fraassen’s and Friedman’s 
strictures will count for nothing in persuading us to believe in the truth of 
our theories. In other words, phenomena must constitute a solid epistemic 
basis for scientific theories.
Both Van Fraassen and Friedman assume that it is possible to describe 
a phenomenon as a structure. This is of course, absolutely essential for
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their proposals to work, as both embedding and reduction are defined as 
relations between structures. Van Fraassen mentions that he first saw this 
kind of formalised structures of the phenomena in the works of Wojcicki 
[142], Przelecki [112], Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia [41] and Suppes 
[126]. I shall concentrate on Suppes’s classic paper ‘Models of Data’ [126].
2.4.1 M odels o f D ata
Suppes argues that there is a hierarchy of set-theoretic models all the way 
down from theory to experimental data. He concentrates on statistical theo­
ries, where the basic hierarchy contains five layers: models of theory, models 
of experiment, models of data, methods and models of experimental design, 
and ceteris paribus conditions on extraneous factors in the experiments actu­
ally performed. Suppes illustrates the former three by means of an example 
from learning theory. We are investigating the responses exhibited by some 
organisms to an stimulus, subject to patterns of reinforcement on their re­
sponses. We assume that there are only two possible responses, A\ or A 2, 
and after each response the individual receives one of two possible rein­
forcements, Ei or E2. An experimental trial consists of a finite number N  
of sequences each formed by a finite number m  of observed pairs (A,-, Ej), 
where i , j  =  1,2. The first member of the first pair, A,n, represents an indi­
vidual’s first response to the stimulus; the second member of the first pair, 
Ej  1 , represents the reinforcement immediately impressed upon the individ­
ual. The stimulus is then repeated; the first member of the second pair, 
Ai2, represents the response of the individual to this repeated stimulus; Ej2 
represents the subsequent reinforcement; and so on (there are N  organisms, 
and the stimulus is presented m  times to each one).
The theory involved is a linear response theory. Suppes takes a model 
of this theory to be a structure S =< X ,P , 0  >, where X  is the (infinite) 
set of all possible (infinite) sequences of pairs Ai , E j , and P  is a probabil­
ity function defined over the smallest Borel field that contains the field of 
cylinder sets of X  (roughly: the smallest field generated by the elements 
in X  over which it is possible to define a Lebesgue probability measure),
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0  is a learning parameter, not observable and hence “not determinable by 
experimenf [126, page 26]. By forming equivalence classes xn of sequences 
identical through a particular trial n < m  we can impose on the probability 
measure P  constraints required for a linear response theory. These condi­
tions need not concern us here; it suffices to say that they are conditions on 
the relative frequencies of reinforcements Ej  conditional on responses A*.
Suppes then constructs a ‘model of the experiment’ < Y ,P '  > where Y  is 
a finite set, consisting of all possible sequences formed by a number m  of pairs 
(Aiw,Ejw) (w < to), and P' is a probability function on the field generated 
by the power set of Y . In the experiment the stimulus is presented m  
times. So, correspondingly, the elements of Y  axe all the possible sequences 
of length m. This model is applicable only if the probability measure P' is 
defined to give relative frequencies of reinforcements on responses, P'(Ei/Aj 
in every trial that agree with the probability distribution P  in the theory.
A model of experiment is not a data-model; it is a truncation of the the­
ory to the conditions in the experiment. Y  contains 4m possible sequences. 
But the data will at most amount to a number N  of such sequences, where 
N  is the number of organisms on which the experiment has been performed; 
hence a much smaller number. A ‘model of the data’, or data-model, is 
defined by Suppes as an IV-tuple of sequences in Y  where N  is the num­
ber of sequences of experimental outcomes, or sequences of pairs (A^,, Ejw) 
(w < m) of an actual experimental run, and where the conditional rela­
tive frequencies of reinforcements approximately fit the distribution
induced by the probability measure in the model of experiment:
An iV-tuple realization is a model of the data if the condi­
tional relative frequencies of E\ and E2 reinforcements fit closely 
enough the probability measure P' of the model of the experi­
ment. (Suppes, op.cit. [126, page 31])
I go through these details because I want to emphasise that, in Suppes’ 
view, the relation between theory and data is a tremendously complex one. 
The theory contains continuous distributions but the data is finite, and one 
has to figure out how well the relative frequencies in the finite sample agree
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with the distribution function. The theory has to be ‘prepared’ to meet the 
demands of the experiment, by truncating the continuous distribution P  over 
the infinite set X  into a discrete measure over the finite set Y . The data 
has to be similarly ‘prepared’ in a form that the theory is able to account 
for, by selecting those runs whose frequencies of reinforcements fit at least 
approximately the conditional probabilities in the model of the experiment:
The central idea, corresponding well, I think, to a rough but 
generally clear distinction made by experimenters and statisti­
cians, is to restrict models of data to those aspects of the ex­
periment which have a parametric analogue in the theory. A 
model of the data is designed to incorporate all the information 
about the experiment which can be used in statistical tests of 
the adequacy of the theory. (Suppes, op.cit. [126, page 31])
In practice the decisions taken to ‘prepare’ the theory and the data for each 
other, -by imposing certain constraints on the probability distributions in 
the theory, or by selecting a subset of experimental rims-, can only be made 
on a case-by-case basis. There are no general rules. These judgements de­
mand practical skills and a fine sense for the details of the experiment; they 
demand a considerable amount of tacit knowledge and a careful considera­
tion of the particular conditions under which the experiment is performed. 
Here I have not dealt with the sort of detailed considerations that play a 
role in Suppes’ example. (They are many and subtle; Suppes himself refrains 
from discussing all of them in detail.) The main point that I want to empha­
sise, following Suppes, is that theories do not confront raw data, but rather, 
specifically tailored, contrived, and highly conceptualised ‘data-models’.
2.4 .2  T he Em pirical Basis: D a ta  or Phenom ena?
The same point has been recently reinforced and expanded in an interesting 
way by James Woodward and Jim Bogen [14], [143], who draw the dis­
tinction between data and phenomena. Facts about data describe sets of 
data-points on a graph, records of scintillation spots on a fluorescent screen,
registered tracks in a bubble-chamber, etc. Data live in the laboratory; they 
are highly dependent upon the particular experimental context in which they 
are observed and recorded; and they are generally short-lived: as better, 
more accurate experiments are performed, the data from previous experi­
ments tends to get ignored, or reinterpreted. By contrast, phenomenological 
facts describe well-established general patterns in nature, and effects. For 
instance, the fact that metals dilate in the presence of heat, is a rather typi­
cal phenomenological fact. Phenomena constitute firmly established bodies 
of scientific knowledge; they are independent of the particular conditions 
under which experiments are performed; and, besides, they are relatively 
theory-independent, in the sense that they tend to ‘last long’: facts about 
phenomena are manifestly impervious to theory-change.
Woodward and Bogen’s main claim is that phenomena, not data, consti­
tute the empirical basis of science. First, Woodward and Bogen argue that 
scientific theories are advanced by scientists as explanations of phenomena, 
but are not normally intended as explanations of data: “typically, scientific 
theories are expected to provide systematic explanations of facts about phe­
nomena rather than facts about data” (Bogen and Woodward, ‘Saving the 
Phenomena’ [14, page 322]). Theories must account for (i.e. be empirically 
adequate of) phenomena; but they are not required to account for any data. 
Secondly, Woodward and Bogen argue, what is observed and gets recorded 
during an experiment is data, not phenomena. Phenomena are instead in­
ferred from bodies of data: “Data, which play the role of evidence for the 
existence of phenomena, for the most part can be straightforwardly observed. 
By contrast [...] phenomena are detected through the use of data, but in most 
cases are not observable in any interesting sense of that term” (op.cit. [14, 
page 306]).
Woodward and Bogen’s target is the requirement, defended by some log­
ical positivists and by Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricist, that scientific 
theories account for observable phenomena. In Woodward and Bogen’s view 
the expression ‘observable phenomena’ is a category mistake. As they write: 
“phenomena for the most part cannot be observed and cannot be reported by
89
observational claims” (op.cit. [14, page 343]). Consider, ask Woodward and 
Bogen, the well-established phenomenological fact that ‘lead melts at 327 
degrees C \ In what way is this fact ascertainable by observation? Is it an 
observable fact? Ernest Nagel writes:
The law that when water in an open container is heated it 
eventually evaporates is a law which formulates a relationship 
between observables, and so is the law that lead melts at 327 
degrees Celsius. (Nagel, The Structure of Science [107, page 79])
But according to Woodward and Bogen this phenomenological claim is not 
observed, nor is it ascertained directly by observation. Instead it is inferred 
from observed data:
Despite what Nagel’s remarks suggest one does not deter­
mine the melting point of lead by observing the result of a sin­
gle thermometer reading. To determine the melting point one 
must make a series of measurements. These constitute data. [...]
What we observe are the various particular thermometer read­
ings -the scatter of individual data points. The mean of these 
[the estimate for the melting point] does not represent a property 
of any particular data-point. [...] So while the melting point is 
certainly inferred from data, on the basis of a theory of statis­
tical inference, the sentence ‘lead melts at 327 + /- 0.1 degrees’ 
does not literally describe what is perceived or observed. (Bogen 
and Woodward, op. cit. [14, page 308])
An important part of Woodward and Bogen’s argument concerns their 
defence of the claim that the assessment of the reliability of data does not 
require a scientific theory to provide explanations of the data. They provide 
a number of case studies to illustrate and defend this claim. Consider again 
the melting point of lead. A number of measurements are made on sam­
ples of different sizes, under different experimental conditions, in different 
laboratories. A thermometer sensor is fixed to a single sample of lead, and
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a reading is made and recorded as soon as melting begins. The sensor is 
then detached, and the sample is cooled down, before another experiment 
is made on the very same sample. These recorded data-points constitute 
evidence for or against the phenomenological claim.
It is striking, however, that the precise melting point may correspond to 
no actual data-point at all. Many data-points will lie very close to the mean. 
But some other isolated data-points will lie far away from the mean. Entire 
sets of data-points belonging to a particular sample may lie consistently 
fax away from the mean -thus suggesting that something went wrong with 
the entire trial on one particular sample. Sometimes it will be impossible 
to record any values -perhaps the sensor did not work appropriately, or 
the thermometer failed. On occasions the whole set of data-points for a 
particular sample will exhibit temporal correlation -perhaps an indication 
that the thermometer wasn’t brought back to zero on repetition of each new 
experiment, or that the sample of lead did not cool down sufficiently. And so 
on. Many measurement outcomes will need to be discarded as they result in 
unreliable data. But, in order to assess the reliability of the data, we don’t 
need to provide a comprehensive explanatory account of what went wrong 
in each discarded case12. We may rest content with considerations such as 
11 whether the data are replicable, whether various confounding factors and 
other sources of possible systematic error have been adequately controlled, 
on statistical arguments of various kinds, and on one’s procedures for the 
analysis and reduction of data” (Bogen and Woodward, op.cit. [14, 327]).
Woodward and Bogen’s account of phenomena has strong similarities
12There would be a very large number of factors that would need to be taken into account 
in each explanatory instance; and such a complete theoretical explanation may not be 
available. But, in fact, a complete explanatory account is actually undesirable. As Bogen 
and Woodward point out, if the determination of the reliability of data as evidence for 
various phenomena depended upon our possessing a general and comprehensive theoretical 
account of the causal mechanisms which produce the data, claims about phenomena would 
be fax more fragile than they actually are. Phenomena would not be impervious to theory- 
change in the way they manifestly are.
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with Suppes’ account of data-models, but there is one important difference. 
For Suppes data-models are primarily employed to test scientific theories. 
This is indeed the reason why the data-model must be ‘prepared’ in the 
light of the theory’s assumptions and requirements -so that the data can 
be put to use as a meaningful test of the theory. By contrast, models of 
the phenomena are often constructed to describe stable phenomena or to 
elucidate them, and not necessarily to test theory -although they may be 
constructed with the help of theory.
According to Woodward and Bogen a phenomenon is inferred from data, 
and not always with the view of testing any particular theory. However, as I 
have noted, when a theory is tested, according to Woodward and Bogen, it is 
normally tested against well established phenomena. So there is a two-stage 
process. First a phenomenon is inferred and some description of it is given in 
a model. Second, a theory is proposed and it is tested against the accepted 
phenomena in its field. A model of the phenomena, as I want to describe it, 
is part of the first stage of the process, and is hence typically independent 
of the testing of theories13. One example is the London theory of supercon­
ductivity that I described in the first chapter. The Londons’ aim was not to 
test electromagnetic theory, but to refine our understanding of superconduc­
tivity phenomena. Their theory constituted a model of the phenomenon of 
superconductivity -among other things it predicted the Meissner effect. The 
claim that superconductors expel magnetic flux is surely a phenomenologi­
cal claim, if any claim ever is: it is quite impervious to theory change, and 
its truth does not depend upon any of the conditions in the experiments 
performed to verify it. In contrast, a data-model, which may record the 
average experimental rates of expulsion of flux in the Meissner-Ochsenfeld 
experiment, is a highly contextual model: it may be true of the data col­
lected in that particular experiment; but it cannot constitute a model of the
13Models of the phenomena must not be confused with the kind of mediating models 
that I discussed in the first chapter. Models of phenomena should also be distinguished 
from the phenomenological models that I considered briefly in my response to French and 
Ladyman, in section 1.4.4. The London treatment of superconductivity is both a model of 
the phenomena, and a phenomenological model.
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Figure 2.3: Layers of Structures
Meissner effect per se.
Mathias Kaiser [93] has proposed an account in terms of hierarchies of 
structures. In his picture a model of a phenomenon Sk sits at the top of a 
hierarchy of models of data (see figure 2.3). According to Kaiser, the bottom 
layer’s structure has as its domain only objects that can be directly observed, 
and the only relation allowed, Do, is ostension14. The next structure up 
is defined by introducing a set of new relations over a perhaps different 
domain. The whole hierarchy is defined in a number of steps, or layers, 
each of which corresponds to a change of elements in the domain, or a 
change in the set of relations. These operations are intended to represent
14In another, puzzling, paragraph Kaiser asserts that the objects in the bottom layer are 
all those things that are to be subjected to scientific scrutiny, i.e. that are to be measured, 
weighed, radiated, dissoluted, accelerated, etc.” [93, page 125] But it is obviously not the 
case that everything measurable must be definable by ostension, or even observable. As 
Mary Morgan has pointed out to me, many economic entities (inflation, unemployment, 
bullion, etc.) can be measured very accurately, yet can never truly be observed. In 
this respect physics is actually not that different; consider for instance measurements of 
electric currents in circuits by means of amperometers, or measurements of field strengths 
by induction techniques. I take it that Kaiser’s conflation is a result of a too narrow focus 
on his case studies in paleomagnetism.
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scientific practice, hence they correspond to operations and redefinitions of 
the domain that are actually performed in the course of scientific research. 
The passage from one structure to the next one up is grounded upon what 
Kaiser calls ‘inference tickets’ which come in two kinds: as warrant for a 
redescription of the domain, or as legitimation of new types of operations and 
computations. Theoretical knowledge is involved -although not necessarily 
knowledge derived from one and the same theory. ‘Inference tickets’ axe 
provided by probing techniques and instruments, error theory, test-methods 
to eliminate useless samples, statistical techniques for the treatment of data, 
etc.
Kaiser’s hierarchy of models of data has three interesting features. First, 
it represents a model of the phenomena as a structure Sk = <  D\t,nj. > , as 
required by the advocates of the semantic view. Second, it allows for the 
fact that the construction of models of phenomena may be constrained by 
(although not dictated by) theory, as in Suppes’s example. But it also 
makes clear that the construction of a model of phenomena usually is inde­
pendent of the testing of any particular theory. Finally, Kaiser shows that 
an adequate scientific theory ought to account for the phenomena, which is 
represented by the top structure in the hierarchy of structures.
As a consequence, however, it is necessary to forgo the requirement that 
an empirically adequate theory must ‘embed’ or ‘reduce’ data: on Kaiser’s 
proposal the model of the phenomena will normally fail to embed or reduce 
the lower models of the hierarchy. The changes in the domain and in the 
set of relations are not necessarily driven by one unique body of knowledge 
as in Suppes’ example, so there is no guarantee that the domains and rela­
tions of structures in different layers will be appropriately ‘nested’. Hence, 
an empirically adequate theory (a theory that accounts for the phenomena) 
will typically not embed or reduce the data that serves as evidence for the 
phenomena. On Woodward and Bogen’s view, however, this is as it should 
be: data rarely constitute evidence for a scientific theory; instead the ev­
idence for or against theories is typically to be found in well-established 
phenomenological facts.
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2.5 The Application o f Scientific Theories
Ian Hacking15 denies that scientific models are generally ‘doubly’ models, 
i.e. models of phenomena as well as models of theory. Some examples of 
models of phenomena include early models for continental drift phenomena, 
the early models of the atom (the Bohr atom), the billiard ball model in phe­
nomenological thermodynamics, models for stellar structure, gravitational 
lensing models. How do these models relate to models of theory: models of 
the continental drift theory, the hydrogen atom in quantum theory, models 
of the kinetic theory, models in the quantum theory of radiation, and the 
Friedmann models in cosmology? According to the advocates of the seman­
tic view if a theory is to be empirically adequate its models must embed, 
or reduce, all models of phenomena in the domain of the theory. Can this 
account of empirical adequacy be used to describe the application of scien­
tific theories? Does the domain of application of a theory coincide with its 
domain of empirical adequacy?
2.5.1 R ev isitin g  th e  London A ccount
In section 3 I showed that ‘embedding’ is a logically weaker constraint than 
reduction. A theory may fail to reduce phenomena, and yet a part of the the­
ory may be shown to be isomorphic (structurally identical) the phenomena. 
In this sense, embedding is a more generous constraint than the alternative 
realist, characterisation of empirical adequacy as reduction. But it is not an 
empty constraint: some models of phenomena are not embeddable in theory. 
A model of the phenomena that contains relations that have no structural 
counterpart in physical theory has no means to be embedded. Some models 
of the phenomena cannot be embedded in any theory, not even in those the­
ories employed to build the models in the first place. Some examples include 
gravitational lensing models in cosmology, stellar structure models in astro­
physics, and models of SQUIDS (Superconducting Quantum Interference
15Haddng [80, page 216].
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Devices).
The model that Fritz and Heinz London gave of superconductivity phe­
nomena is another instance. Let me now review the London model from the 
point of view of the semantic view. In this case, there are three structures: 
the theory of classical electromagnetism, which I take to include at least 
Maxwell’s equations; the ‘acceleration equation’ model of Becker, Sauter 
and Heller which entails the following relation for the magnetic flux:
Ac2V2(H -  H o) = H  -  H o (2.5.1)
where Ho denotes the magnetic field at the time t=0; and the London 
equation which models the Meissner effect by imposing a different constraint 
on the dynamics of the magnetic flux:
Ac2V2H = H  (2.5.2)
In section 5.2. in the first chapter, I gave two alternative pictures of 
the state of classical electromagnetic theory at the time of Meissner’s dis­
covery. First, I argued, it is possible to take ‘electromagnetic theory’ in a 
historical sense, as constituted by all applications to electromagnetic phe­
nomena known at the time. On this picture, the ‘acceleration equation’ 
model is part of classical electromagnetic theory, and the following identi­
fication seems irresistible: the theory (classical electromagnetism) contains 
an empirical substructure (the ‘acceleration’ model of Becker, Sauter and 
Heller) which it puts forward as a candidate for representing the phenom­
ena (the Meissner effect). As the Meissner effect is accurately described by 
the Londons’ model, we can take the latter to provide its phenomenological 
structure. This may of course not be the only possible identification. But let 
me consider first whether, with this identification in mind, electromagnetism 
can be said to account for the phenomena (in the sense of being empirically 
adequate).
We are looking for an isomorphism between the phenomenological struc­
ture and the empirical substructure. The London model is close to being 
isomorphic to the ‘acceleration’ model. First, the two domains are isomor­
phic: for every physical entity (j, H, etc) in the domain over which the
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‘acceleration’ model is defined, there is a corresponding entity in the do­
main of the London model. Second, at least one relation over the domain is 
isomorphic, namely the relation that accounts for a constant current in the 
absence of external fields, expressed in the equation:
(2.5.3)dt c dt
As I mentioned in the first chapter of the Thesis (section 1.4.4) this equa­
tion represents the common part to the London model and the acceleration 
model.
Nevertheless there fails to be a complete isomorphism. The two mod­
els are not structurally identical in the required sense. Equation (2.5.2), 
which entails the ‘fundamental law’ of superconductivity, yields a prediction 
that the ‘acceleration equation’ model cannot match. In the London model 
we find a relation, lacking in the ‘acceleration’ model, that establishes that 
the magnetic flux after the phase transition is zero, regardless of what the 
flux is before the transition. On the other hand, according to the ‘accel­
eration’ model there should be some nonvanishing flux after the transition. 
The phenomenological structure contains one relation -expressed in equa­
tion (2.5.2)- that is not in the theory, while the theory contains one relation 
-equation (2.5.1)- that is not in the phenomena. The relation in the theory 
is an equivalence relation, characterised by an identity mapping that leaves 
the magnetic flux invariant, while the relation in the model is not even a 
symmetric relation (at least not when there is some initial magnetic flux).
There is a caveat, though: the fact that we have failed to find an em­
pirical substructure of the theory isomorphic to the phenomena does not 
necessarily mean that the theory does not have one. We may have misiden- 
tified the correct empirical substructure of the theory: there could be an­
other substructure, unknown to us, that is totally isomorphic to the London 
model. And yet, the ‘acceleration’ model is inconsistent with the London 
model. So if the unknown substructure -the ‘good’ one- is to account for 
the Meissner effect, it must contain at least one relation inconsistent with 
the ‘acceleration’ model. This generates a paradox: the theory contains
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two substructures, intended for the same phenomenon, that yield mutually 
inconsistent predictions. A theory, if consistent, cannot yield inconsistent 
predictions for the very same physical phenomenon. Hence, there must be 
at most one substructure of the theory that applies to superconductivity 
and, given the historical construal of electromagnetic theory, this must be 
the ‘acceleration’ model -which fails to be isomorphic to the Meissner effect.
To sum up, on Van Fraassen’s characterisation of empirical adequacy, 
-and a fortiori on Friedman’s too-, classical electromagnetism, if construed 
in this historical sense, is not empirically adequate (of superconductivity 
phenomena). This cannot be very surprising -for we did not expect the ac­
celeration equation theory to account for the phenomena in the first place16. 
But I hasten to say that this is not a conclusive result. For there is an alter­
native picture of electromagnetic theory, which takes classical electromag­
16I should mention here the partial structures approach developed by Newton Da Costa 
and Steven French [38]. A partial structure S  is a structure <  D, Ri > , where some of 
the R i  are partial relations. A partial n-place relation R  over a domain D  is a triple 
<  R i , R 2 , R 3 >  where R i  is the set of n-tuples that satisfy R ,  R 2  is the set that don’t 
satisfy R ,  and R 3  is the set for which it is not known if they satisfy R .
In response to an earlier draft of this chapter, Otavio Bueno [2 0 ] has suggested that 
it may be possible to lay out a partial, if not a total, isomorphism between the London 
model and the acceleration model. (A partial isomorphism between two partial structures 
P  = <  A, Pj >  and E  = <  C ,T j > , is a mapping f  : A —* C  that preserves the properties 
of all the partial relations {P j , T j } ) .  I have doubts that Bueno’s approach will work. 
Consider an n-place relation P i  = <  P 1 1 ,  -Pi2 , P i 3 >'• no n-tuple of elements of A  can figure 
simultaneously in two of the sets defined by the extensions of P n , P 2 i  or P 3 1 .  Hence, a 
partial isomorphism between P  and E  reduces to a set of three isomorphic mappings which 
take each of P u ,  P 2 i ,  P 3 i  into the corresponding T/,, T2't-, T3,. The problem, as I see it, is 
that the London model contains a relation that is explicitly denied by the acceleration 
model, and viceversa. So there is no room to exploit the main insight of the partial 
structures approach, namely that some n-tuples may belong neither to the extension of a 
relation, nor to the extension of its negation.
Let me emphasise that this result does not invalidate in any way the partial structures 
approach to scientific theories. On the contrary, if the formal notion of partial isomorphism 
is to provide an extended characterisation of empirical adequacy, we should hope that it 
fails here, for we have independent reasons to believe that in this case the theory, as 
understood in the extended historical sense, is not empirically adequate.
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netism to be constituted by the deductive closure of Maxwell’s equations. 
However, neither the acceleration equation nor the London model belong 
to this closure. On this abstract picture, the theory does not ‘reach far 
enough’. It is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by the Meissner effect. It 
lacks empirical substructures capable of representing superconductivity phe­
nomena -the phenomena simply lie outside the theory’s domain of empirical 
adequacy.
Hence, on neither picture is the theory of classical electromagnetism 
empirically adequate of superconductivity. But note that the failure of em­
pirical adequacy does not seem to impugn the claim that the London model 
of superconductivity was a very successful application of classical electro­
magnetic theory. The model accommodated both defining features of super­
conducting behaviour, and it had predictive power: it yielded accurate rates 
of expulsion of flux for the correct temperatures and values of the external 
magnetic field, and it accounted for the current and fields in superconduct­
ing spheres and wires accurately. Bardeen, for instance, writing nearly 20 
years after the advent of the London model, notes that:
The London theory gives a complete electrodynamics of su­
perconductors which has been very successful in correlating and 
predicting results of experiments. (Bardeen, op.cit. [9, page 
284])
In Duhem’s words the phenomena, although not embedded, were, in a sense, 
‘saved’ in electromagnetic theory.
2.5 .2  Instrum ental R eliab ility
In the first chapter (section 5.3) I introduced the notion of instrumental re­
liability, and I argued that this notion should be distinguished very carefully 
from the more common notion of empirical adequacy. By now I hope I have 
made clear why. I want to link the instrumental reliability of a theory to its 
effectiveness as an tool in application. However, a theory’s domain of ap­
plication is typically much larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: if
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the notion of instrumental reliability is to capture the various ways in which 
scientific theories are applied, it must be kept separate from the notion of 
empirical adequacy.
Similarly the explanatory power of a theory does not constitute a guide 
to its instrumental reliability -a  theory can be employed to generate a model 
of phenomena that it cannot provide explanations for. Nancy Cartwright 
[29] has argued for a separation between the explanatory power of a theory 
and its descriptive power. She argues that in many occasions theories pro­
vide descriptions of phenomena that they cannot explain. My concerns to 
separate application from confirmation in many ways mirror Cartwright’s 
concerns to separate application from explanation. She writes
This is how we solve problems in mathematical physics. Some 
of the techniques are a standing part of the theory; but others are 
ad hoc, to the problem at hand. Very, very few of the derivations 
are explanatory. But this, I think, is no problem, for explanation 
is a false goal. (Cartwright, ‘The Born-Einstein Debate: Where 
Application and Confirmation Separate’ [29, page 281]).
Instead the goal -if any- is, in her view, descriptive completeness. I agree, 
but with one important qualification: we should not take the descriptive 
completeness of a theory always to argue for its empirical adequacy, or its 
truth. In my case study in superconductivity, in contrast to Cartwright’s 
examples in [29], the theory helps to provide a description of a phenomenon 
that it simply cannot account for. The structure of application differs also 
dramatically from the structure of confirmation.
Let me briefly recapitulate. The case study in superconductivity points 
to the existence of a variety of ways in which scientific theories are applied. 
Some scientific applications are, perhaps, deidealizations of theory; some are 
reductions of theory in the sense of Friedman; and some are embeddable in 
theory a la Van Fraassen. I argue that there is a further class of applications 
that are not deidealizations of theory, are not reducible to theory, and can­
not be embedded in theory. It is in those cases that mediating models play 
a key dual role. First, they help in the application of theory, by guiding the
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introduction of corrections into the theory required in order to accurately 
describe the phenomena. Second, they provide us with physical insight into 
the nature of the phenomena. Because of that, mediating models are not 
just useful fictions; on the contrary they are carriers of very significant and 
specific knowledge of the phenomena. However, the role of mediating mod­
els in theory-application means that a realist construal of scientific theory 
becomes highly problematic. In these cases the theory itself is used as an 
instrument in application only and no attempt is made to confirm or dis- 
confirm it at all.
In the first chapter I also sketched a distinction between degree of con­
fidence and degree of confirmation. The London model does not raise the 
degree of confirmation of electromagnetic theory; it raises its degree of con­
fidence -th a t is, it gives us a reason to believe that the theory is instru- 
mentally reliable, i.e. that it will go on to provide successful applications. 
The instrumental reliability of a theory provides neither grounds to believe 
that the theory is true, nor that it is empirically adequate -it points neither 
towards scientific realism, nor towards constructive empiricism. Scientific 
realism and constructive empiricism share a common core, which is rejected 
by instrumental reliability. On either view a minimum requirement for the 
acceptance of a scientific theory is that the theory must be empirically ad­
equate -i.e. that what the theory states is the case about the phenomena 
must indeed be the case. The constructive empiricist argues that the accep­
tance of a theory need only involve the belief that it is empirically adequate. 
Theories may have other virtues besides empirical adequacy -such as sim­
plicity, explanatory power, aesthetic value, or even the virtue of being true... 
- ,  but belief in a theory’s empirical adequacy is the only doxastic attitude 
required for the acceptance of the theory. By contrast, the realist argues 
that the belief that the theory is true, or likely to be true, and not just 
empirically adequate, is also required for its acceptance. For the realist a 
good theory, in addition to being empirically adequate, should also be true, 
or likely to be true -not only true to the phenomena, but true tout court, 
true to the world.
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Thus, the scientific realist and her opponent, the constructive empiricist, 
agree that only highly confirmed theories should be accepted; we should have 
confidence in theories that are highly confirmed, and only in those. This is 
because on either view, confirmation always goes via empirical adequacy. 
A theory is confirmed when its observable predictions are borne out. The 
theory is empirically adequate if all the predictions of the theory, -past, 
present and future-, axe borne out17. The realist takes a high degree of 
confirmation as a strong indication that the theory is true, or very likely 
to be true, because on her view empirical adequacy is a guide to truth. 
So, for the realist a high degree of confirmation is required for acceptance. 
For the constructive empiricist a high degree of confirmation is only an 
indication that the theory is empirically adequate, nothing more. But, as 
the constructive empiricist thinks that a belief in the empirical adequacy of 
a theory is required for its acceptance, he will readily agree with the realist 
that a high degree of confirmation is a requirement for accepting a theory.
According to Van Fraassen 4to accept a theory rather than another one 
involves also a commitment to a research programme, to continuing the di­
alogue with nature in the framework of one conceptual scheme rather than 
another’ (Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image [133, page 4]). And yet, the 
scientific community’s commitment to classical electromagnetism as a pro­
gramme of research seemed to require neither the belief that the electro­
magnetic theory was true, nor the belief that it was empirically adequate. 
Only a strong sense of confidence that the theory could be successfully ap­
plied was involved. Thus French and Ladyman can write, following Dahl 
[40]: uthe scientific community displayed a ‘dogmatic faith’ in the applica­
bility to superconductivity of both thermodynamics and standard Maxwellian 
electromagnetic theory” (French and Ladyman [68, page 26]).
To conclude: I have argued that, sometimes, in the decision to commit
17We may never be in a position to know if a theory is empirically adequate or not. The 
claim that a theory is empirically adequate carries precisely the same commitment to the 
correctness of a theory’s future predictions, as does the claim that the theory is true. In 
this respect the constructive empiricist sticks his neck out exactly as much as the realist.
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ourselves to a theory as a research programme, pragmatic considerations 
regarding its instrumental reliability may overrule epistemic considerations 
regarding its empirical adequacy. Sometimes, we have to settle for less18.
2.6 Summary
In the previous chapter I introduced the notion of instrumental reliability. In 
this chapter I have focused on empirical adequacy, and I have explained the 
distinction between empirical adequacy and instrumental reliability. What 
makes a scientific theory empirically adequate? The answer crucially de­
pends upon one’s conception of what a scientific theory is. I have described 
two familiar views of the nature of scientific theories (section 2), and I have 
focused on the semantic conception of scientific theories, according to which 
theories are sets of models. I have reviewed the two most influential char­
acterisations of empirical adequacy within the semantic view (section 3): a 
theory is empirically adequate if it embeds the phenomena (Van Fraassen), 
or if it reduces it (Friedman). I then have gone on to discuss the distinction, 
due to James Bogen and James Woodward, between data and phenomena; 
raised some difficulties for the semantic characterisations of empirical ade­
quacy; and argued that this difficulties can be overcome by employing the 
notion of a model of phenomena (section 4). Finally (section 5) I have re­
181 say sometimes because I want to avoid, at all costs, the suggestion that instrumental 
reliability, rather than truth or empirical adequacy, is the goal of science. Far from it. In 
this respect I prefer to subscribe to Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA):
Does science aim at truth, or does science merely aim at empirical ad­
equacy? This is the springboard for the realism /  instrumentalism con­
troversy. NOA wants to pull back a bit from the question to ask, more 
fundamentally, whether science ‘aims’ at all. Of course, there is a point to 
particular investigations, and certainly particular research groups have aim s 
and goals (to do a better experiment, to solve an outstanding problem, to 
build a better instrument, etc.). But only a fallacy in quantifier logic would 
lead one from ‘They all have aims’ to ‘There is an aim that they all have’.
(Fine [63, page 173]).
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turned to the issue of the application of theories, and argued, by means of 
the case study in chapter 1, that a theory’s domain of application is typically 
larger than its domain of empirical adequacy. I have concluded with some 
remarks on the significance of this fact for the scientific realism /  antirealism 
debate.
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Part II
Application in the  
Foundations o f Quantum  
Theory
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Chapter 3
Quantum Theory of 
M easurement
3.1 The Problem of Measurement
My aim in this chapter is to focus on a main issue in philosophy of physics 
where the distinction between application and confirmation matters. I shall 
argue that there are two problems of measurement in non-relativistic quan­
tum mechanics. One has to do with the empirical adequacy of the quantum 
theory, the other with its application. I shall then describe Arthur Fine’s 
solution to the problem of application, which, I shall argue, is not a solution 
to the problem of empirical adequacy. This should not come as a surprise in 
view of the discussion in Part I of the Thesis: the structure of application 
differs from that of confirmation, and we should not expect an application 
of a theory to always increase its degree of confirmation, or to display its 
empirical adequacy. Hence, I both offer a defence of Fine’s solution to the 
measurement problem, and provide a diagnosis of the source of possible re­
sistance to it. Fine proposes a novel account of the application of quantum 
theory to measurement interactions. But his proposal should not be taken 
as an attempt to solve the first measurement problem; and indeed from the 
point of view of empirical adequacy, and of confirmation, the proposal would
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seem to be defective.
In a nutshell, the problem of measurement in non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics is the fact that the linear dynamics entailed by the Schrodinger 
equation is inconsistent with the requirement that measurements must have 
outcomes (i.e. that they must have some particular outcome or other). In 
this section I show that the measurement problem threatens to make the 
quantum theory empirically inadequate, given a standard interpretations! 
rule, the eigenstate-eigenvalue link.
The essential difficulty raised by the problem of measurement can already 
be appreciated in the simpler formalism of quantum mechanics in terms of 
vectors in Hilbert space1. I explain the essential difficulty in section 3.1.1. 
However, a rigourous proof of the insolubility of the measurement problem 
can only be derived in the framework of statistical operators. The most 
general form of the problem of measurement is encapsulated in the so-called 
insolubility proof of the quantum measurement, which I derive in section 
3.1.4. Section 3.1.2 concerns the ignorance interpretation of mixtures, which 
is essential for the whole chapter, while section 3.1.3 is preparatory for the 
discussion of the insolubility proof.
3.1 .1  T he M easurem ent P rob lem  for P u re S ta tes
Consider an object system 0  initially in state \<f>) (E H \. We are interested 
in the values of some observable 0  of this system, represented by the Her- 
mitian operator2 0 .  We make measurements on this system by letting it 
interact with a measuring apparatus M  initially in state \Ro) € i?2 - We 
then measure the ‘pointer position’ observable, represented by A, on the 
measuring apparatus M . We can represent the initial combined state of the
1See Appendix 1 , section 3.5. Throughout this chapter I shall make much use of some 
established technical results in the formalism of quantum theory, which I review in the 
Appendixes.
2See Appendix 1 . In this Thesis I use the terms ‘observable’ and ‘operator’ exchange- 
ably. Which one is which should be clear from the context.
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system and the apparatus in a larger Hilbert space H1+2 = Hi ® # 2 ? formed 
as the tensor product of the smaller spaces3. Suppose that the eigenstates of 
0  are the set with corresponding eigenvalues A,-, while the eigenstates 
of A  are {Ri} with eigenvalues a;, i.e.:
0\<f>i) = ), 0\<f>2) = A2| (f>2 ),etc.
A \R i) = a i\R i) ,A \R 2) = a2\R2 ),etc.
Suppose further that the initial state of the object system is one of the 
eigenstates |<f>i) of the operator 0 . The initial state of the composite system 
is then given by the vector \<f>i) ® \Rq ) in the tensor product space. We are 
interested in the value that observable (0  <S> A), defined on Hi ® H2, takes 
on the final evolved state of the composite system.
We now impose the following minimal condition on any satisfactory mea­
surement interaction Ut, namely that it should correlate the initial states of 
the object system with distinguishable states of the apparatus system (we 
don’t require that the interaction leave the object system state unchanged):
It is then possible to show that if the initial state of the object system is a 
superposition over some or all of the eigenstates of O then the final evolved 
state of the composite system at the end of the measurement interaction, is 
a superposition over eigenstates of (O' ® A).  If \(j>) =  Yli c*'l&) then:
I* ) ® \ R o  ) =  E  Ci l *  > ® 1^0 > -  E  O iW i > ® iE *- >• C3-1-1)
i i
The problem of measurement can now be generated by attending to 
a standard, interpretationa! principle of quantum mechanics, the so-called 
eigenstate-eigenvalue link, or e/e link for short4. According to the e/e link
3 See Appendix 2 for a discussion of the interaction formalism of Quantum Theory.
4 Although implicit throughout the history of the foundations of quantum mechanics, 
the eigenstate-eigenvalue link was iirst explicitly introduced by Arthur Fine [58] only as 
late as 1973. Fine also showed [59] that the e /e  link cannot be derived, as Von Neumann 
thought, from further principles of the quantum theory, but that it needs to be assumed.
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an observable of a quantum system can be said to bave a value if and only 
if the system is in an eigenstate of the Hermitian operator that represents 
the observable. It follows that the observable ( /  (g) A) has no value in the 
state of the composite object-apparatus system that results at the end of 
the ‘measurement’ interaction (3.1.1). The final evolved state of the com­
posite is not an eigenstate of the required observable (I  (g) A) but, rather, 
a superposition of such eigenstates. Quantum theory predicts, then, that 
measurement interactions will normally fail to have any outcomes. If, as it is 
the case, the occurrence of outcomes of quantum measurement interactions 
is a well-established phenomenological fact, quantum theory turns out to be 
empirically inadequate.
3.1 .2  T he Ignorance In terp retation  o f M ixtu res
In the most general formalism of quantum theory, states are represented by 
Hermitian operators acting on the Hilbert space5. This formalism applies to 
mixed as well as pure states. A mixed state6 is a state of ‘less than maximal 
information’. For any pure state \<f) there is in principle an observable that 
can test whether a system is in this state, namely the observable represented 
by the projector Fj;^)]- A measurement of this observable on any system can 
have one of two outcomes, 0  or 1 ; only if the system is in state \<f>) will the 
outcome be 1 with probability 1 . There is no similar ‘testing’ observable for 
mixed states.
We represent a mixed state W  as a virtual ensemble of pure states {\<f>i)} 
with statistical weights {pt}, 0 < Pi < 1, where Y i  Pi =  1;
W : P l : |<M 
P2 : \<h)
Pn ■ | fin )
5 See Appendix 2 .
6 See Fano [54, page 74].
109
More generally we represent mixed states by so-called statistical operators: 
W  =  YliPil vi ) ( vi I =  YiPiP\vi)? where the set of pure states {|u,-)} can be 
any set you like, and need not be orthogonal or complete. However, sta­
tistical operators are Hermitian and the Spectral Decomposition Theorem7 
dictates that it must be possible to write W  in terms of mutually orthogonal 
projectors, regardless of its initial description.
I have defined a quantum mixed state as a virtual ensemble of pure 
states = | V{){V{ |, with associated statistical weights p{. A mixed state 
in classical statistical physics represents a possible state of a real ensemble 
of systems -each member of the ensemble being in a particular (pure) state. 
In such case, the statistical weights represent the relative frequencies in the 
overall ensemble of systems in each state. Hence, in classical physics mixed 
states cannot be ascribed to individual systems, but only to actual collections 
of systems. By contrast, according to many authors, quantum mechanical 
mixed states can be ascribed to individual systems as well as collections. 
Thus quantum mechanical mixed states can correspond to virtual, as well 
as real ensembles of systems.
In 1948, Hans Reichenbach [116] proposed the ignorance interpretation of 
quantum mixtures. Reichenbach’s aim was to construe quantum mixtures as 
an expression of our incomplete knowledge of the actual state of the system. 
He suggested that the statistical weights pi represented not an intrinsic 
property of the system, but rather our ignorance of the state of the system 
in question. According to Reichenbach’s definition a system is in a state 
represented by W  = Yli Pi I vi ) ( vi I if and only if the system is really in one 
of the pure states \v{), the weights pi representing our degree of ignorance.
There are two standard arguments against the ignorance interpretation, 
and one in its favour. In favour of the ignorance interpretation is the fact 
that it is consistent with the dynamical evolution of mixed states. If the 
initial mixture is W  — Vi I vi } (vi I? and the final, time-evolved, mixture 
is W  = Pi I ) ( ui I we expect, given the ignorance interpretation, that
7Theorem (3.5.1) in Appendix 1 .
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there must be a unitary operator Ut such that:
\ f i : \Ui) = Ut \vi)
Hence:
W V )  =  Y ^ P i l  Ui ) i  Ui  I =  V i ) {  Vi  I# " 1 =
i i
Ut fepii ®<- )< »•-1) u 'r 1 = U tw u r 1
which is indeed the time-evolution of mixed states.
On the other hand, the non-uniqueness of a mixed state’s decomposi­
tion has been thought to militate against the ignorance interpretation. If a 
mixture takes the form W  = ^  WiP\Wi), where the \w{) are not necessarily 
orthogonal, and/or W{ = wj for some i , j ,  then there will exist at least two 
different decompositions, as a spectral decomposition always exists:
W  =  wiP\wi ) ~  ^],PiP\vi )■> 
i i
where the {|u{)} are mutually orthogonal.
The ignorance interpretation cannot be given to both decompositions 
simultaneously8. We need to choose one -but which one? The orthodox 
answer has been always to privilege the spectral decomposition in terms of 
orthogonal projectors. But as Paul Feyerabend [55] was perhaps the first to 
point out, in cases of degeneracy, where 3 i , j  : pi = p j , even the orthogonal 
decomposition is not unique. Nancy Cartwright [25] finally refuted the or­
thodox answer, by displaying one real physical interaction, with the system 
and the measuring apparatus modelled in Hilbert spaces of different dimen­
sions, where the orthodox answer leads to results out of keeping with the 
usual analysis of the interaction.
D’Espagnat9 distinguished between proper and improper mixtures. W  = 
J2i wi\ wi ) { wi I is a proper mixture (a mixture ‘by construction’) if it is the
8 See, for instance, Van Fraassen [138, page 206].
9 D’Espagnat [44, section 7.2].
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result of a preparation procedure that ensures us that the correct decompo­
sition is over the set of not \v{). By contrast an improper mixture (a 
mixture ‘by derivation’) is ascribed to a subsystem of a composite system by 
deriving it from the state of the composite, and it carries no similar assur­
ance as to the preferred decomposition. D’Espagnat concluded that proper 
mixtures can be said always to admit the ignorance interpretation, while 
improper mixtures cannot generally be said to admit that interpretation.
The decisive argument against the ignorance interpretation of improper 
mixtures is as follows (a similar, but not identical, argument appears in 
Hughes [89, pages 149-151]). Consider a composite system 5 i + 2  in & pure 
state W \+2 = | ^ ) ( ^  |, where ) = Y i,j cij\vi ) ® \wj )> and where, as in 
Appendix 3, |u;) (\w j)) are the eigenstates of A (B) with corresponding 
eigenvalues at- (bj). This is clearly a pure state, as T r(W 2+2) =  TV(Wi+2 ) =
M 2 =  !•
The reduced states Wi, W2 can be derived from the standard identifications10 
given by (3.7.11):
Tr({A  <g> I)W 1+2) = Tr(AW x)
T r({ f  ® B)W w ) = Tr(BW 2)
We obtain: Wx = ]£* cuc*^ Vi) ( V{ |, and W2 = J2j cj j cjj\ wj ) ( wj  I- Thus 
Wx and W2 are improper mixtures, found by derivation from the composite 
state W1+2 . Let us now assume that subsystem Sx (S2) is really in one of the 
states | V{) ( V{ | (| Wj) ( wj |) with the probabilities \ca\2 ( |cyy 12)- The state of 
the combined system can then be reconstructed, in the manner described 
in Appendix 3, section 3.7. We find that Wi+ 2 =  lc« |2| vi ) ( I ® W2
(or Wi+ 2 = Y^j ® \cjj\2\ Wj) ( Wj I, or if both Wx and W2 are given the 
ignorance interpretation then: Wi+ 2 = Y ij  lcu |2 lcjj'l2| vi ® vj ) (  vi Wj |).
Thus, on the assumption that W\  (or W2, or both) can be given the 
ignorance interpretation, we find that Wi+ 2  is itself a mixture. But by
10 See Appendix 3 for the details.
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hypothesis W1+2 is a pure state; therefore, by reductio ad absurdum, the 
ignorance interpretation cannot in general be given to improper mixtures.
3 .1 .3  C o n d itio n s  on  M e a su re m e n t In te ra c tio n s
A model of quantum measurements will be expected to treat the interaction 
of the measured object with the measuring device. Quantum theory does 
indeed tell us how to construct an interaction model, in the tensor-product 
Hilbert space formalism. In order to measure a certain property of the object 
system we need to record a correlated property of the measuring device; the 
problem of measurement becomes the problem of the objectification11 of 
the pointer position observable. A measurement of a particular property 
is usually understood as a mapping of objects, or states of objects, into 
the real numbers; a function M  from a set of objects S  onto the reals R, 
M  : S  —> R. Does the observable represented by I  ® A  (the pointer position 
observable) lay out the appropriate kind of mapping into R  characteristic of 
a measurement? Is it possible to ascribe a value to the position of the pointer 
of the measuring device at the end of the interaction? For an arbitrary initial 
state of the object system, an established family of results in the literature 
(the so-called insolubility proofs of the measurement problem by Wigner 
[140], Earman and Shimony [51], Fine [56] and [57], and Brown [18]) shows 
that a consistent mapping M  : S  —» R  from all possible final states of the 
composite (object + apparatus) system into the real numbers is in general 
impossible.
Let us refer to the initial state of the object as W0, and to the initial 
state of the apparatus Wa. In order to perform a measurement of the state 
of the quantum object by the measuring apparatus, an interaction must 
be set up between the object and the apparatus. This interaction will be 
governed by an appropriate Hamiltonian H. According to Stone’s Theorem, 
there is a one-parameter group of unitary operators Ut associated with this 
Hamiltonian (Ut = elHtln). This unitary operator will then dictate the
11 The term is due to Busch, Lahti and Mittelstaedt [2 1 , page 75-83].
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evolution of the composite state while the interaction takes place:
i j f . W o ® W a - *  u t ( w 0 ® w y ir ,- 1
We would like to establish the conditions that a unitary operator Ut 
must satisfy to qualify as a measurement interaction. Suppose that (7® A), 
with eigenvalues pn and eigenvectors \{3n ), represents the pointer position 
observable, and O, with eigenvalues A; and eigenvectors |fa) represents the 
observable of the object system (O and 7 ® A  are discrete, but may be 
degenerate). Consider the following two conditions on unitary operators, 
which I call the Transfer of Probability condition (TPC) and the Occurrence 
of Outcomes condition (0 0 C )12:
Definition 1 (Transfer o f Probability Condition (T PC ))
P(W 0,0 )  = P{U(W  ® Wa)U~l , I  ® A)
(TPC) expresses the requirement that the probability distribution over the 
possible outcomes of the relevant observable 0  of the object system, be 
reproduced as the probability distribution over possible outcomes of the 
pointer position observable in the final state of the composite (object + ap­
paratus) system. (TPC) differs from the Probability Reproducibility condition 
[21, page 32] of Busch, Lahti and Mittelstaedt13, and is closer in spirit to 
the weaker equivalence condition (MEAS) adopted by Fine [57], and Brown 
[18] which I shall discuss below.
12These conditions involve the generalised Born Rule for statistical operators (3.6.10), 
which I describe in Appendix 2 . In stating these conditions I have slightly varied the 
terminology used in the Appendix, in order to deal with statistical distributions over 
eigenvalues: P{W , A) is the distribution defined by calculating, for each eigenvalue A of 
A, the probability P robw (A  =  A).
13 (TPC) and the Probability Reproducibility Condition are different, yet essentially 
equivalent conditions. Busch, Lahti and Mittelstaedt require that the probability distri­
bution for the required observable in the initial state of the object system be reproduced 
in the probability distribution for the pointer observable in the final reduced state  of the 
apparatus. Suppose that W [  represents the final reduced state of the apparatus, derived 
from the final composite state U(W 0 ® W a )17-1 by the standard identifications (3.7.11).
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D efinition 2 (O ccurrence o f O utcom es C ondition (O O C ))
U tiW cQ W aW r1 = J 2 cnW„
n
where for every Wn there is some eigenvalue j i n  of I®  A such that P(W n,I<8)
A  =  fl>n) =  1
The thought that underlies (OOC) is that we must require, in addition, 
that our models of measurement account for the phenomenological fact that 
measurement interactions typically have outcomes. Quantum theory applies 
to individual particles as well as to collections of particles. We need to re­
quire not only that the probability distributions be transferred but also that, 
when a single measurement is made on one system, an outcome be found. 
While (TPC) ensures that the statistical distribution for the relevant ob­
servable 0  will be faithfully revealed by measurements on an ensemble of 
measuring devices, it does not guarantee that single measurements on indi­
vidual particles will have outcomes. (OOC) guarantees that on measuring 
some quantity of an individual particle, an outcome (some outcome, not one 
particular outcome) will be displayed on the measuring apparatus.
(OOC) is necessary for an ignorance interpretation of the final state of 
the composite. The ignorance interpretation allows us to say that when 
a system ends up in a mixture like the one described in (OOC), the sys­
tem is really in one of the pure states that make up the mixture, but we 
don’t know which one. We would naturally write down its state in the form 
Y n cnWn, (where Wn are the possible states of the system) if we had incom­
plete knowledge of the system’s state; the numbers cn ( 0  < cn < 1 ) would 
then represent the probabilities that the system really is in each of Wn. As 
each of Wn is a state for which (I  ® A) takes some value with probability
The Probability Reproducibility Condition reads:
PT0 b(Wo,O ) =  P rob (W *,A )
which, given the derivation of the reduced state W£ from the final state of the composite 
by means of (3.7.11), is provably equivalent to (TPC) for observable A.
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one, we can be confident that a system in state J2n cnWn will always display 
a definite outcome, although we don’t know which one.
There is an important assumption buried in this last remark. I have 
assumed that if (I  ® A) is to have a value in state Wn, the probability of 
finding the outcome pn on a measurement of ( I  ® A) is one -where pn is an 
eigenvalue of the operator I  ® A. In other words, I have assumed that an 
extension of the e/e link holds for mixed states. Arthur Fine14 has provided 
one such extension, which is captured in his two interpretational rules for 
the ascription of values to observables in mixed states, the Rule of Law and 
the Rule of Silence. The Rule of Law is the equivalent of the sufficient part 
of the e/elink, while the Rule of Silence is equivalent to its necessary part. 
Together the Rule of Law and the Rule of Silence amount to a complete 
generalisation of the e/elink  to mixed states, which I state as follows15:
D efinition 3 (G eneralised E igensta te/E igenvalue Link) (a) Observ­
able Q has a value in state Wn if and only if there is an eigenvalue \ n of 
Q, such that P(W n,Q )(An) =  1 , in which case Q takes the value Xn. (b) I f  
the state W  of a system is a mixture over states Wn, Q has a value in W  if 
and only if Q has a value in each o fW n in the sense of part (a).
I shall assume that (TPC) and (OOC) are jointly sufficient for an inter­
action to count as a measurement. Indeed (OOC) is, on its own, a necessary 
condition on measurement interactions. For as long as the generalised e/e 
link is in place, and as long as we allow that the final state of the composite 
may be a mixed state, we are not entitled to say that measurement inter­
actions have outcomes, unless (OOC) holds. In contrast, (TPC) is not a 
necessary condition. A weaker requirement on the transfer of probabilities 
(one, for instance, requiring less than the transfer of the entire probability 
distribution) may be enough for the interaction to reveal some information
14Fine [64], [66 ].
15Note that part (b) of this generalised e /e  link involves the ignorance interpretation of 
mixtures (Fine [64, page 496]), as required by the Occurrence of Outcomes Condition.
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regarding the initial state of the object system. Thus, although it is true that 
any unitary operator that satisfies the conjunction (TPC) & (OOC) quali­
fies as a measurement interaction, we may well be leaving out some further 
interesting, class of measurement interactions. Indeed Fine [57, page 2784] 
has given an equivalence condition that, he claims, is the minimal necessary 
condition for a measurement (exactly the same condition is also employed by 
Brown [18]). Consider the following definition of state equivalence, relative 
to an observable Q:
D efinition 4 (Q-Equivalence) Two states W  and W ' are Q-equivalent if 
and only if prob(W,Q) = prob(W',Q), in which case we write: W  =q W '
This definition generates equivalence classes of states (pure or mixed) with 
respect to some observable; it groups all those states with identical prob­
ability distributions over the eigenvalues of a particular observable. As a 
matter of fact, the definition ensures that the states W  and W l are statisti­
cally indistinguishable and thus, on the standard understanding of quantum 
mechanics, empirically indistinguishable with respect to the observable Q. 
We may thus refer to states W, W ' for which the above ^-equivalence holds, 
as ^-indistinguishable states. We can now write down Fine’s minimal nec­
essary condition on measurement interactions. Consider a measuring appa­
ratus in the initial state Wa, and two possible initial states of the object 
system, WQ and W'Q. Then:
D efinition 5 (M easurem ent (M EA S)) A Unitary Operator U is a Wa 
measurement (of the observable 0  by means of the observable A ) if and only 
if whenever U(W0 0  Wa) U = l m  U{W'0 0  Wa) # - 1 then W0 =o W'0.
A measurement is an interaction that yields 10  A-distinguishable final states 
of the composite whenever the initial states of the object system are 0- 
distinguishable. It is not required by this condition that the unitary operator 
be capable of transferring the entire probability distribution from the object 
system to the composite, but only that if two initial states of the object sys­
tem are statistically distinguishable with respect to 0 , their corresponding
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time-evolved composite states, for any arbitrary initial state of the appara­
tus, be distinguishable with respect to I®  A. The pointer position observable 
must be able to make out these two final states of the composite; but it is 
not required that the distribution over 0  fixed by the initial object-state, be 
reproduced as the distribution over I®  A  fixed by the corresponding evolved 
state of the composite. So Fine’s condition on measurements (MEAS) does 
not entail (TPC). It is clear, though, that (TPC) entails Fine’s minimal con­
dition. (TPC) requires the entire probability distribution over eigenvalues of 
0  in the initial state of the system to be reproduced as the distribution over 
eigenvalues of I  ® A  in the final state of the composite. Hence, given a fixed 
state Wa of the apparatus, any difference in the probability ascribed to one 
of the eigenvalues of I  <g) A  by two different final states of the composite nec­
essarily reflects some difference between probabilities ascribed to different 
eigenvalues of 0  by the two corresponding initial states of the object.
3 .1 .4  T he In solub ility  P ro o f
The essence of the measurement problem is constituted by a proof that 
shows (OOC) and the minimal (MEAS) condition on measurements to be 
inconsistent for some sets of initial states of the object system. As (TPC) 
entails (MEAS), the same proof automatically shows that (TPC) and (OOC) 
are inconsistent, and for precisely the same sets of initial states of the object 
system. I focus on the most general version of the proof, originally due to 
Arthur Fine [57], and slightly reformulated by Harvey Brown [18].
For the sake of generality, let the initial state of the measuring apparatus 
be Wa = Y  wnP[7n], i.e. a mixture over pure states 7 n. Consider three 0-  
distinguishable initial states of the object system, namely P[^], P[4>2] and 
P[03], where 0 i and 0 2  are eigenstates of 0 , with eigenvalues Ai and A2 , 
but 0 3  is a linear combination of both: 0 3  =  a i0 i +  <Z2 0 2 - H is clear that 
0 1 , 0 2  and 03 are O-distinguishable. Let us now set up an interaction in 
accordance with the Schrodinger equation, represented by a unitary operator
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U, for which (OOC) is satisfied. Hence we have for <f>i ,  fa , fa:
u ( p l M ®w„)  = 
u  {P[ M ® w ' )  tf ' 1 =  £ » „ % ,* ]  
tr {Pm ® w «) t f - 1 =  £ » „ % * ]
where (3ni =  U(<fc <g) 7 n).
In order to derive this equality, it is necessary to appeal to a law of evolu­
tion named Real Unitary Evolution (RUE) by Harvey Brown [18, page 860]. 
(RUE) dictates that a mixture W  — Y n  wnP<t> is evolved by unitary evo­
lution into the mixture W* = UW U - 1  = Y n wnU P[<i>]U~l = Y n ^ P u ^ -  
Hence (RUE) asserts that the evolution of a mixture over pure states is 
the mixture over the evolved pure states. It is easy to see that (RUE) is 
consistent with the positive argument in favour of the ignorance interpre­
tation given in 3.1.2. In fact, (RUE) follows naturally from the ignorance 
interpretation of mixtures. However, (RUE) does not require the ignorance 
interpretation. Although it is arguably harder to find a plausible rationale 
for (RUE) in the absence of such interpretation, it is nevertheless possible 
to postulate it independently.
Now we have, by the linearity of U, that:
U(fa ® In) = aiU(fa ® In) + CL2U(fa ® In)
or:
finZ = ®l/^nl “h &2/^ n2 *
H (OOC) is to hold it must be the case that:
VnVi = 1,2,3 : 1 ® A((3ni) =
where /zm- are eigenvalues of 7® A. But now we can see that (OOC) and the 
minimal condition on measurements (MEAS) cannot simultaneously hold. 
For:
/  ® A((3n 3) =
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I  0 A{a\f5ni +  CL2^n2) — 
a\{I (8) A)/3ni +  ^2 ( 7  ® A)/3n2 =
QlfAnlPnl "1“ ®2Mn2^ n2j (3.1.2)
and also:
I  0  A(f3T1 2 ) — f^nzPnZ —
ftnzfalfinl +  0>2pn2) =
^ll^nzPnl “I- Q,2V"n30n2' (3.1.3)
However, (3.1.2) and (3.1.3) can only hold if fini =  /in2 =  /in3 - Thus, the 
final states of the composite wnP[pni] are not 1 0  A-distinguishable, con­
tradicting (MEAS), the minimal necessary condition on measurements, and 
hence contradicting (TPC). It is therefore impossible, under the assumption 
of the generalised e/e link, to set up an interaction between an object system 
and a measuring apparatus that simultaneously obeys the Schrodinger equa­
tion, the Transfer of Probability Condition (TPC), and the Occurrence of 
Outcomes Condition (OOC): the measurement process cannot be modelled 
entirely within quantum theory, given its standard interpretation.
3.2 The M odal Interpretation and Its Problems
The insolubility proof poses a conundrum. By assuming (TPC), (OOC), 
the Schrodinger dynamics, and the generalised e/e link we can generate a 
measurement problem. Hence, at least one among these assumptions must 
be false, if the measurement problem is to have a solution16. (OOC) and 
(TPC) are constitutive of measurement interactions, so it seems that in or­
der to escape the insolubility result we are required to either (1 ) change, or
16In section 3.3 I shall argue, following Arthur Fine, that a further assumption is involved 
in the insolubility proof. This fifth assumption is related to the application of the quantum 
interaction formalism. For the time being, however, and for the sake of argument, assume 
that the only assumptions involved are the Schrodinger dynamics, the generalised e /e  link, 
and the conditions (TPC) and (OOC).
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supplement, the Schrodinger dynamics, or (2 ) relinquish the standard inter­
pretative principle, the generalised e/e link. The former way out (advocated 
originally by Von Neumann [109], and more recently by Ghirardi, Rimini 
and Weber [72], and in a different way by Gisin [75]) involves changing the 
quantum theory altogether, as it implies a revision of one of its basic princi­
ples. In the end, all factors considered, this drastic solution may well be the 
best response to the measurement problem. However, for the purposes of 
this Thesis I am interested in philosophical attempts to assess the empirical 
adequacy of the theory and to describe its domain of application. Hence, in 
this section I shall only be concerned with attempts to provide a solution to 
the measurement problem by relinquishing the e/e link.
These are, in short, attempts to show that the threat against the empir­
ical adequacy of the quantum theory is only apparent. This appearance is 
the by-product of a standard, but ultimately mistaken, interpretation of the 
theory; when the correct interpretation is given, the threat will simply dis­
appear. There are a number of proposals of this kind in the literature, most 
of which spring from Everett’s work [53]. I shall address only what I con­
sider the best developed attempt in this direction: the modal interpretation 
of quantum theory.
3 .2 .1  T h e K ochen-H ealey-D ieks M odal In terpretation
The modal interpretation of quantum theory originates in work by Bas Van 
Fraassen in the early 1970’s (see [130], [131]). Van Fraassen’s intuition was 
(and still is) that the measurement problem can be resolved by introducing 
a new interpretational rule for the ascription of values to observables. The 
modal interpretation effectively relinquishes the necessary part of the e/e  
link. It then becomes possible for an observable to have a value even when 
the state of the system is not an eigenstate of the Hermitian operator that 
represents the observable. We can then dispense with (OOC) as a necessary 
condition altogether. It becomes unnecessary, for measurements to have 
outcomes, that the final state of the (object + apparatus) composite system 
be a mixture over eigenstates of the pointer position observable. The pointer
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will have a value, and the measurement will have an outcome, even if the 
the composite ends up in a superposition.
A state fulfils two roles in a physical theory. First, it determines what the 
properties of the system axe, and what values those properties have. Second, 
it determines how the values of those properties will evolve, if the system 
is isolated. A classical mechanical state will fulfil these two functions si­
multaneously. In the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, however, 
systems are said to possess two states -which Van Fraasen17 calls the dy­
namic state and the value state- and the two functions are split. Modal 
interpretations of interactive systems ascribe to the composite system both 
a dynamic state, represented by a statistical operator W i+2 acting on the 
tensor product Hilbert space Hi 0  JI2 , and a value state represented by a 
vector in that space. The dynamic state is fully specified by stating how 
the system will develop. This is the ‘usual’ quantum-mechanical state: its 
evolution is governed by the Schrodinger equation, and can thus be rep­
resented by the action of a unitary operator U1+2 on the tensor product 
Hilbert space. On the other hand, the value state has no Schrodinger evo­
lution. At any particular time, the value state is fully specified by stating 
which observables have values and what those values are. Hence, the value 
state of a composite system can be represented by a vector in the tensor 
product Hilbert space.
The subsystems of a composite can be ascribed their own dynamic and 
value states. Their dynamic states will be represented by means of statis­
tical operators Wi and W2 acting on the individual Hilbert spaces Hi and 
# 2 , obtainable from the overall state W1+2 of the composite by applying 
the standard identifications (3.7.11). W\ and W2 will typically be non- 
idempotent operators, i.e. they will represent mixtures. We expect their 
evolution to be given by unitary operators U\ and U2, acting on the spaces 
Hi and H2 (but on this issue, more to follow). On the other hand, each 
subsystem of the composite can also, at any time, be ascribed an individual
17Van Fraassen [138, page 2751.
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value state. This will be a pure state, represented by a vector in the corre­
sponding Hilbert space Hi or # 2 - The set of all possible value states of a 
subsystem is determined by the spectral resolution of its individual dynamic 
state, Wi or W2.
If the state of the composite is pure then the value states of the subsys­
tems figure in the so-called biorthonormal decomposition of the combined 
state:
i
where | ^ ) € Hi, and \rji) 6  # 2 - The case for the biorthonormal decomposi­
tion has been argued most forcefully by Simon Kochen, Richard Healey and 
Dennis Dieks18. The biorthonormal decomposition theorem guarantees that 
every state in the tensor product space always has one such decomposition; 
this decomposition is moreover unique, except in the case of degeneracies19. 
So, at any time during the interaction the subsystems may be ascribed re­
duced mixed states, represented by density operators W\ on H\ and W2 on 
H2, whose spectral decompositions range precisely over their respective sub­
system’s possible value states. These facts about the modal interpretation 
can be summarised in the following diagram:
&1+2
decomp decomp
18 Kochen [95], Dieks [45] and [46] and Healey [82].
19 See Kochen [95], page 154.
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As the biorthonormal decomposition is unique, it effectively selects a 
privileged form of representation for W\ and W2. In section 3.1.2 I men­
tioned that a well-known argument against the ignorance interpretation is 
precisely that mixtures generally have no unique representation. For an 
arbitrary mixed state W  =  wi\i>i) ( V^ 'l which might be degenerate and 
where the set { |^ i)} is not necessarily pairwise orthogonal, there axe at least 
two different representations, as one is always guaranteed by the spectral de­
composition theorem. If the mixture is improper then there is no way to 
tell which representation is physically correct, so we cannot apply ignorance. 
But, on the other hand, the lack of uniqueness would cease to be a problem 
if we had an independent rule to determine the physically correct represen­
tation. The biorthonormal decomposition is one such rule. It justifies the 
ignorance interpretation of the reduced states W i, W2 of the subsystems, 
because it makes the representation of those states unique20. It then be­
comes permissible to give W\ and W2 an ignorance interpretation. That is, 
we may assume that the subsystems really possess one of the pure states 
in the mixture with the associated probabilities given by the square norms
20This statement needs to be heavily qualified in light of the discussion in section 3.1.2. 
For a start, the biorthonormal rule will always privilege the orthogonal decompositions for 
the reduced states. In section 3.1.2 I referred to this as the orthodox choice for the rep­
resentation of mixtures, which Paul Feyerabend and Nancy Cartwright have shown won’t 
work as a universal rule for applying ignorance. Hence, the biorthonormal decomposition 
rule justifies the ignorance interpretation as long as we assume that (1) the dimensions 
of the Hilbert spaces of the subsystems is the same, and (2) there axe no degeneracies in 
the reduced states. The latter is possible only if the pure state of the composite is totally 
non-degenerate. Dieks initially argued that degenerate states of the composite form a set 
of measure-zero in the total set of possible states, and hence can be ignored [45, page 
443]. As will become clear soon, I think that measure-zero arguments, whether in favour 
or against modal interpretations, are generally unsound, unless the particular measure in 
question can be given some direct physical motivation. But in this instance such motiva­
tion is absent, as is emphasised by the fact that the most discussed ever composite state in 
philosophy of quantum mechanics, the EPR singlet state, is totally degenerate. Dieks now 
favours a decoherence solution to this problem: see, for instance, his [47]. Bacciagaluppi 
and Hemmo [7] have further developed the decoherence solution.
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of the coefficients. I am not suggesting that the ignorance interpretation 
should be given -in fact I shall shortly argue to the contrary. But the sug­
gestion is rather obvious: in the modal interpretation of interactive systems 
it is always possible to represent the set of value states of the subsystems by 
means of the pure states that appear in the spectral decomposition of those 
mixtures. Hence the modal interpretation of the reduced mixtures is just 
like the ignorance interpretation. As Van Fraassen writes:
It is as if  the ignorance interpretation of mixtures were cor­
rect. For if system X  is in mixed state W , then the actual values 
of observables pertaining to X  are exactly those it would have 
had if it had been a pure state in [the spectral resolution] of W .
But we don’t know which pure state -all of them are possibili­
ties for us, if we are told only that X  is in mixed state W . (Van 
Fraassen, [138, page 22])
And yet, as we can see, Van Fraassen actually refrains from fully embrading 
the ignorance interpretation of mixtures. In the course of this discussion, I 
shall argue that this is a wise thing to do: it is indeed impossible, in general, 
to give an ignorance interpretation to the reduced mixtures W\ and W2 that 
represent the dynamic states of the subsystems of a composite. Before I do 
that, however, I want to explore the extent to which modal interpretations 
accomplish their purported goal to restore the empirical adequacy of the 
quantum theory. An argument by David Albert and Barry Loewer denies 
that modal interpretations accomplish this goal at all.
3 .2 .2  A lb ert and L oew er’s C riticism
Albert and Loewer have presented their argument against the Kochen- 
Healey-Dieks (KHD) modal interpretation in several forms21, but they all 
seem to fall under the following general schema:
21 See Albert [1], and Albert and Loewer [2], [3] and [4].
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(1) Ideal interactions have “measure-zero” in the set of all conceivable 
quantum interactions.
(2) Measure-zero implies physical impossibility.
(3) Thus, physically possible measurements axe not ideal.
(4) But, the modal interpretation requires measurement interactions to be 
ideal.
(5) Hence, the modal interpretation cannot account for physically possible 
measurements.
The conclusion of the argument is that, under the KHD modal interpre­
tation, quantum theory is empirically inadequate. Hence the goal that we 
set out to achieve, namely to restore the empirical adequacy of the theory 
by relinquishing the e/e link, is not after all accomplished. However, I claim 
that Albert and Loewer’s argument, as it stands, cannot refute the modal 
interpretation. The problem concerns premises (1) and (2). These premises 
axe used to derive statement (3), which is then employed as ammunition 
against the modal interpretation. What would make this part of the ar­
gument sound? First, the conclusion (3) must follow from the premises (1 
and 2) and second, the premises must be true -of the same states of af­
fairs in the world! More poignantly: “measure-zero” must mean the same 
in (1) and (2). But not all measures will indicate physical possibility. For 
instance, it can be shown that the set of states of the composite system 
that result from a non-ideal interaction are nondense in the norm topology 
of the tensor-product Hilbert space. However there are many well-known 
counterexamples to the claim that nondensity is a good criterion for physical 
impossibility. If “measure-zero” means “nondense in some norm topology” 
then premise (1) is true, but premise (2) is false in general, and hence the 
overall argument would seem to be unsound.
Albert himself has been trying to put this kind of reasoning to work in 
classical thermodynamics. The issue there concerns trajectories of thermo­
dynamic states in phase space. Some of these trajectories represent systems
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with increasing entropy, some with decreasing entropy. In the neighbour­
hood of every point in an entropy decreasing trajectory there is an arbitrary 
large number of points that belong to trajectories that represent entropy- 
increasing systems. But as Albert has pointed out22, one cannot immedi­
ately draw inferences from this feature of phase space to the likelihood of 
those trajectories in the real world; instead one needs to investigate the 
thermodynamic systems, “case by case”. Similarly in the quantum domain, 
Albert and Loewer need to produce specific examples of non-ideal interac­
tions to support their conclusion. A measure-zero argument, on its own, will 
not do the job.
3.2 .3  N on-idea l M easurem ents
The modal interpretation is committed to ideal interactions because it em­
ploys the biorthonormal decomposition rule to ‘pick out’ the observables that 
take values. At the end of the interaction, different values of the pointer po­
sition observable will be perfectly correlated with values of a well-defined 
observable over the object system; in other words there are no cross terms 
in the biorthonormal decomposition:
) ® |f,-> (3.2.4)
i
But notice that this is a small subset of the set of all possible final states:
i* )  =  E < m & ) ® i&> (3-2-5)
For most states in this larger set, perfect correlations will no longer occur 
between values of the pointer position observable and the observable over 
the object system. One can put this in terms of the Hamiltonians that
govern the dynamics of the composite. Ideal interaction Hamiltonians will
yield final states that are already in the correct biorthonormal form (3.2.4). 
For the larger class of Hamiltonians that govern non-ideal interactions, the 
form of the final state of the combined system will be (3.2.5).
22In his lecture at the 1995 IUHPS meeting in Florence.
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Notice that so far the modal interpretation is not really under threat, as 
its advocates could insist that it is possible in principle to give a treatment in 
terms of ideal interactions to all interesting cases of real physical interactions. 
However, Albert and Loewer continue:
...real measurements are almost never perfect in this sense.
In a real measurement there is always some probability of the 
measuring device making an error. (Albert and Loewer, [3, p.
95]).
If the world is anything less than entirely perfect (and of 
course it invariably is less than that), then the KHD interpre­
tations don’t end up doing their job right. And tha t’s that. 
(Albert, [1, page 196]).
Albert and Loewer’s criticism is that ideal measurement of the kind 
required by the modal interpretation are physically impossible. To support 
this claim they have invoked an argument from measure-zero:
In the neighborhood of every Hamiltonian that characterizes 
an ideal measurement, there are Hamiltonians that characterize 
evolutions like [3.2.5]. In fact, on natural measures the measure 
of the set of Hamiltonians which correspond to ideal measure­
ments is 0. (Albert and Loewer [4, p. 301]).
However, measure-zero rarely indicates physical impossibility. The classic 
counterexample is pointing a highly idealised one-dimensional pointer onto 
the real line. A natural measure can be laid out over the real line, on 
the basis of indifference, in such a way that every individual point will 
have measure-zero, while the whole line will have measure-one. But when 
the pointer points it will do so on one of those measure-zero points! One 
can construct highly counterintuitive examples. For instance, the classical 
mechanical model of the solar system yields a number of possible orbits, 
given some initial conditions. A measure could be laid out over the possible 
orbits of the planets (in the model), according to which the set of the nine
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actual orbits will have measure-zero in the set of all possible orbits. And 
yet nobody will expect to be told that those orbits are impossible, or that 
they are ‘almost never’ realised.
What sort of measure will do the job? And what will the measure be 
over? There are three possibilities: a measure over Hamiltonians, a measure 
over composite states, or a measure over the states of the subsystems.
Consider first a measure over the Hamiltonians that govern the evolu­
tion of the composite state. It is not clear that the set of Hamiltonians that 
induce ideal interactions must have measure-zero in the set of all Hamil­
tonians. Albert and Loewer certainly prove nothing of the sort; and even 
if the set of ideal Hamiltonians was to be given measure-zero, under some 
measure, the point made previously still holds: physical impossibility does 
not necessarily follow.
Secondly, consider a measure over the composite state. Recall that at the 
conclusion of a non-ideal measurement interaction the state of the composite 
is: |^ )  = Y^ij ® \€j)? while if the measurement is ideal, we have:
I*?') =  di\4>i)(2)\£i )• Every vector in the tensor product Hilbert space will
represent a possible final state of the composite system. The advantage of 
focusing upon the final state of the composite, rather than the Hamiltonian, 
is that we can now make use of the metrical properties of the tensor-product 
Hilbert space to define the topological notion of density. Relative to some 
metric function d, a set S  is dense if for any point x € S  there is at least 
one point y € S  such that d(x,y) < e, for arbitrarily small c. Let us refer 
to those vectors in the tensor-product Hilbert space that result from ideal 
interactions as ‘ideal state points’, and those that result from non-ideal 
interactions as ‘non-ideal state points’. The standard metric on the Hilbert 
space is defined by the norm operation: d(x,y)  = |(x — y)|. It can then be 
shown that the set of ideal state points is non-dense in the topology induced 
by the norm: given a sufficiently small e, the neighbourhood of any ideal 
state point will contain non-ideal state points only. The claim would then 
be that ideal state points are unstable, in the following sense: any arbitrarily 
small disturbance will take an ideal state point into a non-ideal state point in
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its neighbourhood. Thus any small perturbation in the initial Hamiltonian 
will result in a non-ideal state point at the conclusion of the interaction; 
and, of course, some perturbation can never be totally excluded.
There are two obvious problems with this argument. First, it is fax 
from clear exactly how ‘disturbances’ of the final states of the composite 
correspond to physical perturbations of the Hamiltonian. Why should tiny 
physical influences invariably get represented by small ‘disturbances’ of the 
final states? Second, there are many other metrics one could impose on 
the Hilbert space, in place of the norm-induced one. Under some of these 
metrics, the set of ideal state points will be dense. Is the norm-induced 
metric more justified than any other?23. The argument from instability 
would have more bite if the norm-induced metric of Hilbert space represented 
actual distances between objects in physical space. We could then intuitively 
see how a small force impressed upon the pointer of the apparatus may 
be represented by a small ‘disturbance’ of its state. But in fact, in the 
discrete model for measurements treated here, the Hilbert space norm is 
not intended to represent distances in space or spacetime. Instead, on the 
standard understanding of the theory, the norm has been associated with 
probabilities for outcomes of particular measurements in particular states24.
A third option for Albert and Loewer is to somehow try to connect 
their measure to the quantum probabilities themselves. One way would
23 In a manuscript recently brought to my attention, Lawrence Sklar raises a similar 
worry for the usual metric of distance in classical statistical phase space. It is clear that 
Sklar thinks that this is a most pressing and unresolved matter. He writes:
The topologies that are usually invoked are, of course, those that are 
defined by using the usual metric of distance between points in the phase 
space. There will be many other metrics that will give rise to the same 
topology, but others, weird and deviant ones, that do not. But is our choice 
of the standard distance measure between the phase space points itself any 
more forced upon us by the dynamical laws and the constitution of the 
system [...]? (Sklar, [1 2 2 , page 19])
24 As in Born’s probability rule (see Appendix 1).
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be to define joint probabilities over tbe value states of the subsystems: 
Pij(\4>i )& |£j)) =  Zidi j i ,  where I ranges over all possible final states of 
the composite. (This probability would of course have to be conveniently 
normalised.) However, this proposal would not serve Albert and Loewer’s 
purposes, because this measure cannot tell us that ideal interactions have 
measure zero. The joint probability for | f c ) and |&) is certainly not zero: 
the state of the composite at the conclusion of a non-ideal interaction is 
1$ )  = Y ,^ij dij\(j>i) ® ), and the probability of \<f>i )&|&) is \da\2 which will
typically be non-zero, and in fact should be quite large (how large depend­
ing upon the efficiency of the coupling interaction). So, on the basis of this 
measure we could not establish that the set of ideal interactions has measure 
zero.
In addition, this third proposal would have a further unintended conse­
quence. The joint measure cannot be defined over the reduced states W\ and 
W2, as the information about the correlations contained in the composite 
state required by our measure is just the kind of information that gets lost 
when the reduced states are derived. Ultimately we would have to define 
Albert and Loewer’s measure over pairs of value states, one of each subsys­
tem. If the value states are given by the sets {]&)} and { |£j)}, we would 
then ascribe probabilities to all the pairs {|<fo), |£y)}. But, what would these 
probabilities be of. The simplest answer is: they would be probabilities for 
the actual states of the two subsystems at the conclusion of an randomly 
chosen measurement interaction. And indeed, by calculating the marginals 
of these joint probabilities we can define probabilities for the set of states 
| <f>i) in W i, and the set of states |&) in W2.
3 .2 .4  T he Ignorance In terpretation  o f R educed  S ta tes
We must now finally address the following important question: Can we then 
apply the ignorance interpretation to the reduced states W\ and W^l Re­
call from section 3.1.2 that there are two arguments against the ignorance 
interpretation of mixtures, and one in its favour. First note that the main 
argument against clearly applies: W\ and W2 do not correspond to any
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process of preparation, but are instead derived from the state of the com­
posite by partial tracing; and the ignorance interpretation cannot generally 
be ascribed to improper mixtures.
I shall argue that, moreover, in this particular case the argument in 
favour of the ignorance interpretation of W\ and W2 is inapplicable. Recall 
that the argument in favour of the ignorance interpretation is its consis­
tency with the time evolution of mixed states. But in this case the reduced 
states are not really quantum mechanical states: they do not evolve accord­
ing to the Schrodinger equation. Here I shall give a shortened version of 
an argument to show that there is no consistent ascription of quantum me­
chanical states to the component subsystems, if those subsystems are really 
interacting25. Hence, I shall conclude, the reduced states W\ and W2 are 
not ignorance interpretable.
Suppose that $  is the state of the composite at the beginning of the 
interaction. Suppose further that W2 are the reduced states of the 
subsystems at that same time. It may now seem natural to assume that 
the dynamics of the reduced states is given by the unitary operators Z7i, 
U2 acting on H i, H2’, while the dynamics of the composite state is given 
by # 1+2 acting on Hi ® H2. That is, we may try to complete our original 
diagram as follows:
25This is not to say that the value states have no Schrodinger evolution. It is as matter of 
course that value states can have no Schrodinger evolution; if they did evolve unitarily, the 
modal interpretation would lack the resources to do justice to the probabilistic character 
of quantum theory. The precise dynamics of value states is currently an area of some 
intense research (see for instance Bacciagaluppi and Dickson [6]).
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However, such, completion turns out to be impossible. Let me begin 
with stating an assumption. If the physics of the particular case at hand 
indicates that two systems evolve as free particles and have never interacted, 
nothing is gained in describing the dynamics of the composite. Conversely 
if the composite is ascribed an entangled state then we must take seriously 
the fact that the evolution of this composite state will exhibit the results of 
some physical interaction between the subsystems. One can then write the 
following criterion:
C riterion  3.2.1 I f  two currently interacting systems are represented as sub­
systems in a composite system then the dynamics of the composite state will 
be given by a unitary operator U1+2 that is not factorizable in terms of in­
dependent operators U\ , U2 that govern the evolution of the states of the 
component subsystems J7i+ 2
Criterion 3.2.1 does not apply to systems that have interacted in the past but 
are currently not interacting -those systems might well show entanglement, 
while their current Hamiltonian does factorize. The logical form of the 
criterion is a conditional where the antecedent requires that the systems are 
currently interacting. The unitary operator that governs the evolution of 
this interacting dynamical state will not be factorizable in terms of operators 
acting independently on the states of the component subsystems. Otherwise 
we have not taken seriously the physics of the situation.
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Now, the following lemma can be proved26:
Lemma 1 I f  = U\WiUf 1 and — U2W2U2 1, where Ui, U2 are 
unitary operators, then U\+2\® ) = Ui ® )
In other words it can be shown that if the dynamics of the reduced states 
is unitary, the unitary operator that governs the evolution of the dynami­
cal state that represents the composite is factorizable27. But according to 
criterion (3.2.1) the state of the composite does not factorize in genuine 
interactions. It follows that in general the reduced states have no unitary 
evolution. Hence no consistent ascription of quantum states can be given to 
the individual subsystems in interaction. One might want to try to ascribe 
classical states instead, but classical states have a dynamics of their own, 
one that will generally be inconsistent with the the Schrodinger evolution of 
the composite state.
This result prevents us from applying in this case the one argument in 
favour of the ignorance interpretation of mixtures in general, namely its 
consistency with the time-evolution of mixed states. For in this particular 
case there is no time-evolution to show consistency with respect to.
3 .2 .5  C onclusions
I hope to have achieved two things. First I hope to have preempted the 
only argument that we may have initially entertained for actually giving the 
ignorance interpretation to the reduced states W2, namely consistency
26The full result is in [106], but see Appendix 4 for a schematic proof. Brown’s principle 
of Real Unitary Evolution (RUE) is crucially assumed in this proof. This is necessary if 
we don’t want to preempt from the start the possibility that W% and W2 be ignorance 
interpretable. For the ignorance interpretation entails (RUE).
27 The lemma is true up to phase factors of the composite state. Under no circumstances 
can these phase factors alter the correlations between the subsystems. Of course an 
interaction with a further measuring device could be set up to reveal these factors, but 
the lemma would then apply to the subsystem involved in this further interaction.
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with the time-evolution. This result vindicates Van Fraassen’s cautionary 
remark: it is indeed only as if  the ignorance interpretation of mixtures was 
correct; for in fact, it is not correct at all. The modal interpretation makes 
it possible to ascribe values to observables even when the subsystems are 
not in eigenstates: that is not state-ascription, it’s value-ascription.
Secondly, I hope to have shown that Albert and Loewer’s argument 
against KHD modal interpretations needs further empirical justification. A 
measure theoretic argument will not do, at least not without some further 
physical justification for the measure in question. Albert has suggested28 
that what underlies the intuition that real measurements are never ideal 
is ‘common sense’. That seems right, provided that we understand such 
‘common sense intuition’ as the result of accumulated knowledge of instances 
of real laboratory interactions, and abandon the attempt to ground the 
intuition directly upon the abstract structure of Hilbert space. Albert now 
agrees. The claim that ideal measurements axe physically impossible, or 
very unlikely, cannot be justified by appeal to a dubious inference from a 
measure-zero set of states in Hilbert space. Such common sense intuition 
must be, if at all, supported by displaying actual instances of non-ideal 
interactions. In this context, that is work that still has to be done.
I am nevertheless inclined to go along with Albert and Loewer in the 
end, and agree with their claim that there exist irreducibly non-ideal real 
laboratory interactions29. But any argument for such a conclusion necessar­
ily has to give a description of at least one such real laboratory interaction, 
and a plausible analysis of why the specific interaction must be modelled by 
means of a non-ideal interaction, and not, for instance, by means of an ideal 
measurement of an approximate observable.
28In conversation, Florence 1995.
29I argue that destructive interactions axe conceivably of just this kind, in a joint paper 
with Maxco DelSeta [43].
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3.3 Measurement and Application
I have so far considered the problem of measurement as a threat against 
the empirical adequacy of the quantum theory. I call this the first mea­
surement problem: is quantum theory em pirically adequate of measurement 
interaction phenomena? The insolubility proof indicates that it is not, at 
least according to the standard interpretation of the theory. In order to 
solve the first problem of measurement we axe requested to abandon the 
standard interpretational rule, the generalised e /e  link, and to search for a 
new interpretation of quantum theory. The first problem of measurement 
is a problem in interpretation: what could it mean to say that a quantum 
system has, or possesses, a particular property, especially in cases when the 
system is in a superposition of eigenstates of the specific observable? The 
modal interpretation is an attempt to answer this question in full generality 
and without falling prey to the insolubility proof, and the Kochen-Specker 
proofs. In the previous section, I explored some of the main difficulties 
faced by the modal interpretation. Is the modal interpretation capable of 
fully rescuing the empirical adequacy of the quantum theory? The jury is, 
arguably, still out. It is still an open question whether the first problem of 
measurement can be solved or not.
Nevertheless, it is also possible to conceive the measurement problem in 
a different light, as a problem in the application  of quantum theory. I call 
this the second measurement problem: can quantum theory be applied to  
measurement phenomena? When conceived in this manner the problem of 
measurement takes a rather different form; as a matter of fact the second 
problem of measurement has a solution and, I shall argue, the correctness 
of this solution does not in any way depend upon there being a solution to 
the first measurement problem.
3.3 .1  S elective Interactions
In a series of recent papers [64], [6 6 ] [67], Arthur Fine has proposed a solu­
tion to the second measurement problem in terms of selective interactions.
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Fine’s approach makes use of an essential feature of the generalised formal­
ism of quantum mechanics in terms of statistical operators, namely that it 
treats mixed and pure states on a par. Pure states axe simply those states 
represented by idempotent statistical operators of trace one30, i.e. they are 
just a subset among all possible states. The trace operation defines, for each 
state, pure or mixed, a statistical distribution over the eigenvalues of a par­
ticular observable. It becomes possible to group states, pure or mixed, into 
equivalence classes associated with every observable, depending on whether 
the states yield the same statistical distribution over the observable’s eigen­
values.
Consider the definition of Q-equivalence (definition (4), in section 3.1.3): 
two states W  and W ' are Q-equivalent if and only if
prob(W, Q) = prob(Wf, Q),
i.e. if and only if both states lay out identical probability distributions over 
the eigenvalues of Q. If two states are Q-equivalent, their probability dis­
tributions axe identical, and we call such states (^-indistinguishable. Thus, 
every observable Q effectively determines, for each state W , an equivalence 
class formed by all of W ’s Q-indistinguishable states. We can define the 
equivalence class [ W ] q  as follows:
D efinition 6  (Q-Equivalence Class) W  G \ W ] q  i f  and only i f  VW7 G 
[W]Q : W = q W '
With this definition in mind, let us now return to the discussion of mea­
surement interactions in section 3.1. A quantum object in state WQ interacts 
with an apparatus initially in state Wa. We axe interested in the property 
0  of the object, represented by the hermitian operator O, with eigenvalues 
Ai and eigenvectors fa. The pointer position observable on the apparatus is 
represented by the hermitian operator 7® A, with eigenvalues /xm- and eigen­
vectors pni. The insolubility proof of the measurement problem shows that
30See Appendix 2 , section 3.6.
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no interaction can be set up that transfers the probability distribution laid 
out by Wc over the A; eigenstates of O to the pni eigenstates of the pointer 
position observable, if  we allow that the in itia l s ta te  o f the object m ay be 
any arbitrary sta te  including, crucially, superpositions of O’s eigenstates.
Fine’s proposal is to restrict the class of initial states of the object, ac­
cording to the kind of observation that we are interested in. If the initial 
state of the object is W0, and if we are interested in the observable O, Fine 
suggests that we focus only on the O-equivalence class of W0, namely [W0]o; 
he advises, for the purposes of this particular interaction, (1 ) to ignore all 
other O-equivalence classes, formed by attending to states other than WQ, 
and (2) to disregard all X-equivalence classes of WQ for observables X  of 
the object system other than O (i.e. those classes formed by considering 
the probability distribution that WQ would lay out over eigenstates of dif­
ferent observables). Suppose that 0  is a (discrete and not maximally de­
generate) observable with spectral decomposition given by ^nAi, where 
Pn =  P[<j,n] = \ 4 >n ) ( 4 )n \ -  We can construct the standard representative  of 
\W0]o as follows:
D efinition 7 (S tan d ard  R epresen tative) WQ{0) is the standard repre­
sen ta tive o f the equivalence class  [ W o j o  if  and only if:
Wo(0) = Y .T < W 0Pn)W n = X > o 6 Wo(0 = Xn)Wn,
n n
where Wn =  ( l / T r ( P nf) Pn .
To construct the standard representative of an equivalence class, knowledge 
is required of both the initial state of a system, and of the spectral decom­
position of a particular observable. Given such knowledge, the definition of 
the standard representative (definition 7) uniquely picks out a special state, 
typically a mixture, corresponding to each equivalence class. Moreover, this 
is a very special state indeed: it is a mixture over pure states for which the 
observable 0  takes some value with certainty. Wn is a normalised projector 
in the spectral decomposition of O. Hence in each Wn the observable 0  will
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take some value with probability one:
MWn : probWn(0  = AB) = Tr(PnWn) =  1 .
This is, of course, easier to appreciate in the case of a maximal observable. 
For suppose that 0  has no degeneracies; then Wn =  Pn, and the probability 
for 0  to have a value An in Wn is, simply: probwn(0  = An) = Tr(PnWn) = 
Tr(PnPn) = Tr(Pn) =  1 .
The standard representative W0( 0 ) contains all the information relevant 
to measurements of the observable 0  in an object system initially in state 
W0. Hence if an interaction is set up between the object system and the 
measurement apparatus to reveal the value of the property 0  in the object 
system, we need only be concerned, in modelling the interaction with the 
measuring apparatus, with the standard representative W0( 0 ), not with 
the full state W0. The interaction is ‘selective’, in the sense that it pays 
attention only to those features of the object system that are significant from 
the point of view of the relevant observable, while ignoring the remaining 
features concerning other observables.
Consider the evolution of the initial state of the composite. It is given 
by a unitary operator £/*:
u t - .w 0 ® w a ^  u t ( w 0 ® wy 1
The insolubility proof shows that, for an arbitrary state WQ, no such unitary 
operator exists that conforms to both the Transfer of Probability Condition 
(TPC) and the Occurrence of Outcomes Condition (OOC). The standard 
representative W0(0 )  is, however, not any arbitrary state. Fine’s proposal is 
to replace the original W0 by the standard representative WQ(0 )  of its equiv­
alence class with respect to the relevant observable 0 . We then obtain31:
W„(0) ® Wa —♦ Ut(W0(0 )  ® W «)Ff1 =
31 The derivation below is for the simplest case of a maximal observable -the general 
case involves a further normalisation constant.
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Ut{T,n Tr(W 0P[M )Wn ® W n P ^ U r 1 =
Enm Tr(W 0PlM )wmUt(Wn ® Pbro]) tf f1 =
E > . T r(W/o%„])®7nC/'((^ „ ] ® -Pbm] ) ^ - 1
An interaction can easily be set up tbat effects the transfer of tbe entire 
probability distribution over (9’s eigenstates into a probability distribution 
over the eigenstates p nm of I  ® A. Consider, for simplicity, an ideal non­
disturbing interaction Ut : Ut{<t>n ® 7 m) = <f>n® 7 n- Now, assuming (RUE), 
this interaction has the following effect:
P[4>n] ®  ^[7m] ------> U t(P[<f>n ] ®  =
^ ( W ] ) ^ 1 =
[0n ®7n] =  ^ [ f in n ]  ’
where /3nn is an eigenvector of (7 <g> A ) with eigenvalue /znn. The final state 
of the composite is then:
^o-\-a = ^j[^Tr(W0Pn)wmPy3Tin] = 77nm P\f3nn] • (3.3.6)
nm nm
This is a mixture over pure states, namely projectors associated with the 
eigenvectors of I  ® A. According to part (b) of the definition of the gener­
alised e /e  link  (definition 3), we axe entitled to say that in this final state of 
the composite I  ® A has a value, in accordance with (00C ).
In other words, by restricting the initial state to its standard represen­
tative it becomes possible to escape the insolubility proof of the quantum 
measurement problem. It now becomes possible to set up a Schrodinger in­
teraction that obeys both the Transfer of Probability Condition (TPC) and 
the Occurrence of Outcomes Condition (0 0 C ) -without ever relinquishing 
any standard interpretational rule, such as the e /e  link.
3 .3 .2  Ignorance, and S tate-descrip tions
I claim that Fine’s proposed way around the insolubility proof constitutes 
a solution to the second measurement problem, concerned with the applica­
tion , rather than empirical adequacy, of the quantum theory. In any case
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where the application of a theory is not guided by a concern to test the 
theory, we expect an independently standing mediating model to be doing 
much of the work, otherwise normally done by the theory itself, in fixing the 
criteria for the introduction of corrections and amendments into the the­
oretical descriptions. I shall argue that the mediating model employed in 
Fine’s proposal is a conception of a probability distribution over the eigen­
values of an observable as a physical aspect of an object. An appreciation of 
this conception can be gained by considering the distinction between state- 
ascription and state-description, and the important function that the latter 
plays in Fine’s proposal.
Let me then explore a bit further the sense in which ‘selective’ inter­
actions constitute a solution to the measurement problem. The result of 
a selective interaction is a weighted sum over states in each of which the 
pointer position observable has values:
W q+ o. =  X I  *7nm.P[Pnn]- 
nm
The final state is mixed, and we are advised by the conjunction of (0 0 C ) 
and the generalised e/e link, to give this mixture the ignorance interpreta­
tion. That is, we are asked to infer that the state of the composite really 
is one of the states P[pnn\, although we ignore precisely which one it is; one 
of these states really obtains at the end of the interaction with the pre­
scribed probability ijnm. This ignorance interpretation of W/+a is indeed 
possible: the mixture in question is not an improper one, as it has not been 
derived from the state of a larger composite system by employing the stan­
dard identifications (3.7.11). As a matter of fact the (object + apparatus) 
system itself need not be conceived, for our purposes, as a subsystem of any 
larger physical system. On the contrary, it is natural, on this picture, to 
think of the (object + apparatus) system as a closed system. The final state 
of the composite, W/+a is a proper mixture, for it is the result of a prepara­
tion procedure - a  complex and highly convoluted procedure perhaps, but a 
preparation procedure nevertheless. It should then be possible to give W/+Q 
the ignorance interpretation, as required by (OOC).
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It is now worth looking into the origin of the probabilities r}nm that 
appear in W{+ 2* For instance 7711 (the probability for the f in  state in this 
mixed state, which we are supposed to interpret as a measure of subjective 
ignorance) is given by the product Tr{W 0P{)xw \. Now, wi is the probability 
of the pure state P[7l] in the initial apparatus mixture32, while T r(W 0P i)  is 
the probability ascribed to the pure state W\ in the standard representative 
of the object system. We are asked, in Fine’s proposal, to give the final 
state of the composite an ignorance interpretation, and to understand the 
probabilities involved in the state W/+a as subjective probabilities describing 
our incomplete knowledge of the ‘true’ state. But it is now clear that in 
order to do that, we have to equally give the mixtures Wo(0 )  and Wa an 
ignorance interpretation. For the probability 7711 ascribed in W/+a to the 
state fin  is a product of two probabilities, wi and Tr{W 0Pi). The subjective 
interpretation of 7711 requires the subjective interpretation of both wi and 
T t(W 0Pi). Hence, in order to give the ignorance interpretation to the final 
state of the composite we have to give the ignorance interpretation to both 
the initial state of the apparatus Wa, and the standard representative of the 
system, Wo(0).
This is again not incompatible with the axguments against the igno­
rance interpretation of improper mixtures that I reviewed in section 3.1.2. 
For neither Wa nor W0(0 )  is an improper mixture, as neither is found by 
‘derivation’ from states of larger systems that the composite (object -f ap­
paratus) may be a physical part of.
But to give an ignorance interpretation to Wo(0 )  raises a puzzle. Wo(0 )  
is a mixture over Wn states:
w „ {o ) = J 2 T r (w °p « )w » =
n n
32Note, en passant, that the actual composition of W a has no effect whatever on the final 
state of the composite. This is as it should be for an ideal interaction, which is the only 
case I treat here. In general, however, the initial state of the apparatus will matter. For 
that reason only I have kept throughout these formulae reference to the index m which, 
in the special case of an ideal interaction, becomes just a dummy index.
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In giving the ignorance interpretation to Wo(0 )  we will be claiming that 
the true  state of the object system, at the beginning of the interaction, is 
really one of the states Wn, with the prescribed probabilities. But, the true 
initial state of the system is W0\ This may not even be a mixed state, and 
it will generally be a very different state to any of Wn. Moreover, although 
by construction the mixture W0{0 ) is in W0’s O-equivalence class, neither 
of the pure states Wn that appear in the decomposition of WQ( 0 ) is.
The point can be made more graphically by considering the very case 
that gave rise to the insolubility proof. There, we were invited to con­
sider a two-dimensional observable 0  with eigenstates <f)\ and <f>2 and corre­
sponding eigenvalues Ai and A2 . We were then asked to consider three 0 - 
distinguishable states, <^>1 , 4>2 and <£3 , where 4>z was the linear combination: 
<f>3 = ai<f>i+ a2<t>2- Given and the spectral decomposition of 0  = AiP^ + 
X2P(h we can construct the standard representative in ^ 3 ’s O-equivalent 
class, namely the mixed state: W0(0 ) =  |a i |2| <t> 1 ) ( <j>i | +  |<Z2 |2| <f>2) ( < h  I-
Fine’s proposal demands that we give the ignorance interpretation to 
W0(0). Giving the ignorance interpretation to Wa(0 )  amounts to claiming 
that the system is really in state <j> 1 with probability |a i |2, or in state <f>2 with 
probability |a2|2. But we know that the state of the system is really neither 
</>i, nor 4>2i but <£3 , which is a superposition of both. Surely we are not 
here being asked to entertain the long-discredited ignorance interpretation 
of superpositions33. What is going on?
What is going on, I think, is that we are implicitly abandoning the 
requirement that systems have, or possess, states really. Instead, systems 
have state-descriptions. Descriptions are useful as long as they enable us 
to solve a particular problem. State-descriptions that ale  useful for some 
purposes may not be useful for other purposes. The description of the initial 
object system as being in the superposition helps us to understand typical 
quantum interference phenomena that the system may generate. But, as
33The irony won’t be lost to the reader that this is precisely the case of Schrodinger’s 
cat (one only has to think of <f> 1 and <f>2 as the dead/alive eigenstates).
143
the insolubility proof makes manifest, it does not help at all to understand 
why measurements of properties of this system have outcomes. For that 
we need to change the description, and adopt the corresponding mixture, 
appropriately ignorance-interpreted.
3 .3 .3  E quivalence C lasses as P hysical A sp ects
Although I believe that Fine’s proposal presupposes som e  form of instru­
mentalism towards physical theory, I do not think that it is of the same 
kind that sometimes gets associated with the logical positivist tradition. In 
the early works of Nagel [107, pages 129-140] and Hempel [83, chapter 8 ], 
instrumentalism was understood as a thesis concerning the meaning of the­
oretical terms; it was an interpretation of theory. I want to use the term 
in a much broader sense, as an attitude  towards science, and as an allied 
methodology for scientific knowledge. Neither do I see instrumentalism as 
the feeble and weak position that it is sometimes taken to be in contempo­
rary discussions -a  sort of ‘anything goes’ attitude that aims to ‘debunk’ the 
authority of science by revealing that its claims about the world, when taken 
literally, lack any true import. Instead I see instrumentalism as a strong, 
robust and positive approach to scientific knowledge, a pro-science  attitude.
Here I can only give a preliminary sketch. This kind of instrumental­
ism is essentially a two-vector notion. One points towards empiricism, and 
against realism, and asks us to refrain from projecting out our representa­
tions onto the world. As Fine aptly puts it, the instrumentalist claims that 
our descriptions o f physical system s are ‘in the head’, and not out there in  
the world. The second component, though, points away from empiricism, 
and towards pragmatism. The justification for the use of a particular rep­
resentation, or a description, of a concrete system is to be found in this 
description’s pragmatic virtues (convenience, tractability, simplicity, con­
sistency with previous representations, instrumental reliability, and so on). 
Pragmatic justification is not always epistemic justification. There is no 
reason to think that pragmatic justification will always track an empiricist- 
oriented sense of epistemic justification, -one, for instance, of the kind that
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Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricist would wish to defend.
From this instrumentalist point of view, physical systems do not pos­
sess states, rather they have state-descriptions. The use of one particular 
description rather than another is justified by the success of the descrip­
tion in solving a particular problem at hand. This pattern of justification 
provides an effective procedure for application. The procedure for applying 
quantum theory, for instance, is as follows. If we are concerned with an 
experiment designed to exhibit the interference phenomena characteristic of 
a quantum superposition, we better use the full initial state of the object 
system W0 in modelling the phenomenon, for only that state can give us 
the correct interference results. If, on the other hand, the experiment is in­
tended to measure a certain quantity 0  on a quantum system, by means of 
an interaction with a measuring device, we should make use of the standard 
representative W0(0)', only by using this state will we succeed in modelling 
the measurement process fully within quantum mechanics.
For any interactive quantum system, the theory seems to yield two in­
consistent future predictions, corresponding either to a measurement or an 
interference interaction. We find out which one applies by inspecting the 
experimental context, and we choose the description of the initial state of 
the system that is more appropriate. As a procedure to test the theory, this 
is clearly unsatisfactory, for it seems ad hoc. But this is precisely the point, 
for the theory is not being put to the test. In modelling measurements as 
selective interactions we are not concerned with finding out if the theory 
is true, or empirically adequate; we are only concerned with applying the 
theory to a particular phenomenon, namely the phenomenon of the occur­
rence of outcomes in quantum measurement interactions. And as Duhem 
stressed34, “there is nothing to shock logic in this procedure”.
Although the decision as to whether to use W0, WQ( 0 ), or the standard 
representative of any other among W0’s X-equi valence classes is not dictated 
by the quantum theory (and hence seems ad hoc from the point of view of
34See the quotation in section 1 of chapter 2 .
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the theory), it is not an arbitrary decision. It is informed by a mediating 
model of the kind I described in chapter 1 . Fine writes:
The basic proposal, then, is to regard the measurement of 
an observable £  on a system in state ip as a measurement in­
teraction that selects the aspect of the system corresponding to 
the probability distribution for E  that is determined by state ip.
(Fine, [67, page 126]).
The probability distributions pick out physical aspects that 
are sufficient to determine the patterns of outcomes of selective 
interactions. (Fine, [64, page 503]).
We are invited to conceive an equivalence class for some observable 0  and 
some state WQ of an object, as a physical aspect of the object. This concep­
tion is not forced upon us by the phenomena, nor is it part of any established 
theory. But it contains knowledge about the structure of quantum objects, 
which helps us to choose the appropriate description of the initial state of 
the system. Fine takes systems to relate to their aspects in the same way 
wholes relate to parts, and he uses the system-subsystem analogy:
My exploration starts out from the idea that some interac­
tions are selective. They do not actually involve the whole sys­
tem, only some physical subsystem. Thus the interaction for­
malism ought not to be applied to the state of the whole system, 
only a representative of the subsystem engaged in the interac­
tion. (Fine, [64, page 502]).
The conception of equivalence classes as physical aspects enables us to apply 
the quantum theory to measurement interactions. Recall that every specific 
probability distribution over the eigenvalues of some observable picks out an 
equivalence class of states; and for every equivalence class there corresponds 
a probability distribution for an observable. Every possible state of a system 
defines one such probability distribution, and a corresponding equivalence 
class, for each observable. (The state W0 defines a family of X-equi valence
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classes, where X  ranges over all the observables of the system.) It seems 
reasonable then, to demand that we treat an interaction of the system with 
a measuring apparatus, designed to reveal information about one particular 
observable of the system, as an interaction of the apparatus with just that 
part of the system.
The criteria for application of the quantum theory is in this case laid out 
by a mediating model, of just the sort described in chapter 1 of the Thesis. 
The presence of this model makes Fine’s proposal a superior alternative, 
as an application of the quantum theory to measurement interactions, to 
some of its ‘pragmatic’ competitors. For instance, one could replace the 
jinal superposition with the correct mixture. Indeed this would seem no 
more ad hoc, from the point of view of quantum theory, than Fine’s pro­
posal to substitute the standard representative for the initial superposition. 
However, from the point of view of the mediating model, this would be a 
totally arbitrary move. It would be justified only as long as it can be shown 
to yield precisely the same mixture that would result from an interaction 
with the appropriate aspect of the system, -represented by the standard 
representative of the equivalence class defined by the initial object state 
and the relevant observable. In this case, the alternative proposal would be 
equivalent to Fine’s for all practical purposes.
In the first part of the Thesis I argued that the structure of application 
and the structure of confirmation differ. Typically the domain of applica­
tion of a theory is larger than its domain of empirical adequacy. Here, I 
think, we have an instance. The quantum theory can be, after all, applied 
to the phenomena of measurement interactions. We may well come to con­
vince ourselves, pace the possible success of modal interpretations, that the 
quantum theory is empirically inadequate, precisely on the grounds that it 
cannot embed all measurement interaction phenomena. This may be so, but 
it constitutes no reason to think that a consistent application of quantum 
theory to measurement phenomena cannot be found.
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3.4 Summary
In the first section, I introduced the problem of measurement as a threat 
to the empirical adequacy of the quantum theory. Some features of the 
interaction formalism of quantum mechanics seem to disagree as a matter 
of fact with some well confirmed facts about nature.
In the second section, I reviewed Van Fraassen’s favourite proposal to dis­
pel the threat, and to solve the measurement problem, by giving a particular 
interpretation to the quantum theory, the so-called modal interpretation. I 
focused on the version due to Kochen, Healey and Dieks, and I reviewed a 
recent critique of their interpretations, due to Albert and Loewer.
In the last section I discussed Fine’s proposal to solve the measurement 
problem by finding alternative strategies to apply the quantum formalism. 
Fine construes the measurement problem as a problem in the application 
of quantum theory, rather than a problem for the theory’s empirical ade­
quacy. He does not attempt to provide an interpretation of the formalism, 
and focuses instead on deriving a useful model for quantum measurement 
interactions.
3.5 Appendix 1: Basic Principles o f Quantum The­
ory
In this appendix I review the principles of quantum theory in a simple 
framework that assumes that the states of a system can be represented as 
vectors in Hilbert space. In this simplest form, quantum theory is roughly 
thought to consist in the following set of five principles35:
1. S tates. States of physical systems axe represented by normalised vec­
tors (\ip) such that | ( ip\i>)\2 = 1 ) in a Hilbert space H.
35These principles have to be altered to make room for mixed states (see Appendix 2 , 
section 3.6).
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2. Observables. The measurable quantities (‘observables’) of physical 
systems are represented by linear Hermitian operators (A  defined as 
(1 ) linear: A {a (v  +  w )) =  aA v  +  a A v,  and (2 ) self-adjoint: ( v \A w ) = 
(An|u;)) that act on Hilbert space. Hermitian operators have real 
eigenvalues:
( A v \v )  =  a * ( u | v )  =  { v \A v )  =  ( n | a u )  =  a ( v \v )  = >  a* =  a
Also, importantly, the eigenvectors of Hermitian operators are mutu­
ally orthogonal. If A \v )  = oi|u ), and A w  = a2\w ) ,  then:
( A v \w ) =  ( v \ A w ) =  ( a i v \ w )  =  ( v\a,2W ) =
=  a i(  v \ w)  =  <22{ = >  ( u | n ? )  =  0
= > -  v ±  w
The eigenstates of a maximal observable, represented by a non de­
generate operator, form a complete basis that spans the whole space. 
Thus any vector state in the Hilbert space can be written as a linear 
combination of the eigenstates of any non degenerate operator.
3. D ynam ical Evolution. The evolution of states is subject to the 
Schrodinger equation:
ih^y- = S f  (3.5.7)at
where H  represents the Hamiltonian of the system.
There are several important aspects to the dynamics. First, the quan­
tum mechanical evolution is continuous from one state ^  to the next
ipt. Hence there must be some operator Ut acting on the space that
takes from tjj to ipt- This is a complex function of the Hamiltonian:
Ut = e~iHt (3.5.8)
Ut is a unitary operator. It is linear: U(av+w) =  aUv+aUw; it has an 
inverse U~l such that UU~l = U ^ U  =  7; and it is norm-preserving:
Vn : \Uv\2 = \v\2.
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Second, the linearity of the Schrodinger equation implies the principle 
of superposition for quantum states. If two vectors v  and w  in the 
Hilbert space represent possible states of a quantum system, then the 
superposition ^  = v +  w  also represent a possible state of the system. 
Finally the unitaricity of the quantum mechanical evolution entails 
that no pure state ever evolves into a mixed state by Schrodinger 
evolution.
4. Empirical Content. The connection with observed outcomes in ex­
periments is supposedly established by Born’s probability rule. Ac­
cording to this rule, the probability that, on measuring observable A 
in a system in state i]}, the outcome at- is found, is given by:
P rob^A  = a,i) =  (#*»)( a ,# )  =  \{^ \a i)\2.
where { |a i)} is the set of eigenvectors of A  with eigenvalues {a;}.
Similarly the expectation value of an observable A  for a system in state 
V7 can be defined as follows: Exp^(A) = ( ) .  This definition is 
consistent with Bom’s rule for the probability that a system takes a 
particular value of some observable. To see this, consider a system 
in state V7 = cj\aj )■> where {\aj  )} is the set of eigenstates of the 
operator A with corresponding eigenvalues Then:
(^\A\^) = Y ai ( ai\A Y ai\aj )  =  Y ai ( ai \ Y aj A\ai )  =
t j i j
Y ,  ai ( a*'l Y  aj cj\aj ) = Y Y  ai aj Cj( a* I a5 ) =
i j i j
Y ai aici =  Y Ci\ai\2 = Y CiPr0h ( A = ai)*
i i i
which is the expectation value, given Born’s rule, as required. The rule 
Exp$(A) = ( V^ AIV7) is also sometimes referred to as Born’s probabil­
ity rule. Born’s probability rule can be expressed in a very convenient 
statistical algorithm in terms of projection operators which we now 
derive.
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A projection operator is an idempotent (P 2 = P) Hermitian opera­
tor which maps every vector in the Hilbert space into its geometrical 
projection along a particular subspace in the space (a one-dimensional 
projector maps vectors into tbeir geometrical projections along rays 
in Hilbert space). One can associate a projection operator with each 
eigenvalue of any particular observable. For example, suppose tbat 
0  is non-degenerate and bas {\ifii)} as its eigenstates, and {o;} as its 
eigenvalues. The family of projectors can be defined: Pt =  P^.j =
| ipi){ |. Projector Pi = f°r instance, takes any arbitrary
vector I'tp) = Yli ci \^ i ) in P  into its one-dimensional subspace spanned 
by |^ i ): Pi|V>) = | V’lX ^ i  I E « c .# i)  = = Ci|V>i).
We are now in a position to state an important theorem:
Theorem 3.5.1 (Spectral Decom position Thm) For every Her­
mitian operator O there is a set of scalars {oi,...,om} and a set of 
projectors {P i,...,.£2} projecting onto mutually orthogonal subspaces 
of H , such that:
m m
O =  X ) °iPi = Y l ° i \ & )( i ’l l
i i
There is always a spectral decomposition for any Hermitian opera­
tor. Moreover, if Vi ^  j  : o; ^  Oj then the spectral decomposition 
is unique (for the details see Redhead [115, page 13] or Hughes [89, 
page 50]). Our desired result, the Quantum Statistical Algorithm is 
the application of Born’s rule to the spectral decomposition:
Prob^(0  =  Oi) = (3.5.9)
where P f  is in the spectral decomposition of 0  associated with eigen­
value 0{.
5. Repeatability o f Outcom es (or constancy o f properties). If
observable A  has been measured on a system in state and the out­
come is at-, then a subsequent measurement of this same observable
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immediately after will yield value ai again, with certainty (P ro b ^A  = 
a{) = 1 ). The obvious way to satisfy this requirement is by imposing 
the so-called collapse postulate and demanding that the system’s state 
be transformed into the corresponding eigenstate |at ). This ‘instan­
taneous transition’ -0 —> ± a t- cannot be consistent with Schrodinger 
evolution as it is a transition from a pure to a mixed state. Von 
Neumann [109, section V] introduced the concept of dual evolution 
precisely to account for this type of indeterministic transition.
3.6 Appendix 2: M ixed States and Statistical Op­
erators
In this appendix I discuss a more general framework, in terms of statistical 
operators, that enables us to deal with systems in mixed states. Mixed 
states are represented by statistical operators: W  =  Y i  Pi( vi\vi )• Our aim 
is to derive an analogue of the quantum statistical algorithm for statistical 
operators. Suppose that the Hermitian operator O has spectral resolution 
Y i  P °  where o, ranges over the possible eigenvalues of O. To each pure state 
|vt-) in W  there corresponds an expectation value of 0 , namely ( Vi\0\vi) = 
Y n  on<$*Cv) - The mean value of O in the mixture W  is the sum of all these 
expectation values appropriately weighted by the corresponding {p,}:
Expw (0)  = Y^pi{ vi\0\vi ) =  Y^on Y .P iW 'W -
i n i
We define W ’s density matrix in the { |^t )} basis as: pnn = Y iP ic$ * cn*• 
(pnn is the matrix representation of W  in that basis). Hence:
Expw(0) — ^ ] OnPnn ~
n
Y,°nnP nn = £ ( < ^ )
n n
where Onn is the diagonal matrix of 0  in the basis {\ifti)}. We define 
Tr(O W ) = Yn{O W ). The trace (TV) operation on statistical operators 
satisfies, among other, the following conditions:
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1. It is symmetric: Tr{WO) =  Tr(OW).
2. Quantum states (mixed or pure) are represented by trace-one opera­
tors: T r(W ) =  1. (This follows from the fact that in W  =  J2iPif\Wi]t 
H i Pi =  !)•
3. If W  represents a mixed state: T r(W 2) < Tr(W ). (As 0 < pi < 1, 
and hence pj < pi for all t ^  0,1).
4. If W  represents a pure state: T r(W 2) = Tr(W ). (A pure state |\Pn ) 
is represented by a projector P^n, an idempotent statistical operator. 
Hence for a pure state there is some n for which pi = 1 if i =  n, =  0 
otherwise).
The Generalised Born Rule for statistical operators, which determines 
the expectation value of any observable 0  for a system in state W , takes 
the form:
Expw (0) = Tr(O W )
Alternatively we define the probability for an observable 0  of a system in 
state W  to take value 0{ as
Probw (0  = Oi) = Tr(WP,? ). (3.6.10)
where Pf* is the projector associated with eigenvalue Oi in the spectral de­
composition of O.
3.7 Appendix 3: The Interaction Formalism
In this appendix I describe the tensor-product space formalism that quantum 
theory provides to represent interactions between systems, which is essential 
in discussing the measurement problem. Given two Hilbert spaces H\ and 
H2 we can always form the tensor-product Hilbert space H \+2 =  Hi <8 > # 2 . 
The dimension of the tensor-product space is the product of the dimensions 
of the individual spaces, dim(Hi+2) = dim(Hi) x dirn^H^). H {|v*)} is
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a basis for H\ and {|v>j)} a basis for H2 tben {|v{) ® \w j)} is a basis 
for Hi+2- Similarly if A is an observable defined on Hi with eigenvectors 
|Vi) and eigenvalues a,, and B  an observable on H2 with eigenvectors \w{} 
and eigenvalues 6j, then A®  B  is an observable on # 1+2  with eigenvectors 
| v,-) 0  | Wj) and corresponding eigenvalues afij.
Consider two systems Si and £ 2 - If 5*i’s state is W\ on Hi, and 6 *2 ’s 
state is W2 on H2, we can represent the state of the combined system 5 *1+2  
as the statistical operator W1+2  = W± 0  W2 acting on the tensor-product 
Hilbert space # 1+2 - If either W2 is a mixture, then W1+2 is also a 
mixture. If, on the other hand, both W i, W2 are pure states then W1+2 is 
pure. Suppose that W\ = P\$), and W2 = P\4 ), where |V7) = S*®*!®*’)
|<j>) = J2j dj\wj )? W1+2  = Yli,j cidj\vi) ® \w j), which is a superposition
of eigenstates of A® B  in H1+2 . More specifically, if 5 i, S2 are in eigenstates 
of A, B , the combined system 6 *1+2  is in an eigenstate of A® B. If W\ =  |v,-) 
and W2 =  | Wj),  then W1+2 = K ') <8> \v j), a so-called product state.
For an arbitrary (pure or mixed) state W1+2  of the combined system, 
and arbitrary observable A ®  B  the Generalised Bom Rule applies. The 
probability that A®  B  takes a particular afij value is given by:
probWl+2(A ® B  = aibj) = Tr(W 1+2Pij), 
and the expectation value of the ‘total’ A®  B  observable in state W1+ 2  is: 
Expw1+2(A ® B) = Tr{(A  ® B )W i+2)
We will sometimes be given the state W1+ 2  of a composite system, and 
then asked to figure out what the reduced states Wi, W2 of the separated 
subsystems must be. Given a couple of observables A  and B  on .Hi, there 
are some relatively straightforward identifications that help to work out the 
reduced states, namely:
Tr((A  ® I)W 1+2) = Tr{AW i)
T r((I  ® B)W 1+2) = Tr(B W 2) (3.7.11)
where /  is the identity observable (V|V>) : /IV7) = IV7))- This amounts to 
the demand that the probability distribution set up by observable A  (B ) in
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the reduced state W\ (W2) be the same as that laid out by A  <g> I  ( I  <g) B) 
in the composite state W1+2 , -thus effectively ensuring that the choice of 
description (either in the larger or smaller Hilbert space) of a subsystem in 
a larger composite system, has no measurable consequences as regards the 
monadic properties of the individual subsystem.
3.8 Appendix 4: A Lemma for Reduced States
In this appendix I give a schematic proof of the lemma presented in section
3.2.4 (lemma 1).
L em m a 2  ( 1 ) IfW {  = UiWiU^ 1 and W \ — V2W 2 where U\, U2 are 
unitary operators, then Ui+2^  ) = Ui ® )-
Consider the following diagram: 
W ) = EiCi\ipi)®\r}i)
decomp
Wi = D N  l ^ ) ( ^
W 2 = Z i \c i \2\rn)(V i
Ui
decomp
u2
The diagram assumes that the reduced states correspoding to the sub­
systems have their own independent unitary evolution and asks what are the 
constraints on the unitary evolution of the state of the composite. Accord­
ing to (RUE), the evolution of the subsystems leaves the coefficients |ct |2 
invariant, and the evolved reduced states are:
w i  =  E \ci\2Ui\i>i)(i>i | i / f 1 =  E M 2I & >{ 4>i I
i i
wl = E M 2& l ^ X m W ? = E M 2I & X £•' I
i i
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These must correspond to some state of the composite, from which they are 
derived by partial tracing. According to Appendix 3, this state is given as:
\i>*) = I > | & )  ® |&) = ® U2\vi)
i i
which is already in a biorthonormal decomposition form. Note that the 
state of the composite is determined by the reduced states only up to a 
phase factor (and not necessarily a mere global phase factor, for c; may 
take negative values in some but not all of the terms in the sum.) State 
|^* ) is in the biorthonormal decomposition form, and the biorthonormal 
decomposition theorem guarantees that this state is unique. Hence:
\-$‘ ) = U1 ®U2 ,
and:
U1+2 =■ U\®  $ 2 -
This lemma can be extended into a full theorem if the coefficients ct- are 
time-independent. It is possible then to prove that if U\+2 = U\ 0  U2 then 
W1 = tfiW i& f1 and W2 = U2W2U2 1. A full proof of this theorem, with 
extensions to mixed states of the composite, is contained in [106].
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Chapter 4
Quantum Causation
4.1 Quantum Correlation Phenom ena
In the previous chapter I provided one illustration of scientific-theory ap­
plication. In this chapter I explicitly compare methodological strategies 
employed in application and confirmation. In doing so, I hope to be fur­
ther strengthening the case for a sharp methodological, as well as epistemic, 
distinction between application and confirmation.
In the first section I review the correlations between distant quantum 
particles described by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in their famous 1935 
‘EPR’ paper1. In the following two sections I am concerned with the philo­
sophical debate concerning possible explanations of these correlations. Specif­
ically I ask the question: can the EPR correlations be explained by means of 
causal models? Two kinds of models are possible: direct-cause models and 
common-cause models. I address an argument due to Van Fraassen against 
common cause models of the EPR correlations; and I concentrate on an 
objection to direct-cause models due to Arthur Fine. I argue that while 
Van Fraassen is concerned with the empirical adequacy of causal theories in 
general, Fine’s argument relates to the application of quantum theory. It is
1 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, ‘Can Quantum Mechanical Description of the World 
Be Considered Complete’ [52].
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Figure 4.1: EPR particles in Minkowski Spacetime
not surprising then, that the responses to these arguments differ method­
ologically. Strategies successfully employed in restoring empirical adequacy 
may have no use in application.
4 .1 .1  T he E inste in -P od olsky-R osen  C orrelations
The version of the EPR experiment that usually gets discussed in the liter­
ature is due to David Bohm2. In Bohm’s version, two particles (an electron- 
positron pair perhaps) are created at a source in a decaying event E. The 
particles (“1”, “2 ”) travel in opposite directions. In a Minkowski spacetime 
diagram they travel along paths symmetric to the time axis (see figure 4.1). 
The initial angular momentum, before the creation event, is zero. After the 
creation event, the spin of both particles must add up to zero: the spin val­
ues for the particles must be correlated. A particle’s spin can be measured
2Bohm [15, pp.614-623].
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by means of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. This is a magnetometer that im­
presses a force on the particle proportional to its spin value, correlating the 
particle’s position to its spin value at the time it interacts with the appara­
tus. The magnetometer can be rotated and set along any direction in space; 
different orientations of the magnetometer will result in measurements of 
different components of the particle’s spin.
The particles’ spin values are measured on both wings, and the mea­
surement events are spacelike separated. According to quantum mechanics 
there are two possible values of the spin component along any one direction 
0: spin-up or spin-down. (I refer to these as and le respectively). Quan­
tum mechanics describes the state of the composite system of both particles 
by means of the so-called singlet state:
4> -  ^= 1  T k ) I  M - ^ l  M l  )  ( 4 . 1 .1 )
where the subscripts refer to particles “1”, “2”. The theory gives two types 
of probabilistic predictions. First, it gives predictions regarding the out­
comes of measurements made on either particle. The quantum mechanical 
statistical algorithm3 can be employed to find out the probabilities for pos­
sible outcomes of measurements on either particle “1 ” or particle “2”. For 
instance, the probability of finding spin-up on a measurement of either par­
ticle is:
2
prob(Ue) =< <f>\ ti* )( ti*  I<f>>= 2H
=< <f>\ T20' ) ( t 2&• \<f> >= prob('\2e‘). (4.1.2)
Second, quantum mechanics also gives, by means of the so-called Liiders’ 
rule, probabilities for state transitions in any one system. For a system in 
state W  on a Hilbert space H , if Ha, Hb are subspaces of H, then Liiders’ 
rule asserts that there exists a probability measure P  such that:
T t(Pb WPb Pa )P ( S J H b) =
T t{WPb )
JSee chapter 3, appendix 1 .
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where Pa , Pb  are projectors upon subspaces Ha, Hb, defined uniquely in 
virtue of the isomorphism between projectors and subspaces of Hilbert space. 
I shall not explain Liiders’ rule in detail; I concentrate only on its conse­
quences for conditional probabilities in the singlet state. In the case of com­
posite systems, Liiders’ rule reduces to the fourth axiom of the probability 
calculus for conditional probability4:
Liiders’ rule gives, in this case, conditional probabilities establishing corre­
lations between outcomes of measurements on both particles. It confirms 
that the spin values of the particles are correlated. Suppose that I measure 
spin along the 6 direction on the first particle, 5 i , and immediately after I 
measure spin along the O' direction on the second particle, 5*2 • And suppose, 
moreover, that the outcome of the first measurement is spin-up (tie)- What 
is then the probability of obtaining spin-up in a measurement on the second 
particle, £2 ? The quantum mechanical algorithm gives the following joint 
probability:
prob(| 20/ k  Tie) = ^s in2^ #
By employing Liiders’ rule together with equation 4.1.2, we can then find 
the following expression for the conditional probability:
prob (T*, /  Ti») =  g ^ S !(Ty  =  s i n (4 -l-4) 
which yields the EPR correlations for most values of 9, O':
prob (he* /  Tie) ^ P rob(he>)
In the special case where 9 = 9', we obtain:
p r o b 20 /  Tie) =  \ sin2\ o e = °*
4See for instance Hughes [89, pages 349-350].
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And correspondingly,
prob(l2e /  he) = 1- prolb (he /  he) = 1.
Hence, we can see that whenever spin is measured along the same direction 
on both particles, the singlet state has got built into it a perfect anticorre- 
lation between their spin values. If we measure spin along the 0 direction 
on the first particle, and find that the outcome corresponds to spin-up, we 
are in a position to predict with certainty that the outcome of a subsequent 
measurement of spin along 9 on the second particle will be spin-down.
4.1 .2  B e ll’s R esu lt
The simplest explanation of these distant correlations would be to assume, 
as in any analogous case of correlation in classical physics, that the parti­
cles already possess definite values for spin as they leave the source. John 
Bell famously showed that this explanation is not available for the quantum 
correlations. Bell5 derived mathematical relations between the joint expec­
tations of values of spin measured along different directions. These relations 
(Bell’s inequalities) would have to be satisfied by any model of the EPR 
correlations that assumed (1 ) that the particles have well-defined values of 
spin at the time they interact with the apparatus, and (2 ) that on neither 
wing does the outcome of the measurement event depend on any spacelike 
separated events. A model that satisfies (1 ) and (2) is often called a local 
realistic model. It is supposed to be realistic because it satisfies requirement 
(1 ): measurements may reveal spin values, but cannot generate them6. And 
it is supposed to be local because it satisfies requirement (2 ): the outcomes of
5Bell [12].
6 Whether requirement (1) is actually essential for a realist construal of a scientific 
theory is uncertain. The requirement is only vaguely connected, if connected at all, to the 
kinds of realism about scientific theory that I have so far discussed in the Thesis. A more 
accurate and neutral terminology would be ‘local and value-definite models’. However, for 
the sake of consistency with other writers, I will continue to use the standard terminology.
161
measurement do not depend on any spacelike separated events. This local­
ity requirement has often been expressed as the requirement that a certain 
factorizability condition, which I discuss below, be satisfied.
There are essentially two kinds of local realistic models: deterministic 
and stochastic. The deterministic model is the simplest one described above: 
as they leave the source, the particles already possess definite values of 
spin. The possession of these values is not described by the singlet state, 
so these values must be fixed by some ‘hidden’ state of the system, usually 
represented by A. Thus, in an ensemble of systems prepared in the same 
singlet state, the correlations will be determined by the distribution of A:
p(Tw & M  =  J  A ( e , \ ) B ( e ' <x)p (x )d \
where A(0, A), B(0', A) are the corresponding characteristic functions (for 
instance: A(0, A) = 1 if and only if a measurement of spin along direction 6 
made on a system in ‘hidden’ state A yields outcome | ,  and =  0 iff it does 
not yield such an outcome, i.e. if it yields j  instead.)
In a stochastic local model, by contrast, the hidden state, A, does not fix 
the values of spin of each particle as they are ejected from the source. Instead 
A fixes probability distributions for the different values. First, it fixes single 
probabilities for values of spin of particle “1 ” or particle “2 ”: Prob\(ho), 
Prob\(he'), Prob\(lie), Prob\(he ')> etc- Second, A also fixes joint proba­
bility distributions for both particles: Prob\(Ti# & he')-> P r°b\{he  & T2e')-, 
etc. Hence, although the ‘hidden’ state does not determine the precise out­
come, it does determine the overall joint probability distribution for out­
comes of measurements on both wings:
P ( h e  & he') = J  Probx{ h e  & h e > ) p W d \ .
Bell describes a particular sense in which a model like this could be described 
as local: the distribution over A is assumed to be independent of the settings 
of either measurement apparatus. This is to ensure that lthe result B for 
particle 2 does not depend on the setting 0 of the magnet for particle 1, nor 
A on 0n (Bell [12, page 404]). For, in Aspect’s 1982 experiment7, which
7Aspect et al [5].
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confirmed the quantum mechanical predictions, the setting on one wing and 
the outcome event in the distant wing are spacelike separated. Hence, in the 
context of Aspect’s experiment, the locality assumption (requirement (2)) 
entails that the outcome of a measurement on either wing cannot depend 
upon the setting of the distant apparatus. This locality assumption8 has 
traditionally been cast in the form of a condition of stochastic independence:
Probx(he & he1) = Probx(he) x Probx(he>)- (4.1.5)
Hence, as a result, the overall joint probability distribution factors out:
jP(Ti0 & he1) = J  Probx(he & he<)p{><)d\ =
= J  Probx(he) x Probx{he')pWdX.
Bell showed that either kind of model (‘deterministic’ or ‘stochastic fac- 
torizable’) is committed to the Bell inequalities which axe violated by ex­
periment, and equally violated by the quantum mechanical predictions. It 
would appear that no model that begins by assuming that each particle has 
a definite value of spin at the time of measurement, -one which does not de­
pend on the setting of the distant measurement apparatus-, can account for 
the EPR correlations. It has been claimed that because of this the violation 
of the Bell inequalities by the EPR correlations refute '‘local realism’. This 
conclusion is, however, far from being universally accepted. Arthur Fine in 
particular, has contested the assumption that the condition of stochastic in­
dependence (condition 4.1.5) captures the notion of physical locality; he has 
constructed models of the EPR correlations that purport to be local, yet are 
not factorizable9 . My aim, however, is not to discuss locality, but causal­
ity. Hence I shall not be concerned with the Bell inequalities themselves.
8A s a matter of fact, three different and independent conditions need to be assumed 
to derive Bell’s result. I discuss these conditions in the following section, and again in 
section 4.2.2.
9Fine [61].
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Rather I shall he concerned with possible causal readings of the condition 
that Bell notoriously assumed in the derivation of the Bell inequalities. This 
condition, expressed in equation 4.1.5, is nowadays known as factorizability.
4 .1 .3  Factorizability
Suppose that si and s2 are the outcomes of the measurements on the first 
and the second particle. We know that these outcomes will exhibit statis­
tical correlation: P f a / s i )  ±  P (s2), or in other words, that P (s2 &$i) ^  
P M  x P(si). Suppose also that a is the setting of the apparatus that 
makes measurements on the first particle, and b the setting of the apparatus 
that makes measurements on the second particle. These are settings of the 
apparatus to measure spin along different directions 9, 0', etc. The factoriz­
ability condition, required to derive Bell’s inequalities, is then the following 
condition (in the larger probability space):
prob{s\k.S2la h b h \ )  = prob(si/a&X) xpro&($2 / 6&A) (4.1.6)
The condition says that when we conditionalise on the hidden state and 
both settings the probabilities for outcomes on both wings of the experiment, 
conditional on the hidden state and the corresponding setting, factor out; the 
original correlation disappears, as si and s2 become statistically independent 
of each other.
Why would factorizability be a natural condition to impose on local 
realistic models? Abner Shimony [1 2 1 ] has argued, following Jon Jarrett 
[90], that factorizability is logically equivalent to the conjunction of two 
other probabilistic conditions, Parameter Independence (PI) and Outcome 
Independence (OI)10. (PI) asserts that the probabilities for outcomes of mea­
surements with a fixed setting on one wing are independent of the setting
10Shimony’s conditions, which I adopt here, are somewhat different from Jarrett’s. 
Jarrett introduces variables a  and P to describe any further features of the measure­
ment apparati that may affect the outcomes. He then conditionalises on all of a, b, 
a, P and A. Jarrett’s locality condition is then analogous to parameter independence: 
P(si/ahb&.a&.p&X) =  P (s i  / a&cb'&zot&p'foX), while his completeness condition corre­
sponds to outcome independence: P {s \ jS 2 &a,&bhak.piz.X) =  P (s \fa& b& ah ph X ) .  Shi-
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of the distant apparatus, if we keep A fixed:
prob(s\/akbkX)  = prob{s\jakX)
prob (S2fa kb kX ) = prob (5 2 /&&A) (4-1-7)
While (01) asserts that the outcomes on one wing are statistically indepen­
dent of the outcomes in the other wing, if we keep the hidden state and both 
settings fixed:
prob(si/s2&akb&\) = prob(si/akbkX)
prob(s2/s ik a kb k X )  = prob fa /akbkX )  (4.1.8)
I shall return to the interpretation and implications of these conditions in 
section 3. For now, I just want to point out that factorizability can be 
derived from (01) and (PI), given the axioms of the probability calculus, as 
follows:
prob (si&S2/akb&X)
= prob (s i /a k b kX ks2) X prob(s2/akbkX )  (4.1.9)
= prob{sijakbkX) x prob{s2/akbkX )  (4.1.10)
= prob (s i /a k X ) x prob (5 2 / 6&A) (4.1.11)
Expression 4.1.9 follows from equation (4.1.3), which is the definition of
conditional probability. Expression 4.1.10 can be derived from 4.1.9 by (01); 
while expression 4.1.11 can be derived from expression 4.1.10 by (PI).
Hence factorizability is the conjunction of (i) outcome independence, (ii) 
parameter independence, and (iii) the calculus of probabilities, including 
the definition of conditional probability. Factorizability enables us to derive 
the Bell inequalities, and the Bell inequalities are violated by experiment. 
But by the derivation above, a violation of factorizability is equivalent to a 
violation of either (i) outcome independence or (ii) parameter independence
mony’s conditions can be made equivalent to Jarrett’s by taking a, b to represent both 
the setting and further relevant factors of each apparatus.
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or (iii) the calculus of probability, or (iv) some combination of (i), (ii), 
(iii). Although the definition of conditional probability fails in general in 
the standard axiomatisations of quantum probability, its application in this 
context is justified because we are dealing with experimental statistics, not 
quantum probabilities. Thus, any empirically adequate theory must reject 
either (0 1 ) or (PI), or both.
It is not difficult to show that quantum mechanics satisfies (PI). This 
follows from the spherical symmetry of the singlet state:
0 = ^ 1  Ti* )l I2 0 ) -  ^=| lie )| ?20)
= ^=\ he> )| I 2o') ~  ^ 5=1 h e 1 )\ he>)
for any 6, O'. The first measurement, whether made on particle “1” or 
“2 ” , gives outcome |  or j  with probability p — 1 / 2 , whatever direction 
spin is measured along on either particle. The probability for an outcome 
of a measurement of spin in one wing of the experiment is independent 
of the setting of the distant apparatus: (PI) holds. And hence, as either 
(PI) or (01) must fail, in quantum mechanics (01) fails. The suggestion 
has been made, by Shimony, Ballentine and Jarrett, that we should follow 
the example of quantum mechanics and reject the condition of outcome 
independence altogether. A number of arguments have been given for this 
rejection; I review some of them in section 4.3. But now, I turn to the central 
topic of this chapter: can we give a causal account of these experimental 
correlations? Do the EPR correlations admit causal models? To answer this 
question we must look into empiricist theories of causation, and determine 
if the conditions that those theories lay out are met in the EPR case.
4.2 The Principle o f the Common Cause
The most influential empiricist theory of causality11 is due to Hans Reichen- 
bach, who proposed a concept of causation as a formal feature of probabilis­
11 By an empiricist theory I mean, roughly, any theory that aims to explicate the notion 
of causation by broadly complying with Humean strictures, i.e. by eschewing any explicit
166
tic models. Reichenbach’s conception was inspired as much by Rudolph 
Carnap’s distinction between the formal and material mode of speech12, as 
by the Humean critique of necessary connection. The objects of the mate­
rial mode are concrete entities in the physical world, and their properties. 
By contrast, the objects in the formal mode are not entities in the physical 
world; they axe instead words, sentences, logical symbols, syntactic opera­
tions -they are linguistic entities.
According to Carnap, the correct mode of speech in philosophy is the 
formal mode. In the formal mode there are no unsolvable problems. If 
a so-called philosophical problem, generated in the material mode, has no 
translation into the formal mode then either it is a scientific problem in 
disguise, and not a philosophical one, or it is not a genuine problem at all. 
For example, the dispute over the existence of numbers is, according to Car­
nap, a pseudo-dispute. The realist, such as Peano or Hilbert, asserts that 
numbers are primitive objects. But for Russell and Whitehead numbers are 
classes of classes. When these two contradictory assertions axe translated 
into the formal mode, they cease to  be contradictory: each one of them 
is true in a different language, or syntactic frame. In Principia numeri­
cal expressions axe class expressions of the second-order; in Peano’s system 
numerical expressions are not second-order expressions, but irreducible ele­
mentary expressions13.
appeal to necessary regularities or counterfactuals. There is a more recent trend to refer 
to a theory of causation as empiricist if its account of causation is dictated by science, 
not metaphysics -in  this respect, the debate between Philip Dowe [48] and Wesley Salmon 
[119] is instructive.
12This point is argued by Cartwright, see [27, 158-170]. Carnap introduced the distinc­
tion between the formal and the material modes in his 1935 Logische Syntax Der Sprache 
[23].
13This is Carnap’s own example in [24, pp. 76-77].
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4.2.1 Reichenbach’s Formed Conditions
The suggestion, then, was that long-lasting philosophical debates concern­
ing causation were similarly underpinned by disputes concerning the correct 
expression of the fundamental assertions of the theory. An analogous purga­
tive exercise could then be carried out on causation, by divesting this notion 
of its usual formulations in terms of powers, or dispositions, and giving an 
appropriate definition in the formal mode of speech. In his 1956 book, ‘The 
Direction of Time’ [117], Hans Reichenbach undertook this task. Reichen- 
bach proposed a number of features that a probabilistic model would need 
to possess in order to qualify as a causal model. On his view, the concept of 
causation could be entirely captured by describing some formal features of 
our representations of empirical regularities. Reichenbach proposed a the­
ory of causation that would apply to statistical representations as well as 
deterministic ones. The aim was to define formally the causal structure un­
derlying every correlation. Reichenbach’s central notion was the Principle 
of the Common Cause:
If an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist 
a common cause. (Reichenbach [117, page 157].)
Regarding this principle, two remarks are in order. First, by ‘improbable’ 
Reichenbach does not just mean a coincidence with low prior probability. He 
has in mind a coincidence of two events of types A  and B , such that there 
is no reason to suspect that A  directly causes B  or B  directly causes A, i.e. 
there is no reason to suspect a direct causal link. The second remark is that, 
according to Reichenbach, it is not the case that a coincidence is genuine 
if and only if it is lawlike, in some metaphysically robust sense. Rather, 
a coincidence is genuine if it is an instance of some empirically established 
statistical correlation between event-types. Although two event-tokens may 
be coincident, they cannot, of course, exhibit correlation; correlations can 
hold among event-types only. To establish a correlation it is necessary to 
determine, by inductive means, and on the basis of observed regularities, a 
probability distribution P(A) over events of kind A, a probability distribu-
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tion P(B)  over events of kind B, and a joint distribution P (A h B )  for tbe 
joint occurrence of A’s and B’s. Events of types A  and B  are said to be 
correlated if and only if:
P  (A kB ) > P  (A) x P  (B) (4.2.12)
This condition is, barring the case of probability zero, provably equivalent 
to the following two conditions on the conditional probabilities: P ( B /A ) > 
P  (B ), and P  (A /B ) > P  (A), barring the case of probability zero. It is clear 
that a correlation makes a token of A more likely to occur if a token of B 
has occurred, and viceversa.
The Principle of the Common Cause then asserts that any coincidence 
between two tokens of A and B  must be explainable by either showing a 
direct causal connection between the types A and B , -so that the coincidence 
ceases to be ‘improbable’- ,  or by pointing to a common cause C of both 
event types. That is, coincidences are to be explained by embedding them in 
observed correlations between variables in some causal structure. The main 
problem with this mode of explanation concerns causal inference. For any 
set of correlations always underdetermine its underlying causal structure. 
The existence of a correlation does not give grounds to assert the existence 
of a direct-causal link between the correlated events, for it is always possible 
to postulate further structure. Thus, a correlation between present smoking 
(‘smoking now1) and lung cancer (‘cancer now1) does not entail that ‘smoking 
now’ causes ‘lung cancer now’, for there is a hidden factor, namely a history 
of smoking, that is a common cause. But, then, for the same reason, no 
correlation ever gives grounds to infer any particular common cause. For 
there could be still further, underlying common causes. A patient’s smoking 
history, his present lung cancer, and his present smoking may all be caused 
by a secret gene. (Figure 4.2 serves to illustrate this example. For if A  is 
present smoking, B  is present lung cancer, and D is the smoking history of 
the patient, it is still possible that D is not the cause of either A or J?, but 
that they are all caused by C , the secret gene).
To reveal the genuine causal structure in probabilistic models one has 
to identify the underlying common causes; if we want to remain empiricists
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we need to be able to identify the common causes from the statistics alone. 
The issue of identification turned out to be an exceedingly difficult one. 
Reichenbach’s ingenious idea was that common causes must screen off their 
effects from each other. Reichenbach’s definition14 is as follows: C screens 
off A from B iff P (A k B /C )  = P{A/C)  x P(B /C ).  Put informally, the 
condition says that the statistical correlation between the effects becomes 
irrelevant to the assessment of the occurrence of either effect, when the 
common cause is taken into account. Conditionalisation on the common 
cause should wash out the original correlation between its effects. In perhaps 
more conspicuous notation we can write the following condition (note that 
this condition is symmetric in A and B):
D efinition 8  (Screening Off) C screens off A from B iff P (A /B h C )  = 
P (A /C ).
This condition is provably equivalent to Reichenbach’s own15, and I will 
adopt it instead. Screening off is a purely probabilistic condition: no causal 
notions are involved. But Reichenbach thought that screening off reveals 
information about causal structure. His intuition was that common effects 
always occur in closed conjunctive forks, while common causes may occur in 
open conjunctive forks. A closed fork is a parallelogram with causally related 
variables in each vertex; so it requires four variables. Reichenbach defined 
an open conjunctive fork as a set of three variables A, B  C that satisfy three 
conditions. First, A  and B  exhibit correlation (condition 4.2.12); second, C 
screens A from B (definition 8 ); and third, C temporally precedes both A  
and B 16. In such case, C is the common cause of A  and B. I will focus on
14The definition is given in [117, page 159], and the terminology of screening off intro­
duced in [117, page 189].
15The proof of the equivalence is very simple: If P ( A h B f C )  =  P {A /C )  x  P (B /C ) ,  
then P ( A b B / C ) =  P ( A L B b C ) / P ( C )  =  P ( A / B k C ) P ( B / C )  =  P (A /C )  x P {B /C ) .  
Hence P (A /B lzC )  =  P (A /C ) ,  and similarly for P ( B / A h C )  =  P (B /C ) .  The converse 
implication is trivial.
16As a matter of fact, the temporal precedence of causes was a consequence of Re­
ichenbach’s theory of time. Reichenbach defined the direction of time in terms of the
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Figure 4.2: Screening-off is not a Sufficient Condition
the screening off condition. Is this a sufficient condition on common causes, 
a necessary condition, or both? In the causal structure pictured in figure 
4.2, variable D is not a common cause of A and B  although it satisfies all 
the criteria for a common cause (A and B  are correlated, D precedes both, 
and it screens off A from B 17). The true common cause is C, which is a 
cause of all A, B , and D .
asymmetries of causation, essentially by stipulating that time always flows in the direc­
tion of open conjunctive forks -and therefore ruling out backwards-in-time causation by 
definition. The reduction of time to causation is a complex and controversial issue; as I 
do not wish to prejudice the issue, I take the temporal precedence of C  over both A  and 
B  to be an independent condition on common causes. This condition is indeed waived in 
some theories of probabilistic causation, most notably in Patrick Suppes’s [127].
17This is only true if C  screens off too. For if C  did not screen off A  from B  then 
neither would D.  But we are here assuming that C  is the true common cause, and on 
Reichenbach’s theory, as we shall shortly see, every common cause screens off.
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It becomes clear that Reichenbach cannot really have meant that we 
can infer to the existence of a common cause from the statistics alone. An 
assumption of completeness is required to make screening off into a suffi­
cient condition on common causes. If we knew that A , B  and C  are the 
only causally relevant variables then, according to Reichenbach’s account 
we would also know that, if they form a conjunctive fork, C is the common 
cause of A  and B. But the assumption of completeness is unwarranted, for 
at least two reasons. First, complete knowledge of the full set of causal fac­
tors is rarely, if ever at all, available in practice. Second, the completeness 
assumption would have gone against the form of empiricism embraced by 
Reichenbach: in order to arrive at knowledge of causes through statistics 
one would need to know in advance the full causal structure. For both these 
reasons Reichenbach settled for necessity rather than sufficiency. Although 
it is not true that every screener-off is a common cause, in Reichenbach’s 
theory every common cause must be a screener-off. The discovery of causal 
structure was to proceed negatively, as it were, on the basis of violations of 
the screening-off condition.
4 .2 .2  Van Fraassen against C ausal R ealism
Bas Van Fraassen18 adopted Reichenbach’s conditions in order to advance 
an argument against the thesis of causal realism -the  thesis that there are 
causal mechanisms underlying all empirical lawlike regularities. Causal re­
alism is false, according to Van Fraassen, because no causal theory can ever 
be empirically adequate. There are some correlations that no causal the­
ory could ever account for. Specifically, the EPR correlations cannot be 
embedded in any statistical model that complies with Reichenbach’s formal 
conditions. It then follows, taking embedding as a necessary as well as suf­
ficient condition for empirical adequacy, that no causal model can account 
for (i.e. be empirically adequate of) the EPR correlations.
18Van Fraassen [136].
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Van Fraassen’s argument lias convinced many, including some firm ad­
vocates of causal realism. Wesley Salmon, for instance, writes:
Van Fraassen argues cogently, on the basis of Bell’s inequal­
ities and relevant experimental results, that ‘there are well- 
attested phenomena which cannot be embedded in any common- 
cause model’. [...] When we ask for the causal mechanism in­
volved in the production of the EPR correlations, we find our­
selves at a loss. (Salmon, [118, pp. 251, 254])
In the EPR experiment, measurement outcomes are correlated. It is possible 
to interpret hidden state theories as postulating a common cause A, the 
creation event at the source, that gives rise to the correlations. Van Fraassen 
writes down three conditions that any putative common cause in EPR must 
satisfy. Suppose that the common cause is the quantum state of the two 
particles at the source -in the EPR case, this is the singlet state19. Van 
Fraassen first two conditions are a precedent of (01) and (PI) respectively. 
The first condition, -which Van Fraassen names ‘causality’-  is inspired by 
Reichenbach’s screening off condition:
Definition 9 (Van Fraassen’s ‘Causality’)
prob(si/s2kaSzbktp) = prob(si/akb$zip) 
prob ($2 / sikakbk't/)) = probfa/aSzbk'if))
The second condition is named ‘hidden locality’:
Definition 10 (Van Fraassen’s ‘Hidden Locality’)
prob (si / akbkip) = prob{s\ja&ip)
prob{s2/akbkt})) = prob (5 2 / bktp)
19This is a substantial assumption, as the state could also evolve stochastically. Jar- 
rett has argued that the Bell inequalities could be violated due to indeterministic time- 
evolution (see Jarrett [91]). In general one may prefer to use the state of the particles at 
the time of measurement, instead of the state at the source as I do here.
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The third condition is designed to rule out any possible dependency of the 
common cause on either of the settings (recall that in the derivation of the 
Bell inequalities, it is assumed that the probability distribution over the 
hidden variable, p(A), does not depend on any of the settings):
Definition 11 (Van Fraassen’s ‘Hidden Autonom y’)
prob {^Jahb) = prob (^)
Van Fraassen first claims that a violation of either ‘hidden locality’ or 
‘hidden autonomy’ would be incompatible with a common cause explanation 
of the correlations:
If the probability of a given outcome at [one wing] is depen­
dent not merely on the putative common cause, but also on what 
happens at [the other wing], or if the character of that putative 
common cause itself depends on which experimental arrange­
ment is chosen (even if after the source has been constructed) 
then I say that the two outcome-events have not been traced 
back to a common cause which explains their correlation. (Van 
Fraassen, op.cit [136, page 105]).
On the other hand, ‘causality’ is required by Reichenbach’s principle of the 
common cause. This is easiest to see in the simplest case where the apparatus 
settings are fixed in the same orientation in both wings of the experiment. 
‘Causality’ is then nothing but the demand that the common cause screens 
off:
P ( s i / s 2kil>) = P ( s 1/1>)
P ( s 2/ s 1kip) = P ( s 2/i>)
The conjunction of ‘causality’, ‘hidden locality’, and ‘hidden autonomy’ 
is committed to the Bell inequalities, which are violated by experiment; 
hence at least one conjunct must be false. In particular, if the quantum 
state itself is to represent the total state of the common cause, we get a
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straightforward violation of the ‘causality’ condition by simply considering 
the EPR correlations. For the singlet state cannot screen off the correlations 
between the outcomes. Here we can take a smaller probability space, writing 
the quantum state as a subscript to the probability function, and hence 
avoiding having to assign probabilities to impossible propositions that state 
that the combined particle-pair system after measurement is both in state 
if) and in whatever state corresponds to outcomes si or 5 2 , and also avoiding 
having to assign probabilities for the occurrences of quantum states. We 
then make the natural analogue of the previous conditions; and find:
Pip ( 5 l / 5 2 )  7^  ( 5 l )
Pip (^2 / 5 l )  ^  P-tp ( 5 2 )
Hence, trivially, in the EPR experiments, the quantum state of the particle- 
pair cannot be the common cause. And, more generally: if ‘causality’, ‘hid­
den locality’ and ‘hidden autonomy’ are necessary conditions on a common 
cause, it is impossible to embed the EPR correlations into a causal model of 
the sort described by Reichenbach, -regardless of whether the common cause 
is the quantum state, or a more complete hidden state. To conclude: by 
assuming only Reichenbach’s conditions on common causes, Van Fraassen 
derives a striking refutation of causal realism by the EPR correlations.
4 .2 .3  C ausation  in a P robab ilistic  W orld
It is now time to look more carefully into Van Fraassen’s presuppositions. 
In particular, is screening-off really necessary for a common cause? In a 
series of recent papers, Nancy Cartwright20 has shown that screening off is 
too restrictive a condition on common causes. Screening off is a necessary 
condition on deterministic common causes only. In the most general case,
20Cartwright [28], [32], [33], and particularly [27, section 3.3]. Cartwright’s ideas have 
been explicitly applied to the EPR correlations in a joint paper with Hasok Chang [36], 
which also deals with many of the issues that I discuss in this chapter.
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when a cause acts probabilistically to generate its effects, screening off is 
obeyed by just a very special subset of all possible common causes.
In order to bring this point home, let me first consider a remarkable 
consequence of Van Fraassen’s analysis of the EPR correlations: when ap­
plied to the perfect correlations in the singlet state, screening off entails 
determinism21. We begin by rewriting the EPR perfect anti-correlations as:
P  (Sl =T k s 2 = t)  = 0 =  P  (Sl = i k s 2 = | ) .
P  (Sl = t  k s 2 = J) = l  = P  (Sl = i k s 2 = T ).
When we have probabilities one or zero, we can conditionalise on anything 
that has non-zero probability. So we can conditionalise on A, which we 
assume to have non-zero probability, and obtain:
P (Sl =T k s 2 =T /A) = 0 = P  (5 i = |  k s 2 =[ /A ).
P ( Sl = r  k s 2 =1 /A) = 1 = P (*1 =1 k s 2 =T /A).
We now impose Reichenbach’s screening off condition:
P ( Sl = |  k s 2 = |  /A) = P ( Sl = |  /A) x P {s2 = t  /A) =  0.
P  (*  =T k s 2 = |  /A) = P  (Sl =T /A) x P  (s2 = i  /A) =  1 .
P (si = i k s 2 =T /A) = P  (5l =1 /A) x P  (5 2 =T /A) =  1 .
P ( Sl = i k s 2 = |  /A) = P ( Sl = |  /A) x P ( s 2 = |  /A) = 0.
In order to satisfy all these equalities at once, either P  (si = t  /A) = 0 and 
P  (s2 =T /A) = 1; or, alternatively, P ( 5 i = |  /A) = 1 and P ( s 2 = |  /A) = 0.
21 This result can be seen an instance of Arthur Fine’s theorems on factorizable stochastic 
models. Fine [60] has shown, following Suppes and Zanotti [129], that factorizable stochas­
tic and deterministic hidden variable models of the quantum correlations axe mathemat­
ically equivalent, in the following sense: if some set of correlations admits a factorizable 
stochastic model, it admits a deterministic model as well. It is clear that Fine’s result must 
be applicable to Reichenbach’s screening-off condition; for recall that Reichenbach origi­
nally expressed his requirement as the condition that the outcomes factor out conditional 
on the common cause.
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It follows, in either case, that in order to satisfy ‘causality’ A must give 
probability 1 or 0  to all possible outcomes in both wings of the experiment. 
That is, A must function as a deterministic common-cause: it is hardly 
surprising that Bell’s inequalities axe violated!
Reichenbach’s analysis of causation, which was originally intended to 
apply to probabilistic and deterministic causes alike, is actually committed 
to determinism in this particular context. Any putative common cause 
that -as demanded by Van Fraassen-, obeyed Reichenbach’s screening off 
condition would have to act deterministically in each wing of the experiment 
to generate the EPR correlations. However, there is nothing in the concept 
of probabilistic causation to indicate that a common cause must determine 
its effects in this manner.
Consider a simple case of purely probabilistic causation: a factor z  causes 
a factor x with, say, 75% probability. In a representative sample the presence 
of z is sufficient for x in 75% of the cases, and fails to produce x 25% of 
the times. We can represent the action of z to produce x by means of the 
symbol azx, an indicator function that takes value 1 whenever z fires to 
produce x and value 0 whenever z fails to fire to produce x. We can then 
fix the expectation of the action of z  to produce x accordingly: Exp(azx) = 
P{azx) = | .  If z is s ’s only cause then P{x) = P(azx)P(z) = | P{z)\ this 
equation determines the frequency of occurrence of x completely.
Consider now a three-variable structure, where z is a common cause of 
x and y, and there is no direct causal link between the latter two. We write:
P(x) = P(dzx)P(z)
P{y) =  P{azy)P(z)
If a common cause is really probabilistic, its action to bring about one effect 
may bear any relation whatever to its action to bring about any other. For 
instance, it is not required, in the example above, that P(dzx) = P(azy) = 
And indeed, the action of z to produce x may be totally independent of 
its action to produce y ; in such case the joint expectation of its indicator 
functions factorizes: P{dxyhaxz) = P(axy) x P(dxz). As a consequence
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the joint probability of x and y, conditional on the common cause, also 
factorizes, and screening off is satisfied by this common cause:
_ P i& zx & a zy )  _ P i& zx )  w P ( a Zy )  p , , v p f  I \
P (x k y /z )  -  — p^J—  -  -pfr x -J0- -  P(*/*)  x nvh)
On the other hand some stochastic dependence between the actions of 
the common cause cannot be ruled out: z 's action to generate x may overlap 
with its action to generate y. In fact, there could be a perfect correlation 
between azx and azy. A particular instance of this type of cause is one 
that never produces one effect without the other; a cause that invariably 
either acts to produce all of its effects, or fails to produce any. The joint 
expectation of this cause’s actions won’t factorize (P{azxk.azy) =  P{azx) 7  ^
P(a*x) x P(azy)), and the common cause won’t generally screen off:
P(xU y/z) = = P (x /z )  #  P (x /z )  x P (y/z)
Screening off is a necessary condition on a common cause that produces
its effects independently of each other. But is not a reasonable condition to 
impose on a cause that exhibits some degree of correlation between its effects. 
Using the small probability space notation once more: the common cause z 
determines a probability function Pz over its effects. There is no reason why 
this function’s distribution over the effects x and y must obey the following 
strict condition derivable from screening off22: Pz(xhy)  = .
Any other combination is also possible.
The application of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause to 
probabilistic causes requires a revision of the conditions on common causes. 
Nancy Cartwright has enunciated a general criterion for any common cause, 
whether of the deterministic, factorizable stochastic, or purely probabilistic 
kind23. To bring it closer to Reichenbach’s Principle, her criterion is formu-
22This condition can be derived from screening off by means of the equality: Pz(x&cy) =  
Pz(x) x Pz(y) =  [Pz(xixy) +  Pz(x&:->2/)] x [.Pz{y&x) +  Pz(y&->x)].
23 Cartwright [28, page 187.] is the earliest statement. The criterion is restated in [27, 
page 236], with the additional qualifications that I discuss below.
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lated as a necessary and sufficient condition on the absence of a direct-link 
between the effects of the putative common cause. It says that x and y are 
not directly causally linked if and only if their joint probability is entirely 
due to the joint expectation of z’s actions to produce them:
Criterion 4.2.1 (General Common-Cause Criterion) There is no di­
rect causation between x and y (i.e. axy is always zero) if and only if
P z ( x h y )  —  P z i d z x & d z y } .
I want to break down this criterion into its necessary and sufficient parts.
I shall embrace necessity but, for the purposes of EPR, reject sufficiency. 
This is because the sufficient part of Cartwright’s general criterion rules out 
a significant class of possible common cause models for the EPR correlations. 
Besides the necessary part is all that is really needed to show, contra Van 
Fraassen, that common cause models cannot be ruled out.
Criterion 4.2.2 (Necessary Condition on Common-Causes) I f z  were 
the only cause of x, and of y, the joint probability for x and y would be 
equal to the joint expectation of z ’s actions to produce x and y: Pz(xhy) — 
PziP>zX^dZy ).
Hence the necessary part of Cartwright’s General Criterion asserts that if z 
is a common cause of x and y, and if there is no direct causal link between x 
and y, the joint probability of x and y is the joint expectation of the cause’s 
actions. This is always true: if the common cause z is the only cause of x 
and y, then x and y will co-occur when and only when z fires to produce 
both x and y.
Criterion 4.2.3 (Sufficient Condition on Common-Causes) I f  it is the
case that Pz{xk.y) =  Pz(&zx&dzy) then neither x nor y cause one another 
(z is their only cause).
The sufficient part of Cartwright’s criterion is, however, not generally true.
It fails in two types of cases. First, suppose that y is a direct cause of r ,  but 
that azy = 0, i.e. y is never actually caused by z (see figure 4.3). Suppose
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Figure 4.3: General Criterion: First Counterexample
•xy
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•zy
Figure 4.4: General Criterion: Second Counterexample
further that y happens never to produce x whenever z occurs, and z  never to 
produce x whenever y occurs. (Or, alternatively suppose that z and y never 
occur together.) Then Pz(xhy)  =  0 = Pz(azx&azy), and the antecedent of 
the criterion holds, even if the consequent doesn’t.
Second, suppose the arrangement of (figure 4.4), with z  as a cause of x 
and y , and x as a direct cause of y (possibly a deterministic one). Imagine 
that x, though a cause of y, is always preempted by z, i.e. axy —> azy. 
Suppose in addition that azx —*■ azy, i.e. whenever z causes x, it also causes 
y. Even if a direct cause link exists between x and y, the antecedent of the 
sufficient condition is satisfied: Pz(xSzy) = Pz(x) =  Pz(azx) = Pz(azx&azy)
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In order to deal with these counterexamples, Cartwright has constrained 
the operation of a common cause in the following two ways24:
( 1) h z x  ^  0 , (LZy 7^  0.
This constraint makes it clear that it is not possible to infer that z 
is a common cause by looking at the statistics alone. For (1) says 
that in order to apply the General Criterion to z , we first need to 
know that z is indeed a common cause. This is not a problematic 
constraint, though. Recall that Reichenbach’s screening off was never 
meant as a sufficient condition on common causes -the  assumption of 
completeness of the causal structure had to be added to make screening 
off sufficient. The situation is formally analogous here. Prior knowl­
edge of the causal structure that underlies the statistics is required for 
Cartwright’s criterion to work as a sufficient condition,
(2 ) '(CLZX * * dZy).
The second constraint, I think, spells more trouble. (2) rules out 
a common cause whose operations to cause some effect may entail 
some other of its operations to cause another effect. It rules out a 
common cause z that never acts to produce y without also acting to 
produce x ; or viceversa, one that never acts to produce x without 
acting to produce y. A special case is a cause whose operations axe 
fully coextensive, i.e. one whose operations entail each other.
We now see that Cartwright’s General Criterion, as qualified, is inapplicable 
to causes whose actions axe genuinely coextensive. This is not to claim 
that the criterion is inapplicable to causes that generate perfect statistical 
correlations, of the EPR type, between its effects. Coextensiveness of a 
cause’s operations is, of course, not entailed by perfect correlation between 
its effects. A cause’s effects Ei, E 2 exhibit perfect correlation iff P (E i /E 2)
24These are essentially Cartwright’s own constraints in [27, page 236], -although they 
are incomplete as they appear there, and require slight amendments.
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= 1 or 0, but this is consistent with there being a small subset -o f measure- 
zero- of E u  £ 2  tokens for which E\h-*E2, or -1E281E 1. By contrast, perfect 
coextensiveness of a cause’s operations means that every single instance of 
Ei  is accompanied by an instance of E2, and viceversa. So, as long as the 
EPR common cause’s operations are not coextensive, Cartwright’s qualified 
General Criterion can be safely applied to the EPR correlations; it is then 
possible to make the stronger claim that there exists no direct causal link 
between the wings of an EPR experiment if there is a common cause whose 
actions generate the EPR correlations exactly.
The point I want to make is that Cartwright’s qualified General Crite­
rion, if applied as a sufiicient as well as necessary condition on a common 
cause, would be too restrictive: it would rule out a cause whose operations 
are fully coextensive -i.e. one that invariably produces its effects in tandem. 
I don’t see any reason to rule out such a common cause explanation of the 
EPR correlations. Indeed, with the apparatus settings fixed in the same 
direction in both wings of the experiment, the simplest possible model for 
the EPR correlations is a common cause that in every single instance acts in 
both wings, producing outcomes of opposite spin value. The cause’s actions 
may not always be reflected in the actual experimental outcomes; there may 
well be other interfering causes operating, and the common cause may just 
be a partial one. In other words, it is likely that, in any real EPR experiment 
the antecedent of the conditional in criterion (4.2.2) is not satisfied, so the 
actual experimental outcomes may fail to exhibit the perfect coextensiveness 
of the common cause’s operations. But the point stands: it makes perfect 
sense, in EPR, to postulate a common cause with coextensive operations. 
For, if the antecedent of criterion (4-2.2) were true the consequent would 
follow, even for this perfectly coextensive cause. But Cartwright’s General 
Criterion, once qualified in order to deal with the counterexamples, would 
automatically rule out this common-cause model for the EPR correlations.
A better response to the counterexamples is to separate the General Cri­
terion into its sufficient and necessary parts. It then becomes clear that the 
qualifications are required for the sufficient part only; they axe not needed
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for the necessary part, which is always true. Hence, in the EPR case -in fact, 
in any case where a cause with coextensive operations may conceivably be 
at work-, it is better to enunciate these parts clearly as separate conditions, 
and then go on to assert the necessary condition only. In doing so, we will 
be in fact following Reichenbach’s own example. I therefore propose that in 
the EPR case we suspend criterion (4.2.3), and assert criterion (4.2.2) only.
The structure that underlies the EPR correlations may well be one where 
the cause acts invariably to produce opposite spin outcomes in each wing, in 
every single instance of its operation. As we have suspended criterion (4.2.3) 
this common cause does not rule out a direct-link between the wings. There 
may well be a direct link overlaying the common cause. In fact, the quantum 
state itself serves perfectly well as a possible common cause of this type. For 
recall that, keeping the settings fixed in the same direction in both wings of 
the experiment, the quantum state suffices to yield the perfect correlations. 
The model would obviously have to be extended to take account of the fact 
that the full set of EPR correlations depends upon the relative orientations 
of the measurement apparati. This is not a problem. For, once again, if 
the settings are fixed, the quantum state gives the right statistics; we can 
therefore take the quantum state as a partial common cause of the outcomes 
in both wings -in each wing the corresponding apparatus setting event would 
be another partial cause.
Van Fraassen’s ‘causality’ condition would, of course, be violated in this 
probabilistic common-cause model25. This shows that Van Fraassen’s proof 
against common-cause models is inconclusive. Van Fraassen has shown that 
no causal theory that assumes Reichenbach’s conditions is empirically ad­
equate. But, as we have seen here, in a probabilistic causal theory the 
common cause obeys a much weaker condition than Reichenbach’s.
25There is no need for either ‘hidden locality’ or ‘hidden autonomy’ to be violated too. 
Cartwright constructs a common cause model that obeys both these conditions in [27, 
appendix 1]. See also the extended discussion in [36, section 2].
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4 .2 .4  T he Em pirical A dequ acy o f  C ausal T heories
The process of theory extension that takes ns from screening off to the weaker 
criterion (4.2.2) can be put in language more akin to the semantic conception 
of theories. We may define any scientific theory that employs probabilistic 
concepts as a causal theory if the probability distributions defined in the 
theory, and the variables therein, obey a set of conditions. For instance, 
a causal theory may require common causes to appear in open conjunctive 
forks (n.b. the theory does not entail that all open conjunctive forks contain 
genuine common causes). However, several definitions of ‘open conjunctive 
fork’ are possible.
We begin by first considering Reichenbach’s definition. Reichenbach de­
fines an open conjunctive fork as a structure of three statistical variables a, 
b and c that obeys the conjunction of three conditions: correlation (of a and 
6), temporal precedence (of c with respect to a and 6), and screening off (of 
a from b by c). We then find out that some well-established experimental 
correlations can not be embedded into any conjunctive fork. The EPR cor­
relations violate the screening off condition. To restore empirical adequacy 
we need to extend the theory to cover the EPR correlations; and, if we 
want the theory to remain a causal theory, we need to do so by weakening 
the causal conditions on probability distributions. So we proceed to enlarge 
the set of allowed structures by weakening Reichenbach’s definition; and, in 
particular, we withdraw the screening off condition. As a result, a larger 
class of open conjunctive forks is allowed. This is an extension of the causal 
theory because it lets more probabilistic structures in. (Notice, by the way, 
that we have not tinkered with the phenomena in any way.) We compare 
the resulting extension with the experimental correlations; as the correla­
tions are embeddable in some of the structures allowed in this extension, the 
empirical adequacy of the theory is restored. If the correlations were not 
embeddable, we would have continued looking for further extensions of the 
theory, by relaxing some further causal assumptions.
The strategy that I have just described is a standard part of the normal
184
methodology for restoring a theory’s empirical adequacy26. Van Fraassen27 
has described this strategy as the first of two steps in the scientific process of 
theory development. This first step is required to ensure empirical adequacy. 
The theory may be initially extended so that it embeds virtually all possible 
as well as actual phenomena. In order to regain informativeness, and pre­
dictive power, we then have to narrow down the set of allowed structures; 
this narrowing down constitutes the second step in theory-construction.
The response to Van Frans sen’s arguments against causation that I have 
described in this chapter follows this methodology very closely. We first re­
jected the screening off condition, thereby admitting all probabilistic struc­
tures that satisfy Reichenbach’s other two conditions. We then narrowed 
down the set of possible structures, by demanding that open conjunctive 
forks obey some other condition, such as Cartwright’s General Criterion or, 
better still, criterion (4.2.2). Did we change our theory in this process? 
Is this not perhaps better described as a process of theory-change, rather 
than theory-development? Not at all. For all throughout we have been very 
careful to firmly uphold the principles of the theory -in this case, the Prin­
ciple of the Common Cause, and Reichenbach’s requirement that common 
causes occur in open conjunctive forks28. The principles of the theory have 
remained the same, but the set of permitted theoretical structures has been 
expanded. We have not produced a new theory, but merely extended the old 
theory.
26 In this respect it is useful to recall the discussion of the modal interpretation in 
chapter 3 of this Thesis. The attempt to solve the measurement problem by relinquishing 
the necessary part of the eigenstate/eigenvalue link is formally analogous to the strategy 
pursued in this chapter to derive causal models of the EPR correlations. In both cases, 
the aim is to restore the empirical adequacy of the theory by relaxing some constraint on 
the available structures, thereby allowing new theoretical structures into the theory.
27Van Fraassen [135].
28In the quantum measurement case, the modal interpretation similarly sticks to the 
quantum theory’s basic principles, including Schrodinger’s equation.
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In restoring the empirical adequacy of a theory, we need to expand its 
theoretical structures. Postulating phenomena would not help to fulfil the 
aim of empirical adequacy. On the contrary, when confronted with an em­
pirically inadequate theory, postulating further phenomena can only make 
things worse, for it can only make the theory even more inadequate. But, 
as we shall see in the next section, it is however possible to solve problems 
in application by introducing further structure in the phenomena -i.e. by 
extending the phenomenological structures. This emphasises a fundamental 
methodological difference between application and confirmation.
4.3 Direct-Cause M odels for E PR  correlations
I have so far assumed that there is no direct causal link between the wings of 
an EPR experiment. Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause dictates 
that in the absence of such direct causal link there must be an underlying 
common cause. Cartwright’s criterion (4.2.2) suggests, however, that if the 
common cause’s operations are coextensive, an additional direct causal fink 
between the wings cannot be ruled out, even if the joint probability for 
the effects is entirely accounted for by the joint expectation of the common 
cause’s operations to produce these effects.
What then is the argument against direct causation between the wings? 
The standard argument is that special relativity makes a direct-causal link 
impossible. The acts of measurement on both particles of an EPR experi­
ment are spacelike separated from each other. In Aspect’s 1982 experiment, 
the setting event on the one wing is also spacelike separated from the mea­
surement event on the other. But a causal influence between two spacelike 
separated events has to be transmitted at superluminal velocity -and special 
relativity is often taken to rule out superluminal causation.
In sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, I discuss the status of this standard fine 
of argument. But I really want to concentrate on a different argument, 
suggested by Arthur Fine, which does not rely upon considerations of (STR). 
I address Fine’s argument in section 4.3.3.
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4.3.1 Peaceful C oexistence
Is special theory of relativity (STR) compatible with the EPR correlations? 
Assuming that (STR) rules out direct-cause models of the EPR correlations: 
do the EPR correlations nevertheless admit a direct-cause model? (STR) 
would be compatible with the EPR correlations only if, as a matter of prin­
ciple, the EPR correlations could not admit such models. The recent debate 
over the ‘peaceful coexistence’ of (STR) and quantum theory has turned 
on the interpretation of the conditions of Outcome Independence (01) and 
Parameter Independence (PI) described in section 4.1. Let me restate them 
here:
Definition 12 (Parameter Independence (PI))
prob(si/aSzbSzX) =  prob (s\ /  akX) 
probfa/a&b&X) =  probfa /bkX )
Definition 13 (Outcome Independence (OI))
prob (s \f S2hahbhX) = prob{s\fahbhX ) 
prob(s2/Si&caSzbfoX) = prob(s2/akbSzX)
In section 4 .1 1 showed that the factorizability condition required to de­
rive Bell’s inequalities is the conjunction of (PI) and (01). Bell’s inequalities 
are violated by experiment; thus any empirically adequate theory must vio­
late either (PI), or (01), or both. I showed that quantum theory obeys (PI) 
and, hence, violates (01). The burning question then, seems to be: how does 
(STR) fare with respect to these two conditions?
Jarrett and Shimony29 have claimed that (STR) entails parameter inde­
pendence (PI), but not outcome independence (01). Quantum theory can 
then peacefully coexist with (STR): the violation of the Bell inequalities 
by quantum theory is due to the violation of precisely the one condition
29 Jarrett [90], Shimony [120]. See also Ballentine and Jarrett [8].
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whose failure poses no threat to (STR). Jarrett and Shimony’s argument is 
roughly as follows. Suppose that (PI) is false, i.e. there is some state Ai of 
the particle-pair for which P(si/a$zbfo\i) ^  P (si/a& 6 /&Ai), for different 
settings b, bf of the distant apparatus (apparatus “2 ”). We may then be able 
to prepare an ensemble of particle-pairs in state Ai. The experimenter at the 
“2 ” end can then send superluminal signals to the experimenter at “1” by 
carefully selecting the setting of apparatus “2”. These signals are revealed 
at “1 ” as limiting frequencies in a long run of experiments on identically 
prepared particle-pairs in state A2 . Different choices of the setting of appa­
ratus “2” will result in different limiting frequencies of outcomes at “1”. By 
appropriately selecting the settings, discernible information can be passed 
on between the wings. Hence we conclude that, on the assumption that 
(PI) is false, there exist superluminal causal influences between the wings 
of an EPR experiment. As special relativity is often taken to forbid such 
influences, it follows that a violation of (PI) entails a violation of (STR), i.e. 
(STR) entails (PI).
By contrast, Jarrett and Shimony argue, (STR) does not entail (01). 
(0 1 ) is false if and only if there is some possible state A2 of the particle-pair 
for which P (s i/s 2&a$zb&\2) 7^  P(si/s'2$za$zb&\2). However, the outcomes 
of a first measurement, at either wing, are stochastic. Unlike violations of 
(PI), the experimenter at wing “2” has no control over the relevant variable, 
and hence he finds it impossible to send his partner at “1 ” a signal30.
Jarrett and Shimony presupose that direct causation between the wings 
of an EPR experiment would conflict with (STR). But, as quantum theory 
violates (01) not (PI), the quantum correlations cannot be used to send 
signals; so in the EPR experiment, they argue, there is no causation between 
the wings -and quantum theory and special relativity can peacefully coexist.
30 Shimony’s terminology makes this very clear. He refers to the nonlocality that re­
sults from violations of (PI) as 1 controllable nonlocality*, and to that which results from 
violations of (01) as ‘noncontrollable nonlocalittf. (Shimony [120]).
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4 .3 .2  T he R ela tiv istic  A rgum ent R eb u tted
Jarrett and Shimony’s argument, however, -as pointed out by a number of 
authors-, is flawed. I want to take issue with their argument in three dif­
ferent stages; at each one I raise an objection, of increasing strength. First, 
I want to take issue with the claim that superluminal causation requires 
superluminal signalling. Second, I want to lessen the import of parameter 
independence and outcome independence by showing that, as conditions on 
putative causal factors, (PI) and (01) are arbitrary: other choices are also 
available. Finally, I take issue with the claim that (STR) entails (PI). As 
a matter of fact (STR) does not strictly entail (PI). More precisely: (STR) 
does not entail (PI) anymore than it entails (01) -in either case, an addi­
tional assumption is required.
I begin by pointing out that nothing in the concept of probabilistic cau­
sation requires a causal connection to always be a vehicle for signalling. 
Recall that in probabilistic theories of causation a cause C at some space­
time point c may act genuinely stochastically to produce an effect A  at some 
other point a. Suppose that C raises the probability of A, although it does 
not make it certain: we will then say that C  is a (probabilistic) cause of 
A. Suppose also that we control for C and that we have a large number 
of C-tokens available. The causal relation can then be employed to send a 
signal from c to a, by raising the frequencies of A’s at a. But C itself may 
be a stochastic effect of some further cause D , making it impossible for us to 
control for C. No matter: we axe surely not going to withdraw our assertion 
that C is a cause of A because of that! For (7’s capacity to bring about A 
remains unaltered, as it is indeed exhibited whenever C occurs -and that 
surely is the content of the causal claim that we have been making all along. 
Thus, causation cannot generally be analysed in terms of signalling. The 
fact that some causal connections cannot be employed for signalling does 
not make them any less causal. In general, causation does not require the 
kind of controllable signalling demanded by Jarrett and Shimony. There 
may well be causation between the wings, even if (01), rather than (PI), 
fails.
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The violation of (01) is then no less problematic than the violation of 
(PI). We are in trouble either way, if it is true that (STR) forbids superlumi- 
nal causal influences. This, however, is not a very telling objection to Jarrett 
and Shimony’s argument. For in fact, special relativity theory does not for­
bid superluminal causation at all. The point has been convincingly argued 
by Tim Maudlin31, and I shall not rehearse it in detail here. To cut a long 
story short: the Lorentz group of (STR) lays out no constraints whatever on 
the speed of causal connections. Instead (STR) dictates a constraint on the 
acceleration of material moving objects: no infraluminally moving object 
can be accelerated past the speed of light; and viceversa, no superluminally 
moving object can be deaccelerated to within light’s speed. As causal con­
nections, however, need not be associated with the trajectories of moving 
material objects, nor do they need to be ‘carried’ by such objects, (STR) 
cannot be said to lay out constraints upon the speed of causal connections.
So where does the argument that (STR) rules out superluminal causation 
originate from? As it happens, the argument originates in the notorious 
‘signalling’ paradoxes of (STR): in certain spacetime contexts, it becomes 
possible to send signals to one’s own past; such signals may (although they 
need not) give rise to logical contradictions. (I may be able to signal to my 
own past, and instruct myself not to send the signal in the first place: so I 
don’t send a signal if and only if I do.) Thus, what we meant all along is 
that (STR) forbids certain kinds of superluminal signals. But I have already 
established that causation does not require signalling. (STR) may then be 
said to admit superluminal causation of the kind prescribed by the failure 
of (0 1 ), while ruling out some subclass of the superluminal signals allowed 
by violations of (PI). As quantum theory violates (01) but not (PI), the 
quantum correlations cannot be used for any form of superluminal signalling 
between the wings; and hence, a fortiori they cannot be used to send any 
of the special kind of signals that (STR) would find objectionable. Jarrett 
and Shimony’s argument for peaceful coexistence is now again on its feet32.
31 Maudlin [99].
32But notice that, in this revised form, the axgument can shed no light on the causal
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The second objection to Jarrett and Shimony’s argument is that (PI) and
(0 1 ) are not the only conditions whose conjunction is logically equivalent to 
factorizability. Tim Maudlin33 has noted that the following two alternative 
conditions, which we may call (PI’) and (OP), also yield factorizability:
Definition 14 (P I’)
prob (si/S 2&a&b&\) = prob ( s i/s 2&a&A) 
prob{s2js\hak.bh\) = probfa/si&bSzX)
Definition 15 (OP)
prob(si/S2&a$z\) = prob(si/ahX) 
prob {S2Isi&bhX) = prob fa /bkX )
The first condition states that the probability of a given result in one wing of 
the experiment, given that one already knows the result on the other, does 
not depend upon the actual setting of the distant apparatus. We may be 
told what the result of the distant measurement was - ‘up’, or ‘down’- , while 
being kept in the dark as to the setting of the distant apparatus when this 
measurement was carried out. Condition (PI’) says that the probabilities 
for outcomes on our wing are not affected when we receive extra information 
concerning the distant setting. So (PI’) is the analogue of parameter inde­
pendence: both make the information about the distant setting irrelevant 
to the assessment of the probabilities of measurement outcomes.
The second condition, (01’), states that the probabilities for outcomes at 
one wing do not depend on the outcomes of measurements performed in the 
distant wing. So (OP) is analogous to outcome independence. But notice
processes that may be operating in an EPR experiment, nor can it serve to rule out causal 
models for the EPR correlations. The argument now applies to signals, not to causal 
connections.
33Maudlin [99, pp 93-99].
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that, unlike its original counterpart, (OF) does not require conditionalising 
on, and keeping fixed, the distant setting.
In construing their original conditions, (PI) and (01), as conditions on 
causal influences, Jarrett and Shimony took it that if some factor had no 
statistical significance, then it had no causal significance. Thus (PI) could 
be construed as asserting that the settings on one wing cannot causally 
influence the outcomes on the other wing, while (0 1 ) would assert that out­
comes on one wing cannot bring about outcomes on the other. The same 
interpretation can of course be given to Maudlin’s analogous (PF) and (OF) 
conditions. (PF) would assert that distant settings do not causally influ­
ence the outcomes, while (OF) would assert that distant outcomes have 
no causal influence on nearby outcomes. But now, the situation is strik­
ingly reversed: quantum theory violates (PF), while satisfying (OF). (It is 
straightforward to show that quantum theory satisfies (OF): in the absence 
of any information about the distant setting, the information regarding the 
actual outcome, ‘up’ or ‘down’, of the distant measurement can have no 
effect on the probabilities for outcomes on the nearby wing.)
So, by applying to Maudlin’s (PI’) and (OF) conditions the very same 
causal interpretation often applied to (PI) and (01), it turns out that quan­
tum theory exhibits causal links between settings and outcomes and no 
causal influences between outcomes. Jarrett and Shimony’s verdict is dra­
matically changed, and peaceful coexistence turns into open war. For, on the 
very reading of (STR)’s constraints that favours (01) over (PI), the viola­
tion of (PF) takes quantum theory into straightforward conflict with (STR). 
Quantum theory now violates precisely the one condition whose failure al­
lows superluminal signalling of the sort we have taken (STR) to prohibit.
The final, and most decisive, objection to Jarrett and Shimony’s argu­
ment is due to Jeremy Butterfield34. Butterfield shows that (STR) does 
not strictly entail (PI). A further assumption is required. Unfortunately for 
Jarrett and Shimony’s argument, given this assumption (STR) entails (01)
34 Butterfield [22]. See also Jones and Clifton [92] for a related criticism.
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as well. Hence, as regards the special theory of relativity (01) and (PI) are 
on a par: together with the further assumption, (STR) entails both; without 
the further assumption, it entails neither.
Butterfield begins by noting that both (01) and (PI) are essentially 
screening off conditions. On the one hand (01) asserts that the conjunc­
tion of a, b and A screens off si from S2 . The settings and the state together 
screen off the outcomes from each other. On the other hand, (PI) contains 
two screening off conditions: first, the conjunction of a and A screens off si 
from b; second, b and A screen off S2 from a. That is, the setting on the one 
wing together with the state, screen off the outcome on that wing from the 
setting in the other.
In section 4.2 I argued that screening off is not a necessary condition on 
common causes. Hence, for instance, taking the conjunction of a, b and A to 
be the common cause of Si and S2 won’t justify (0 1 ) -if the causal relation is 
genuinely probabilistic, the conjunction of a, b and A won’t normally screen 
off. Similarly for (PI): taking a k A (bkA) as the common cause of s\ and b 
(s2 and a) gives no grounds to uphold (PI). Butterfield suggests that we take 
the different conjunctions of a, b and A to constitute indexes for spacetime 
regions, and that we take those regions to constitute the common past of 
the events that get screened off. He then enunciates the following extension 
of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause35:
D efinition 16 (P as t P rescribes S tochastic Independence  (P P S I)) If
two events are correlated, but one does not cause the other, then the proba­
bility distribution prescribed by the total physical state of their common past 
makes them stochastically independent (and so [...] screens them off).
This principle restores screening off as a necessary condition, not on common 
causes, but on the total state of the common past of two correlated, and not 
directly causally connected, events. For instance, as regards the correlated 
outcomes si, $2 on the wings of an EPR experiment, (PPSI) implies that
35 Butterfield [22, page 123].
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either there is a direct causal link between these events or the common past 
of Si and S2 screens them off from each other, as prescribed by (01). If 
we now take (STR) to rule out direct causal influences between the wings, 
we can conclude that the common past screens off, and hence (0 1 ) holds: 
(STR) and (PPSI) together entail (01).
There are two obvious rubs. First: why should the common past screen 
off? This is a subtle issue, and I shall not attempt to treat it in detail 
here. Butterfield makes a compelling case for (PPSI), by showing that in the 
standard macroscopic and classical examples of failure of screening off by the 
putative common cause, there is a region of spacetime that satisfies (PPSI). 
However, quantum theory violates (01) and, if superluminal causation is 
impossible, (PPSI) must be false in the EPR experiment. So, Butterfield 
claims, the fact that (PPSI) fails in the EPR experiment is a truly surprising 
one, and it shows just how deep the revolutionary implications of quantum 
theory go. But here comes the second rub: didn’t we agree that (STR) does 
not rule out superluminal causation? Fortunately it doesn’t matter much 
what interpretation of the relativistic constraints we take here. My purpose, 
following Butterfield, is to show that (PI) is no more entailed by (STR) -on 
its own- than is (01). We may grant, for the sake of argument, the stronger 
interpretation of (STR) as ruling out superluminal causation. It won’t affect 
our conclusions. For if (STR) fails to entail (PI) on this interpretation, it 
can hardly entail it on weaker interpretations.
And indeed (STR) fails to entail (PI). But not if (PPSI) is also assumed. 
Recall what (PI) says: P(sijak.bhX) = P(si/aSz\); the measurement out­
come at ‘1 ’ exhibits no statistical dependence upon the distant setting at ‘2 ’ 
(and similarly for the outcome at ‘2 ’ and the setting at ‘1 ’, but let me con­
sider one case only). Recall also that in Aspect’s experiment the outcomes 
axe spacelike separated from the distant settings. If we then take (STR) to 
rule out superluminal causation, (PI) turns into yet another screening off 
condition. As we noted earlier, there is no reason to expect (PI) to hold, 
even if we take a and A to be the common cause of si and b. There is no 
reason to expect the correlations to wash out conditional on the common
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cause, even in the absence of any direct-cause link. So (STR) does not entail 
(PI). To enforce screening off we need to appeal to a principle like (PPSI): 
only then can we expect the correlations between si and b to vanish when we 
conditionalise on a and A. Hence, (PI) and (01) are on equal grounds with 
respect to (STR). Neither is entailed by (STR) on its own; and both are 
entailed by the conjunction of (STR) and (PPSI). And this is good news for 
the peaceful coexistence of quantum theory and special theory of relativity: 
the failure of (PI) spells no more disaster for peaceful coexistence than does 
the failure of (OI)36.
One final remark. It is now possible to see why I have taken Butterfield’s 
to be a stronger objection than Maudlin’s. Although Maudlin’s objection 
makes Jarrett and Shimony’s argument less plausible, I do not think it 
is a decisive objection. For Maudlin’s conditions are not really on a par 
with parameter and outcome independence. The latter two can be justified 
by means of Butterfield’s (PPSI): in the absence of superluminal causation 
between the wings, and given (PPSI), both (01) and (PI) hold. But, (PPSI) 
cannot be similarly used to make (PI’) plausible. Recall that (PI’) says that 
P {si/bhs2hahX) — P (s i/s2&a$z\), i.e., read as a screening off condition, 
the conjunction of 6 2 , a and A screens off si from b. But it is not possible 
to construe S2, a, A as indexes for the common past of si and b: for in all 
inertial frames of reference b is in the past of 5 2 ! No choice of spacetime 
region is then available to justify Maudlin’s (PI’) condition by means of 
(PPSI).
4.3 .3  A  Q uantum  M echanical M odel
Suppose that there is superluminal causation between the wings of the EPR 
experiment. What kind of information needs to be transmitted? A direct-
36Rather than rejecting (STR), it is always perfectly possible to put the blame, as 
Butterfield does, on (PPSI)’s doorstep. On the other hand, we are not forced to reject 
(PPSI) either. We may instead choose to put the blame on the strong interpretation of 
(STR). This is a plausible way out too, -for it is indeed dubious that (STR) prohibits 
superluminal causation. I take this line in section 4.3.3.
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cause model would have to transmit two types of information directly from 
one wing to the other: information regarding the outcome of a particular 
measurement on a given wing, and information regarding the setting of the 
measurement apparatus on that wing. All the information could be trans­
mitted in one go, at the conclusion of the first measurement interaction on 
either particle. But a model in which all the information is transmitted in 
one go, says the critic, would be against the spirit of both relativity and 
quantum mechanics. For in that case, information regarding the setting of 
the measurement apparatus on the one wing is essential for an accurate cal­
culation of the probabilities for outcomes on the distant wing. In this final 
section, I shall be primarily concerned with the claim that a direct-cause 
model would be in conflict with the spirit of quantum theory. This claim 
has been made explicitly by Arthur Fine37. What would be required, asks 
Fine, to show that there must exist a direct causal link between the wings of 
an EPR experiment? Well, if the denial of the existence of direct links en­
tailed Bell’s inequalities, it would follow from the experimental violation of 
the inequalities that there must be such links. Fine then looks for a ‘locality’ 
principle, the violation of which would entail the existence of superluminal 
influences between the wings. He does not give us a specific principle, but 
he describes part of what such a principle would have to state. Whatever 
its precise content turns out to be, this principle would explicitly deny that 
there are any sort of causal influences between the wings of an EPR exper­
iment; it would deny, for instance that the outcomes of measurements on 
a given wing causally depend upon spacelike separated events in the other 
wing. Thus, if we could show that the Bell inequalities are entailed by this 
principle we would have achieved our aim: we would have shown that there 
must exist causal influences between the wings. On the other hand, as Fine 
notes, if it can be shown that the principle is consistent with the denial of 
the Bell inequalities, our argument would collapse -and we would then never 
be in a position to show that there must exist superluminal causal influences
37Fine [65, pp 183-185].
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between the wings.
According to Fine the quantum theory itself shows that the ‘locality’ 
principle is consistent with the denial of Bell’s inequalities. He writes:
For [the locality principle] is built into the quantum theory, 
according to which there is no influence between the two wings of 
the experiment, that is, no physical interaction of the sort that is 
represented by terms in the Hamiltonian of the composite system 
at the time one or the other component is measured. (Fine [65, 
page 183], my italics).
Fine’s claim is that quantum theory fully subscribes to, and in fact embodies, 
the ‘locality’ principle. And yet, the theory predicts a violation of Bell’s 
inequalities. So the quantum theory itself provides a context in which our 
‘locality’ principle is consistent with the denial of Bell’s inequalities. But 
then our ‘locality’ principle cannot entail the Bell inequalities, and we axe 
left with no positive argument for a direct-cause link between the wings. 
(This does not mean that we have ruled out direct-cause links, but rather 
that we have no hope ever of providing a positive argument for them.)
Note first of all, that Fine’s argument works entirely within quantum 
theory, and makes no appeal to relativity. Fine claims that the quantum 
theory contains no resources to model direct causation between the wings. 
Indeed, for Fine’s argument to work, there must exist no application of the 
quantum theory to the putative phenomenon of direct-causation between the 
wings. Fine thinks that the absence of interaction terms in the Hamiltonian 
of the composite system gives conclusive reasons to believe that there is no 
quantum treatment of direct-cause links.
Can there be no quantum treatment of direct-cause links? I shall now 
outline the very basic elements of a direct-cause model for the EPR correla­
tions built together with Nancy Cartwright38. The model postulates carriers 
which transmit causal influence between the wings. Each particle has an as­
sociated carrier, with a quantum state of its own. When a measurement is
38 Cartwright and Suarez [35].
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performed on one particle, a stochastic outcome results, with correspond­
ing Born probability; and the associated carrier is released. This carrier 
attaches itself to the partner particle in the opposite wing. The dynamics 
for the interaction between a particle and a carrier is governed by a specific 
rule of evolution of the particle/carrier composite system, which we have to 
add to the quantum formalism. This dynamics is unitary, so the evolution 
of the particle/carrier system is purely quantum mechanical -subsequent 
measurements on the partner particle will not result in stochastic outcomes, 
but will reveal spin values possessed by the particle before measurement. 
This model replicates the quantum mechanical statistics, including the con­
ditional probabilities at the heart of the EPR correlations.
Is this model ruled out by special relativity? I do not think so. In 
this model the transmission of causal influence is instantaneous between the 
wings in the rest frame of the laboratory. This gives us two options. The 
first is outright conflict with (STR). This would be the case if the process 
of causal transmission was used to pick out a preferred frame. We could 
then assert that the process of causal transmission in an EPR experiment 
is always instantaneous in some particular, privileged frame, and decline 
(STR)’s invitation to consider the physical situation from the point of view 
of any other inertial frames. The second option is to insist that relativity 
must hold. The principle of relativity then requires that no differences in the 
physical laws or mechanisms in this situation must result from mere changes 
of inertial frame description. All physical laws and mechanisms should be 
the same from the point of view of all Lorentz invariant frames. Suppose 
that we make a measurement on particle “2” first. Consider the frame in 
which particle “1 ” is at rest (this is a valid inertial frame only if the first 
particle travels at infraluminal speed, of course, i.e. if it is not a photon.) 
As described in that frame, the causal transmission is not instantaneous, 
but has finite superluminal speed. There is no conflict with the principle of 
relativity, though: the order of events is unchanged, and so are the mecha­
nisms that generate the correct EPR statistics. However, consider now the 
same measurement process as described in the rest frame of particle “2 ”.
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The carrier is received at particle “l ”s end before it is ejected as a result of 
a measurement on particle “2”: the effect precedes the cause39. The direct- 
cause model is com m itted  to the cogency of backwards causation. This is 
perhaps not surprising. Indeed this is also a consequence of other causal 
models of the EPR correlations -such as, for instance, the zigzag model 
of Costa de Beauregard40. No matter: conflict with (STR) is nonetheless 
averted.
The direct-cause model constitutes a further illustration of the profound 
differences between the structure of application and the structure of empiri­
cal adequacy. To resolve difficulties with empirical adequacy, we expand the 
set of structures that the theory makes available; adding structure to the 
phenomena seems hopeless in this case. But to resolve conflicts of applica­
tion, adding phenomena may well help, as is the case with this direct-cause 
model of EPR. Instead of relaxing some of the constraints on the quantum 
theory to let new structures in -such as for instance introducing new in­
teraction terms in the Hamiltonian of the composite-, the model postulates 
further phenomenological structure, in the form of carriers that transmit the 
causal influence between the wings. These carriers are modelled as quan-
39A reinterpretation principle is also generally available for tachyons, but I do not think 
that it works here. The reinterpretation principle states that a tachyon travelling back­
wards, i.e. one emitted in the future and received in the past, can always be interpreted 
as a tachyon with negative energy travelling forwards in time. The problems usually as­
sociated with the reinterpretation principle have to do with negative energies: any system  
could increase its energy infinitely by emitting infinitely many negative energy tachyons. 
However, the direct-cause model does not assume that carriers must transport energy, so 
this problem does not arise. But there is another problem. One would have to suppose that 
it was particle “1” which originally emitted the carrier, rather than particle “2”. But one 
of the assumptions of this thought-experiment is that the measurement is made on particle 
“2” not “1”. Hence, according to the description in the rest flame of “2” the carrier is 
ejected by particle “1” even if no measurement is ever made on it. This would constitute 
a violation of the relativity principle: some physical process (spontaneous carrier-release) 
is describable in rest-frame “2” but not in “1”.
40 Costa de Beauregard [42].
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turn objects themselves, and they are ascribed a quantum state. It is then 
possible to provide a theoretical law that represents the physical interaction 
between particles and carriers.
The overall methodology in this case of theory-application is as follows. 
First we postulate further phenomenological structure -hence making the 
theory even more grossly empirically inadequate. But it then becomes pos­
sible to ‘adapt’ the theory, by introducing a new operational law. From the 
point of view of the theory, the introduction of this new law looks ad hoc - it  
looks as a device for simply saving the phenomena-; and hence this move 
yields no confirmatory boost for the theory. But from the point of view of 
the newly postulated phenomena, the introduction of this law is justified by 
the fact that the carriers are modelled as quantum objects. It then becomes 
possible to apply the quantum theory to the EPR experiment, in order to 
provide a direct-cause model of the correlations.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have focused on some more typical quantum phenomena, 
namely the correlations between spin values of entangled pairs of particles 
first described by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. In the first section, in order 
to set the scene, I review the EPR correlations, and I introduce the condi­
tions of factorizability, outcome and parameter independence. In the second 
section, I address Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause and Van 
Fraassen’s allied argument against common-cause models of the EPR cor­
relations. I argue, following Cartwright, that Van Fraassen’s analysis does 
not cut ice against genuinely probabilistic common-cause models of the EPR 
correlations. For, in those cases, Reichenbach’s conditions are too limited 
and need to be appropriately extended. And although the EPR correlations 
fail to fit the original Reichenbach conditions, they fit the extended condi­
tions for probabilistic causes very accurately; a common-cause model of the 
EPR correlations is then possible. In the third and final section, I look at the 
arguments against direct-cause models of the EPR correlations. I consider
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briefly, and reject, arguments from relativity theory. Then I take on Arthur 
Fine’s objection to direct-cause models. Fine has argued that the quantum 
theory itself rules out such direct-cause explanations: no consistent applica­
tion of the quantum theory can be found that describes such direct-causal 
links between the EPR particles. I argue that, to the contrary, it is possible 
to construct a quantum mechanical model of the putative direct-cause links 
operating in the EPR experiment.
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